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CASE NO. SPOT0500155 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, provides notice of hearing on his Motion for 
Pennission to Appeal. The hearing shall be held before the Honorable Thomas F. Neville, 200 
W. Front Street, Boise, Idaho, at a date and time yet to be detennined by the Court and the 
parties. j.,. 
DATED this 1'!J day of August, 2007. 
PAULAM. SWENSEN 
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
01007 
NOTICE OF HEARING Page 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of August, 2007, served a true and correct 
copy of the attached NOTICE OF HEARING by the method indicated below: 
/ 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL X U.S. Mail 
INMATE # 33835 Statehouse Mail 
--IMSI Facsimile 
--
POBOX 51 __ Hand Delivery 
BOISE ID 83707 
ROGER BOURNE U.S. Mail 
--
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE Statehouse Mail 
--
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 Facsimile 




CLU Administrative Assistant 
01008 
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RECEIVED 
AUG 272007 
Ada County Clerk 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 2127 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Phone: 287-7700 
Fax: 287-7709 
AUG 2 7 2007 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByJ BLACK 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, Case No. SPOT0500155 
vs. 










STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS 
Respondent, 
----------------------------) 
COMES NOW, Roger Bourne, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of 
Ada, State of Idaho, and responds to the petitioner's request for admissions as follows. 
The petitioner seeks an admission from the State that a Boise Police Report, DR # 
026815 describing Norma Jean Oliver's arrest as a runaway on November 18, 1990, over a year 
prior to the defendant's Rape charge, was not provided as part of discovery in the Henneman 
murder case State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. H0300518. The State admits that that police 
report was not provided as part of discovery in the murder case. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS (HALL), Page 1 01009 
Similarly, the petitioner seeks an admission from the State that two other police reports 
under DR # 127-536 and 127-686, which both describe Norma Jean Oliver's arrests as a runaway 
on December 2 and 3, 1991, were not provided as part of discovery in the underlying murder 
case. It appears to the State that those reports were not provided as part of discovery. 
However, the State denies that any of the above-referenced police reports are subject to 
discovery. The State denies that there is any impeachment value or other exculpatory value to 
the police reports themselves nor their contents. The State denies that the reports are relevant or 
material in any respect. 
Post conviction counsel has observed that the State redacted the date of birth used by Ms. 
Oliver in her November 1990 contact with the police under DR # 026815. Counsel has asked 
that date of birth be provided. That date of birth i
Petitioner's counsel has asked the State to review the two tape recordings of 
conversations between Detective Hess and Norma Jean Oliver and the petitioner made on 
December 4, 1991. The State observes that the two tape recordings in the possession of the 
Prosecutor's Office appear to be copies of the originals. The Ada County Prosecutor's Office is 
not in possession of the originals, but only those copies. As reported earlier, it appears that the 
Garden City Police Department purged the original rape file sometime after the conviction and 
no longer has the original recordings. The copies that the Ada County Prosecutor's Office has 
are available for petitioner's counsel to review. 
1lf. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2r day of August 2007. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecutor 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's 
Response to Request for Admissions to the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 3647 Lake 
Harbor Lane, Boise, Idaho 83703 by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid, this t1ay of August 2007. 
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, I.S.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 












Case No. SPOT0500155 
MOTION FOR EXPERT 
ACCESS TO PETITIONER 
(Capital Case) 
Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at the State Appellate 
Public Defender's Office, moves this Honorable Court to order the Twin Falls County Adult 
Detention Facility to grant Dr. James Merikangas of Bethesda, Maryland, access to Petitioner in 
a quiet and confidential setting suitable for interview, testing, and evaluation. Petitioner moves 
that such access be granted on Thursday, September 13, 2007 from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. In the event 
that Petitioner is transported back to the Ada County Jail prior to the time set for access, 
Petitioner moves in the alternative for the Court to order the Ada County Jail to grant access to 
Dr. Merikangas, under the same conditions, on either Thursday, September 13, 2007 from 6 p.m. 
to 9 p.m. or Friday, September 14, 2007 from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m., depending on the 
Petitioner's physical location, and the Court's jury selection schedule in Case No. H0300624. 
Petitioner further moves that his hands be unrestrained for the testing, as deemed necessary by 
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Dr. Merikangas.1 Undersigned co-counsel has discussed the visit with the State's representative, 
Roger Bourne, who stated he had no objection to Petitioner's request. 
This request is necessary to develop Petitioner's claim that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately investigate and present evidence of Mr. 
Hail's neurological and mental deficits and/or illness. See Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief, Claim S.4, pp.160-163. Dr. Merikangas has had one previous visit with Petitioner at the 
Idaho Maximum Security Institution ("IMSr'). However, Petitioner was not provided a "quiet 
and confidential setting necessary to a thorough examination. See Attachment A (Affidavit of Dr. 
James Merikangas, dated April 13, 2006, pA (filed as Exhibit 26 to the Amended Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief, and stating that " ... a psychiatric interview in a confidential setting is 
also indicated to further elucidate a psychiatric diagnosis as [Erick] was unable to be frank, open 
and forthcoming in the presence of his jail guards.") 
Moreover, recent brain scans conducted on Petitioner and reviewed by Dr. Merikangas 
definitively show neurological damage, which supports the need for the additional visit to 
complete the neuron-psychiatric examination with questions specifically related to the results of 
the scans, conducted under appropriately confidential conditions. 
This motion is made pursuant to I.C. §§ 19-4001, et seq., and 19-870 and the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and it is based upon all 
matters of record. 
1 Dr. Merikangas and any accompanying SAPD personnel will, of course, submit any required 
liability waivers to the appropriate jail personnel. 
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Lead Counsel, Capital Liti . n Unit 
2 /, ;I 
lald 1k fJA~~~ 
PAULAM. SWENSEN 
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER PAGE 301014 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. !ID I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this U- day of September, 2007, served a true 
and correct copy of the forgoing MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER as 
indicated below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
POBOX 51 
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Case No. SPOT0500155 V· 
Petitioner, 
v. 
ORDER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT 
OF HEARING HELD IN ADA COUNTY 
CASE NO. HCRl8591 




In accordance with this Court's decision granting the petitioner's request for certain 
records, and the Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that ¥a;:ssa ~tan, CUBit R;ef'l"Z(e l 611 (he HI IIiIlIaltlc Ijie! 
J4.- n. ij tI lI, PlO; iete to PetitiOhCi in tne ili'lts' lil 1 : 2I~ a certified transcript of the hearing held on 
~
October 28,2003, in the case of State v. Hall, Ada County Case No. HCR18591X Said transcript 
shall be provided to Petitioner's counsel as follows: 
Mr. Mark J. Ackley 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
Capital Litigation Unit 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this {2~ay of ~~1 ,2007. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
HELD IN ADA COUNTY CASE NO. HCR18591 
01016 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this l} day of ~007, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
HELD IN ADA COUNTY CASE NO. HCRl8591 by method indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR 
BOISE ID 83702 
ORDER TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
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By' J. O~O~rtr 
Petitioner, 
Case No. SPOT0500155 ~'L~ 
ORDER TO CONDUCT 
v. MEDICAL TESTING 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. (CAPITAL CASE) 
Upon motion of Petitioner, lack of objection from Respondent, and the Court otherwise 
being fully advised: 
.~~~/ 
IT IS ORDERED that the Twin Fall~ion Facility shall allow Dr. JfA 
James R. Merikangas of Bethesda, Maryland, to visit with Erick Virgil Hall, on September 13, 
2007 from 8 p.m. to 10 p.m. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner be provided a quiet and confidential 
\ c~~.:rt ..frc~-V 
setting, which is suitable for neurological interview and evaluation, aIiJVPetifloiief'S hands shall 
be unrestrained for any portions of the interview or testing, as deemed necessary by Dr. 
Merikangas. Petitioner's attorneys and agents will submit any requisite liability waivers prior to 
the visit. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this 'Z ~ay of September, 2007. 
Honorable Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER I 
01018 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this \}"f'1"day of September, 2007, served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER as indicated 
below: 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE, ID 83703 334- ~q~{ 
GARY RANEY, SHERIFF 
ADA COUNTY JAIL 
7210 BARRISTER DRIVE 
BOISE, ID 83704 
ADA COUNTY MARSHAL'S DEPT. 
200 W. FRONT STREET, ROOM 4193 
BOISE, ID 83702 . 
Twin ~l(S Co· S~ 
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GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Bourne 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 2127 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
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Case No. SPOT0500155 
COURT'S ORDER DENYING 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
JUROR CONTACT 
The petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys, the State Appellate Public 
Defender's Office, has moved this Court for unrestricted access to the jurors who found the 
petitioner guilty of Rape, Kidnapping and First Degree Murder and determined a sentence of 
death for murdering Lynn Henneman. The petitioner supported his motion for juror contact with 
a memorandum filed June 1, 2007. The memorandum sets out the petitioner's view of the law 
and also details the specific questions that the petitioner would ask of each of the named jurors. 
COURT'S ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUROR CONTACT 
(HALL), Page 1 
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On July 9, 2007, the State filed a written objection to the petitioner's motion for 
unrestricted access to the jurors citing case law and Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b). 
The Court heard argument from the parties on the motion on August 8, 2007. Based upon 
the briefing done by the parties, together with argument and the Court being otherwise fully 
informed, the Court denies the petitioner's motion for access to the jurors for the reasons set out 
below. 
To begin with, the Court finds that the issue of access to jurors is part of discovery and as 
such, is within the sound discretion of the Court. The Court has earlier ruled on the petitioner's 
motion for discovery and has held that requests for discovery are only granted to the extent that 
they are necessary to protect the substantial rights of the petitioner and that the request must be 
related to a specific claim in the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. A request for discovery 
cannot be simply a "fishing expedition." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397 (Ct. App. 1999). 
An allegation based simply on speculation should not justify the granting of a discovery motion. 
Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602 (S. Ct. 2001). 
The Court finds that the claims made by the petitioner relating to possible jury 
misconduct are made without factual support. The petitioner makes no effort to support his 
claims with any objective or observable conduct. For instance, the petitioner has not included 
evidence from bailiffs, marshals, the sheriffs office transport team, court clerks or court 
reporters, or any other persons who were in a position to observe the jury, to give the slightest 
indication that the jurors were involved in misconduct or that they violated the Court's 
instructions. The Court specifically instructed the jury that they were only to consider "evidence 
admitted at trial." Opening instructions Tf. pg 3404. The Court instructed the jury that: 
COURT'S ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUROR CONTACT 
(HALL), Page 2 
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You should keep an open mind throughout the trial and not form or 
express an opinion about the case. You should only reach your decision 
after you have heard all of the evidence, after you have heard my final 
instructions and after the final arguments. Opening instructions Tr. pg 
3407. 
The Court also instructed the jury as follows: 
Fourth, during this trial do not make any investigation of this case or 
inquire outside the courtroom on your own. Do not go to any place 
mentioned in the testimony without an explicit order from me to do so. 
You must not consult any books, dictionaries, encyclopedias, or any other 
source of information unless I specifically authorize you to do so. Tr. pg 
3408 - 3409. 
The Court is satisfied that the jury was properly instructed and the Court has no reason to 
think that the jury did not follow those instructions. Therefore, the Court knows of no reason to 
permit questioning of the jury in these areas for what would only amount to a "fishing 
expedition." 
The petitioner argued that Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b) is nothing more than an 
"admissibility rule" as it related to testimony or affidavits from jurors. The Court rejects that 
view and finds that Idaho case law has interpreted Idaho Rule of Evidence 606(b) as a prohibition 
on testimony from jurors about their verdicts except in the following limited circumstances: 
1. When extraneous, prejudicial information was improperly brought to the 
jury's attention; 
2. Outside influence was improperly brought to bear on a juror; or 
3. The verdict was determined by resort to chance. State v. Webster, 123 
Idaho 233 (Ct. App. 1993). 
The Court of Appeals made a similar holding in State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629 (Ct. App. 
2001). From those cases and others, the Court finds that LR.E. 606(b) among other purposes, 
serves to protect jurors from "post trial inquiry or harassment." Levinger v. Mercy Medical 
Center, 139 Idaho 192 (S. Ct. 2003). This Rule then clearly is more than an "admissibility rule." 
COURT'S ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUROR CONTACT 
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During the hearing on the petitioner's motion, the Court ruled specifically on each of the 
areas of inquiry contemplated by the petitioner. The Court incorporates by reference its ruling 
from the bench on that motion, from August 8, 2007, including its findings of fact and 
conclusions oflaw, as if set forth fully herein. 
For the reasons set out above, together with the reasons articulated by the Court on the 
record, the petitioner's motion for unrestricted access to the jurors is denied. AND IT IS SO 
i-t. 
ORDERED this (3 -day of September, 2007. 
THOMAS F. NEVILLE 
District Judge 
COURT'S ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR JUROR CONTACT 
(HALL), Page 4 
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Case No. SPOT0500155 
Petitioner, 8Y-J,,::::6:\r\o'~~~~:::::':== 
ORDER TO RELEASE RE 
v. OF NORMA JEAN OLIVE 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Respondent. 
In accordance with this Court's decision at a hearing held on August 8, 2007, and the 
Court otherwise being fully informed that records in possession of the Social Security 
Administration may contain documents relevant to these capital post-conviction proceedings, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Social Security Administration, Suite 101, 1249 S. 
Vinnell, Boise, Idaho 83709, shall release all records included in the Social Security 
Administration's file for Norma Jean Oliver, DOB SSN  Said 
records shall be limited to the following time frame: 1991 through 2004. 
This Court will review such documents in camera for a determination of relevance before 
providing copies to the respective parties. Accordingly, said records shall be sent. ~~ -k ~ 
'h. ~~.~~~Aq.~~~7J7.001~: 
(J I~ Honorable Thomas F. Neville 
200 W. Front Street) S71i3 .. ~ (00 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
#'A Dated this ( g - day of September, 2007. 
~ ,. Inn. ///~ 
THOMAs F. NEVILLE 
District Judge, Ada County 
ORDER TO RELEASE RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 1 
01024 
" . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J1 day of September, 2007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO RELEASE RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
by method indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR 








__ Hand Delivery 
ORDER TO RELEASE RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 2 
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Case No. SPOT0500 1 ~_J_. r-F~~~,=::::::::.Ie==rk==-
Petitioner, 
ORDER TO RELEASE M CAL 
v. AND PSYCHOLOGICALIPSYCHIATRIC 
RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Respondent. 
In accordance with this Court's decision granting the petitioner's request for certain 
records, and the Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Margaret Farmer release all reports, notes, and other 
documents relating to the medical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment or counseling of 
Norma Jean Oliver, DO  for the following years: 1991, 1992,2003,2004. 
This order includes the release of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Medical Records, which are 
protected by the Federal confidentiality rules set forth in 42 C.F.R. Chap.1, Part 2, Subpart C 
2.32. This order, in accordance with federal confidentiality laws, prohibits the further disclosure 
of such records unless such further disclosure is expressly ordered pursuant to 42 C.F.R. Chap. 1, 
Part 2. This information cannot be used for the purpose of criminally investigating or 
prosecuting Ms. Oliver for activities relating to her alcohol or drug abuse records. 
The information authorized for release may indicate the presence of a communicable 
disease or venereal disease which may include, but is not limited to, diseases such as hepatitis, 
syphilis, gonorrhea, or the human immunodeficiency virus, also known as acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
1 
01026 
This order specifically requires the release of medical, psychological and psychiatric 
information. 
Said records shall be '_'" ~~ ;..~~ o..t-;U..~Q ....... ,. 
(!~~ ~~~~trP7) 2007 ~: 
Honorable Thomas F. Nevi Ie 
200 W. Front Street) 5rt=.5fOO 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this (3 tRday of .~ ,2007. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
2 
01027 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this J.i day of ~~~~';W07, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICALIPSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER by method 
indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR 








__ Hand Delivery 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
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Case No. SPOT05 0015 5 By.--:::t-~::.::::;~~===:::::::::-= 
ORDER TO RELEASE MED AL 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC 
RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Respondent. 
In accordance with this Court's decision granting the petitioner's request for certain 
records, and the Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dr. Lamar Heyrend release all reports, notes, and 
other documents relating to the medical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment or counseling 
of Norma Jean Oliver, DO , for the following years: 1991, 1992,2003,2004. 
This order includes the release of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Medical Records, which are 
protected by the Federal confidentiality rules set forth in 42 C.F.R. Chap.1, Part 2, Subpart C 
2.32. This order, in accordance with federal confidentiality laws, prohibits the further disclosure 
of such records unless such further disclosure is expressly ordered pursuant to 42 C.F.R. Chap. 1, 
Part 2. This information cannot be used for the purpose of criminally investigating or 
prosecuting Ms. Oliver for activities relating to her alcohol or drug abuse records. 
The information authorized for release may indicate the presence of a communicable 
disease or venereal disease which may include, but is not limited to, diseases such as hepatitis, 
syphilis, gonorrhea, or the human immunodeficiency virus, also known as acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/ 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
1 
01029 
This order specifically requires the release of medical, psychological and psychiatric 
information. 
Said rec.ords shall be. LOS~~"~ ~w ~~ 
~.At-<.?,~  : _____ 2:1~ 2.cU' .~: 
Honorable Thomas F. Neville 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this (B f%ay of ~, 2007. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
2 
{)1030 
, .. ' . ) 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Jl day of ~007' I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO LEASE MEDICAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER by method 
indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR 




__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail I Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
0103f 
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8y--,~-.,;;..;::;..;:;..-====~=..;;;;...;..._ J~NCase No. SPOT0500155  
Petitioner, 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL 
v. AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC 
RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Respondent. 
In accordance with this Court's decision granting the petitioner's request for certain 
records, and the Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Intermountain Hospital release all reports, notes, and 
other documents relating to the medical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment or counseling 
of Norma Jean Oliver, DO , for the following years: 1991, 1992,2003,2004. 
This order includes the release of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Medical Records, which are 
protected by the Federal confidentiality rules set forth in 42 C.F.R. Chap. 1 , Part 2, Subpart C 
2.32. This order, in accordance with federal confidentiality laws, prohibits the further disclosure 
of such records unless such further disclosure is expressly ordered pursuant to 42 C.F .R. Chap. 1, 
Part 2. This information cannot be used for the purpose of criminally investigating or 
prosecuting Ms. Oliver for activities relating to her alcohol or drug abuse records. 
The information authorized for release may indicate the presence of a communicable 
disease or venereal disease which may include, but is not limited to, diseases such as hepatitis, 
syphilis, gonorrhea, or the human immunodeficiency virus, also known as acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/ 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
1 
01032 
This order specifically requires the release of medical, psychological and psychiatric 
information. 
ora e omas F. NevIle 
200 W. Front Street J 57£.5<00 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this (3 @.day of ~ ,2007. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
2 
01033 
,. ., I 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ji day of h~007' I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER T ELEASE MEDICAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER by method 
indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR 




__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
. Statehouse Mail 
~Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/ 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
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J~ Case No. SPOT05001§~ ~ 
Petitioner, 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL 
v. AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC 
RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Respondent. 
In accordance with this Court's decision granting the petitioner's request for certain 
records, and the Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Dr. Lawrence Vickman release all reports, notes, and 
other documents relating to the medical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment or counseling 
of Norma Jean Olive , for the following years: 1991, 1992,2003,2004. 
This order includes the release of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Medical Records, which are 
protected by the Federal confidentiality rules set forth in 42 C.F.R. Chap.1, Part 2, Subpart C 
2.32. This order, in accordance with federal confidentiality laws, prohibits the further disclosure 
of such records unless such further disclosure is expressly ordered pursuant to 42 C.F .R. Chap. 1, 
Part 2. This information cannot be used for the purpose of criminally investigating or 
prosecuting Ms. Oliver for activities relating to her alcohol or drug abuse records. 
The information authorized for release may indicate the presence of a communicable 
disease or venereal disease which may include, but is not limited to, diseases such as hepatitis, 
syphilis, gonorrhea, or the human immunodeficiency virus, also known as acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/ 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
1 
This order specifically requires the release of medical, psychological and psychiatric 
information. 
Said records shall be !flit" ~~~ J--IA ~~o::t:-+e.-.La&a. ~ 
~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ 2-1) ZUd7~: 
Honorable Thomas F. Neville 
200 W. Front Street, S rE. 5(00 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Datedthis r3~dayof ~,2007. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of ~007, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICALIPSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER by method 
indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR 




__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
----r Statehouse Mail 
v--. Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
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Case No. SPOT0500155 8Y-41'-F~~~~::: 
Petitioner, 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL 
v. AND PSYCHOLOGICALIPSYCHIA TRIC 
RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Respondent. 
In accordance with this Court's decision granting the petitioner's request for certain 
records, and the Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that St. Alphonsus Hospital release all reports, notes, and 
other documents relating to the medical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment or counseling 
of Norma Jean Oliver, DO 4, for the following years: 1991, 1992,2003,2004. 
This order includes the release of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Medical Records, which are 
protected by the Federal confidentiality rules set forth in 42 C.F.R. Chap.!, Part 2, Subpart C 
2.32. This order, in accordance with federal confidentiality laws, prohibits the further disclosure 
of such records unless such further disclosure is expressly ordered pursuant to 42 C.F .R. Chap. 1, 
Part 2. This information cannot be used for the purpose of criminally investigating or 
prosecuting Ms. Oliver for activities relating to her alcohol or drug abuse records. 
The information authorized for release may indicate the presence of a communicable 
disease or venereal disease which may include, but is not limited to, diseases such as hepatitis, 
syphilis, gonorrhea, or the human immunodeficiency virus, also known as acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
1 
01038 
This order specifically requires the release of medical, psychological and psychiatric 
information. 
Said records shall be S? t ie.~;eei§r~ .. ~ ~ /11\.a~~ 
~1c2..7,ZooI ~: 
Honorable Thothas F. Neville 
200 W. Front Street) SrE. S(oO 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this '3 t0aay of ~, 2007. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
2 
01039 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of b~07, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER by method 
indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR 
BOISE ID 83702 
U.S. Mail 
~ Statehouse Mail 
r- Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
---:-t- Statehouse Mail 
\)L Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/ 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
01040 
3 
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S:? 1 32007 












Case No. SPOT0500155 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC 
RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
(CAPITAL CASE) 
Respondent. 
In accordance with this Court's decision granting the petitioner's request for certain 
records, and the Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Bonnie Pitman release all reports, notes, and other 
documents relating to the medical, psychological, and psychiatric treatment or counseling of 
Norma Jean Oliver, DO 4, for the following years: 1991, 1992,2003,2004. 
This order includes the release of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Medical Records, which are 
protected by the Federal confidentiality rules set forth in 42 C.F.R. Chap.!, Part 2, Subpart C 
2.32. This order, in accordance with federal confidentiality laws, prohibits the further disclosure 
of such records unless such further disclosure is expressly ordered pursuant to 42 C.F.R. Chap. 1, 
Part 2. This information cannot be used for the purpose of criminally investigating or 
prosecuting Ms. Oliver for activities relating to her alcohol or drug abuse records. 
The information authorized for release may indicate the presence of a communicable 
disease or venereal disease which may include, but is not limited to, diseases such as hepatitis, 
syphilis, gonorrhea, or the human immunodeficiency virus, also known as acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS). 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL/ 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
0104f 
This order specifically requires the release of medical, psychological and psychiatric 
information. 
Said records shall be stiM i@1 ~ ~ J-.~ ccl::-~O&.e.. ~~ 
~N\..C .~~ ~'td-1)u:.of '£1: 
Honorable Thomas F. NevIlle 
200 W. Front Street J S(E- 5(00 
Boise, Idaho 83702-7300 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this (3 tfaayof ~ , 2007. 
Thomas F. Neville 
District Judge 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 
PSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER 
2 
0"1042 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of ~~007' I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND 
PSYCHOLOGICALIPSYCHIATRIC RECORDS OF NORMA JEAN OLIVER by method 
indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W FRONT STEET 3RD FLOOR 




__ Hand Delivery 
U.S. Mail 
Statehouse Mail £ Facsimile 
__ Hand Delivery 
ORDER TO RELEASE MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL! 




GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
Roger Boume 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Idaho State Bar No. 2127 
200 West Front Street, Room 3191 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL [ISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 












Case No. SFOT0500155 
ORDER GltANTING IN PART 




The petitioner requests documents from several agencIes and depositions in his 
supplemental motion for discovt.'TY. The Court took up the motion ane heard argument by both 
sides on August 8, 2007. Based upon the briefing done by the parties} argument and the Court 
being otherwise fully informed, the Court orders as follows: 
The Court grants the motion for No~~~ds from st. Alphonsus 
HOSP~~~h~~)~'~~) 
~~)o..v-& ~4J~ ~ (<t'll~ (9«2.. o...v-cl~ 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PETITIONER'S 
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR DISCOVERY (HALL), Page 1 
01044 
fmfB hrttHPOwuaiR Uogpgal am H~£ll &8: 19911 ad aiso from 2003 aJJd 2004. The Court will ~ 
require that those records be delivered to the Court for in-camera inspl~tion. The Court will 
determine whether any of the records contain material relevant to claims Inade by the petitioner in 
his Petition for Post Conviction Relief. 
The Court grants the petitioner's motion for an order permitting a subpoena to be sent to the 
Social Security Administration for Norma Jean Oliver's social security records relating to her 
mental health. The Court grants that order for all of her mental health records up through 2004. 
Those records must also be delivered to the Court for in-camera inspectiOlL. The Court will release 
any records that it appears are relevant to claims made by the petitioner. 
The Court grants the petitioner's request for an order directing Payotte County to deliver any 
records of juvenile prosecutions against Norma Jean Oliver from 1990 and 1991. Those records are 
to be delivered to the Court for in camera inspection. The Court will releru:e any records that appear 
to be relevant to a claim made by the petitioner. 
~fh., ~o-«Q I). ~ 
The Court grants the petitioner's motion for a transcnpt of the he8Iiil OIlthequestion oftbe d"k 
release of the Pre-Sentence Investigation Report from the defendant's 199] Rape conviction. 
The Court grants the petitioner's motion for the release of April Sebastian's Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report. However, that report will be reviewed by the Court in-camera and only 
portions of that report will be rele:ased to the extent that they are relevant t;) any claims made by the 
petitioner. 
The Court grants the stipulated order for the release of certain iten IS on Wesley Allan Dodd 
that are currently being held by the sheriffs office in Clark County, Washilgton. 
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN P1I..RT PETITIONER'S 




MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. #4843 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, LS.B. # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
(208) 334-2712 
~~=:::=::=FI:'LEO;;:p.M:-ri '1"'];"'-m"'-', r-
OCT 0 1 2007 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByA.GARDEN 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 













Case No. SPOT0500155 
MOTION FOR FRAGILE-X 
BLOODTEST 
(Capital Case) 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, ERICK VIRGIL HALL, by and through his attorneys at 
the State Appellate Public Defender's Office, and respectfully request this Court to order Ada 
County Jail to conduct a blood draw of Petitioner and send it to Annette K. Taylor, M.S., Ph.D., 
Kimball Genetics, Inc., 101 University Boulevard, Suite 330, Denver, CO 80206 for Fragile-X 
testing. Kimball Genetics will send all necessary materials and instructions to the Ada County 
Jail. 
Respondent, by and through Mr. Roger Bourne, has informed undersigned counsel that 
the State has no objection to this motion. Petitioner is aware that trial counsel in the Hanlon case 
has filed a similar motion. 
0-1047 
MOTION FOR FRAGILE-X BLOOD TEST PAGE 1 
This request is necessary to develop Petitioner's claim that trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to adequately investigate and present evidence of 
either Mr. Hall's neurological and mental deficits, or mental illness or both. See Amended 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Claim S.4, pp.160-163. This motion is made pursuant to the 
Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and it is 
based upon all matters of record. 
Petitioner was examined and recently re-examined by Dr. James Merikangas and, based 
on his neurological findings and a childhood diagnosis of mild mental retardation, he 
recommended Erick Hall be tested for Fragile-X syndrome. This syndrome is a genetic disorder 
caused by mutation of the FMRI gene on the X chromosome. Fragile-X impacts behavior in 
several different ways; in males it can include attention deficit disorders, aggression, speech 
disturbances, mood disorder, panic episodes, hand biting, autistic behaviors, low IQ, poor eye 
contact, and unusual responses to various stimuli. Petitioner has exhibited many of these 
symptoms throughout his life; however, he has never been tested for this syndrome. If present, 
Fragile-X syndrome would have provided powerful mitigating evidence of a genetic defect 
affecting Mr. Hall's perceptions and behaviors. 
The testing itself will be simple to arrange. Petitioner requires only that the Ada County 
Jail conduct the appropriate blood draw and send the samples by overnight mail (eg. Federal 
Express) to: Annette K. Taylor, M.S., Ph.D., Kimball Genetics, Inc., 101 University Boulevard, 
Suite 330, Denver, CO 80206. The lab will make all arrangements for the test, the expenses for 
which will be incurred by the State Appellate Public Defender. The lab will provide full 
instructions to the jail concerning the procedures of sending the blood draw. Because time is of 
the essence, Petitioner request the sample be taken and shipped as soon as possible. 
CONCLUSION 
MOTION FOR FRAGILE-X BLOOD TEST 
01048 
PAGE 2 
Petitioner exhibited clear indications of neurological and mental deficits, or mental illness 
or both, yet trial counsel failed to investigate the issue or conduct neurological testing. Because 
the completion of this test is necessary and material to the adequate development of critical 
issues of neurological and mental health relating to ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth 
in the Amended Petition, this Court should allow the necessary medical testing, the results of 
which will support this claim. 
l ~t Dated this __ day of October, 2007. 
MOTION FOR FRAGILE-X BLOOD TEST 
Respectfully submitted; 
PAULA M. SWENSEN 
Co-Counsel, Capital Litigation Unit 
0:1049 
PAGE 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this _ day of October, 2007, served a true and 
correct copy of the forgoing MOTION FOR EXPERT ACCESS TO PETITIONER as 
indicated below: 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 
BOISE ID 83702 
ERICK VIRGIL HALL 
INMATE # 33835 
IMSI 
PO BOX 51 
BOISE ID 83707 
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By 1". J.~~~ 
Case No. SPOT0500155 OEPUTY 
Petitioner, 
ORDER TO CONDUCT 
v. FRAGILE-X BLOOD TEST 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. (CAPITAL CASE) 
----------------------------) 
Motion having been made and Court otherwise being fully informed, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Ada County Jail conduct a blood draw of 
Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, and send to: Annette K. Taylor, M.S., Ph.D., Kimball Genetics, 
Inc., 101 University Boulevard, Suite 330, Denver, CO 80206 for Fragile-X testing. Kimball 
Genetics will send all necessary materials and instructions to the Ada County Jail. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the results of the testing be forwarded to Dr. 
Merikangas at 4938 Hampden Lane, #428, Bethesda, Maryland 20814, to be kept by him in 
accordance with the privileges attendant to doctor/patient and attorney/client unless otherwise 
requested by Petitioner, through his attorneys of record, or as ordered by the Court. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated this 2 day of C9 <!J-o.{!:ALn- , 2007. 
ORDER FOR FRAGILE-X TESTING 
~~~ 
F~ . 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this .3- day of ~007, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER TO CONDUCT MEDICAL TESTING AND ORDER 
TO TRANSPORT by method indicated below to: 
MARK ACKLEY 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
3647 LAKE HARBOR LANE 
BOISE ID 83703 
ROGER BOURNE 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
200 W. FRONT, SUITE 3191 








__ Hand Delivery 
~~ D ut Clerk 
ORDER FOR FRAGILE-X TESTING 
0"1052 
2 
MOLLY J. HUSKEY, I.S.B. # 4843 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
MARK J. ACKLEY, I.S.B. # 6330 
PAULA M. SWENSEN, ISB # 6722 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defenders 
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COMES NOW the Petitioner, Erick Virgil Hall, by and through his attorneys at 
the State Appellate Public Defender, and petitions this Honorable Court for post-
conviction relief from the conviction and sentences imposed by this Court in the Fourth 
Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County case no. H0300518, on January 18,2005. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the action pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719; §§ 19-4901, et 
seq.; I.C.R., Rule 57; and Article I, Sections 1 and 5 of the Constitution of the State of 
Idaho. Mr. Hall relies on Article I, §§ 1,5,6, 7, 8, 13, 17, and 18 of the Constitution of 
the State of Idaho, and the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, .and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution as well as International Human Rights Law in support of 
this Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (herein "Final Amended 
Petition"). 
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I. BACKGROUND (I.C.R. 57(a)(I) through (a)(6» 
1. Mr. Hall is in the custody of the State of Idaho Department of Correction, 
detained at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution near Boise, Idaho. 
2. Judgment and sentence were pronounced by the Honorable Thomas F. 
Neville, District Judge of the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofldaho, 
in Ada County, Boise, Idaho. 
3. Mr. Hall stands convicted in Ada County case no. H0300518 of the crimes 
of: 
Count I, Murder in the First Degree 
Count II, Rape 
Count III, Kidnapping in the First Degree 
4. The Court imposed sentences as follows on the 18th day of January, 2005: 
Count I, for Murder: Death 
Count II, for Rape: Life in Prison without possibility of parole 
Count III, for Kidnapping: Life in Prison without possibility of parole 
The sentences for Counts II and III are to run consecutively. 
5. Mr. Hall pled not guilty and a jury returned verdicts of guilty to the crimes 
charged. 
6. Other than post-trial motions and a Notice Of Appeal, which cannot be 
litigated under Idaho law until these post-conviction matters are 
concluded, this is Mr. Hall's first attempt in any court to obtain relief from 
the convictions and sentences herein challenged. 
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II. ILLEGAL RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY 
Mr. Hall is a person restrained of his liberty in that he is a prisoner of the State of 
Idaho, under the custody of the Idaho State Board of Corrections, held on death row at 
the Idaho Maximum Security Institution. This restraint is pursuant to the following 
conviction and sentence imposed on January 18, 2005, by this Court presiding in the 
Fourth Judicial District, in State v. Hall, Ada County case no. H0300518: Murder in the 
First Degree, Kidnapping in the First Degree, and Rape. This restraint is illegal in that 
the convictions and sentences were obtained in violation of the constitutions of the 
United States and of the State of Idaho and in violation of court rules, statutes and other 
law as set forth infra in section IV. 
III. CONTENTS OF FINAL AMENDED PETITION 
A. Exhibits 
Idaho Code § 19-4903 addresses the contents of an application/petition for post-
conviction relief and states in relevant part that, "Affidavits, records, or other evidence 
supporting its allegations shall be attached to the application or the application shall 
recite why they are not attached." I.e. § 19-4903. The contents of this Final Amended 
Petition are limited due pending in camera review of documents by the Court, to the lack 
of complete cooperation by all of Mr. Hall's trial team members, as well as various 
rulings by this Court imposing restrictions on Mr. Hall's ability to investigate relevant 
information, including the following. 
1. Glenn Elam, the investigator on Mr. Hall's trial defense team in the 
underlying criminal proceedings, has relevant information regarding the 
course and scope of trial counsels' investigation. Mr. Elam has spoken to 
Mr. Hall's current investigator, Michael Shaw, but has refused to sign an 
affidavit without authorization from Amil Myshin, lead trial counsel. Mr. 
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Myshin has not given such authorization. An affidavit of Michael Shaw is 
attached in lieu of Mr. Elam's affidavit. (Exhibit 36.) 
2. The Court has denied numerous of Mr. Hall's post-conviction discovery 
requests, including his request to depose Mr. Elam. The litigation and all 
relevant filings, including the Court's order denying numerous requests, 
are a matter of record in these post-conviction proceedings, and are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
3. The Court has imposed an absolute prohibition on any jury contact. The 
litigation and all relevant filings, including the Court's order prohibiting 
any jury contact, are a matter of record in these post-conviction 
proceedings, and are incorporated herein by reference. 
B. JUDICIAL NOTICE 
The Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 201, provides in part that a "court shall take 
judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary information." 
I.R.E. 201 (d) (emphasis added). The rule was amended, effective July 1, 2007, to ensure 
that appellate courts are aware of the adjudicative facts of which the lower court took 
notice. The relevant portion ofthe amended rule provides, 
When a party makes an oral or written request that a court take judicial 
notice of records, exhibits or transcripts from the court file in the same or 
a separate case, the party shall identify the specific documents or items for 
which the judicial notice is requested or shall proffer to the court and serve 
on all parties copies of such documents or items. 
I.R.E. 201 (d). Mr. Hall requests the Court take judicial notice of the complete Clerk's 
Record and Reporter's Transcript from the underlying criminal case, Ada County case 
no. H0300518, and of other documents and transcripts as identified and requested in this 
Final Amended Petition. 
IV. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF 
Mr. Hall asserts that the convictions and sentences entered against him were 
obtained in violation of laws of the United States and of Idaho, including the Fourth, 
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Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, 
§§ 1,5,6, 7, 8, 13, 17, and 18, of the Constitution of the State ofIdaho, provisions of the 
Idaho Code and the Idaho Criminal Rules as well as international law. 
Within this Final Amended Petition, Mr. Hall has raised numerous grounds for 
relief based on various types of claims including, but not limited to, claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel (Strickland claims) as well as Brady violations.! Mr. Hall alleges 
he is entitled to relief on each independent claim. Further, Mr. Hall alleges that even if 
the claims do not meet the governing level of prejudice on their own, when jointly 
considered, the accumulation of error creates the degree of prejudice entitling Mr. Hall to 
relief. Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F .2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992). 
A. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Adequately Investigate And Present Evidence Of Erick Hall's 
Neurological Damage, Mental Retardation And Mental lllness2 
1. Introduction 
Trial counsel did not conduct any neurological testing of Mr. Hall despite ample 
evidence of numerous closed head injuries and other symptoms of neurological damage. 
! See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), and Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963). To prove a Strickland violation, Mr. Hall must show (1) deficient 
performance and (2) prejudice. Prejudice is established by showing that but for counsels' 
deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have 
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability that undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the trial or sentencing. To prove a Brady violation, Mr. Hall must show 
that the State failed to disclose (1) material and (2) exculpatory evidence. Materiality has 
been defined to mean a "reasonable probability of a different result." Where not 
otherwise stated herein, Mr. Hall asserts that he has established all requisites for his 
Strickland and Brady claims. 
2 This claim focuses on Mr. Hall's neurological damage. While Mr. Hall has not 
presented evidence of mental illness and mental retardation to satisfy the Idaho statute for 
excluding the death penalty, he hereby seeks to preserve this claim for future litigation as 
technology, testing techniques, and standards of decency evolve. 
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Trial counsel had no plausible reason for failing to conduct the testing; further, the testing 
that has been conducted during Mr. Hall's post-conviction investigation has uncovered 
significant neurological damage. 
2. Applicable Legal Standards 
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees a criminal defendant effective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-686 (1984). Idaho 
has adopted the Strickland two-prong test in evaluating whether a criminal defendant was 
denied the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 
106 P.3d 376, 385 (2004). Specifically, a defendant must prove counsel's performance 
was deficient and counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his case. !d. To show 
deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. ld. To show prejudice, the defendant 
must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different. ld. A defendant must prove his claims by 
a preponderance of the evidence. ld. at 56, 106 P.3d at 382. 
When assessing the reasonableness of counsel's decisions, this Court owes 
deference to counsel's strategic decision; however, "[t]he relevant question is not whether 
counsel's choices were strategic, but whether they were reasonable." Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000) (citation omitted). Accordingly, courts must first focus 
on whether the investigation itself was reasonable. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 523 
(2003) ("[W]e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision ... was 
itself reasonable. ") (emphasis in original) (citation omitted); Strickland 466 U.S. at 691 
(holding that counsel has "a du~y to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
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reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."); Conner v. 
Quarterman, 477 F.3d 287,293-94 (5th Cir. 2007) ("The judgment is whether counsel's 
investigation was reasonable, not whether counsel's trial strategy was reasonable.") 
(citation omitted). 
3. Analysis 
The use of a wide array of mental health experts, various testing instruments, and 
various neurological and medical tests has become the standard of practice for effective 
representation of capital defendants. It is particularly important in a capital case that trial 
counsel thoroughly investigate the possibility of brain damage. Trial counsel operates 
below the prevailing standard of practice in a capital case if he fails to obtain a physical 
and neurological examination. The importance of a medical and neurological 
examination is evidenced in the commentary to the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment 
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003) (herein 
"ABA Guidelines"), which provides in relevant part that: 
... mental health experts are essential to defending capital cases. 
Neurological and psychiatric impairment, combined with a history of 
physical and sexual abuse, are common among persons convicted of 
violent offenses on death row .... the defendant's psychological and social 
history and his emotional and mental health are often of vital importance 
to the jury's decision at the punishment phase. Creating a competent and 
reliable mental health evaluation consistent with prevailing standards of 
practice is a time-consuming and expensive process. Counsel must 
compile extensive historical data, as well as obtain a thorough 
physical and neurological examination. Diagnostic studies, 
neuropsychological testing, appropriate brain scans, blood tests or 
genetic studies, and consultation with additional mental health specialists 
may also be necessary. 
(Exhibit 1, ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 4.1 (emphasis added) (footnotes 
omitted).) Thus, at a minimum, trial counsel must arrange neurological and medical 
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examinations. Then, if the examinations reveal potential damage, trial counsel must 
arrange for further testing, including the appropriate brain scans. 
a. Deficient Performance 
In this case, trial counsel utterly abandoned the duty to investigate neurological 
damage, without any reasonable explanation, even though Erick Hall had a history 
warranting a neurological examination.3 Erickohad a history of head injuries, black outs, 
and bizarre and erratic behavior. (See e.g., Exhibit 2 (Affidavit of Wendy Levy); Exhibit 
3 (Second Affidavit of Dr. James Merikangas, dated October 14, 2006);4 Exhibit 5 
(Mfidavit of Deanna Jean (McCracken) Horman); Exhibit 6 (Affidavit of Jean Hall 
McCracken); Exhibit 7 (Affidavit of John August Thompson); Exhibit 8 (Affidavit of 
Frank ("Frankie") Alvin Charles McCracken); and Exhibit 9 (Affidavit of Kenneth S. 
Douglas).) This history was available to trial counsel, and they certainly knew of at least 
Erick's erratic behavior, history of headaches, and history of head injuries. (See e.g., Tr., 
p.5055, L.ll-p.5056, L.25; p.5081, Ls.7-10; p.5004, Ls.4 -7.) Nonetheless trial counsel 
failed to arrange for even minimal standard neurological and medical testing to determine 
whether brain scans or other testing was warranted. 
The theory of the mitigation case was that Erick did not represent the worst of the 
worst murderers for which the death penalty is reserved, because of the emotional trauma 
stemming from the abuse and neglect of his childhood. (See Exhibit 10 (Affidavit of 
Rosanne Dapsauski).) However, there was nothing about the mitigation theory of the 
3 A neurological examination is always warranted, even without any significant historical 
indicators of potential neurological damage. However, in this case, there was ample 
reason to believe that Erick required at least the preliminary neurological examination to 
determine whether further testing was required. 
4 Dr. Merikangas' curriculum vitae is submitted as Exhibit 4. 
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case that precluded further investigation and presentation of neurological damage. Id. 
Indeed, Dr. Cunningham, who testified for the defense at sentencing, agrees that evidence 
of brain damage would have been extremely helpful, and he would have incorporated 
such evidence into his testimony. (Exhibit 11, pp.2-3 (Affidavit of Mark Cunningham, 
Ph.D.)i 
During depositions of trial counsel, trial counsel confirmed that Erick was never 
subjected to brain scans, such as PET and MRI scans, during the course of their 
representation. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.54, Ls.2-11; Tr., 9/13/06 
deposition of D.C. Carr, p.88, Ls.I-5.) Counsel further confirmed that none of their 
experts, including their testifying experts, Dr. Roderick Pettis (psychiatrist) and Dr. Mark 
Cunningham (forensic psychologist), ever advised trial counsel not to obtain such testing. 
(Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.93, Ls.7-9 (Q. "Did they ever say, 'Don't do this 
testing'? A. No, they never said that."); Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.58, 
Ls.11-13 (Q. "Okay. And did Dr. Cunningham and Dr. Pettis ever say, 'Don't do brain 
scans.' A. I don't remember.")l 
Amil Myshin indicated one reason he did not request brain scans was because 
such scans were not relevant to the mitigation case presented to the jury, which focused 
on Erick's traumatic childhood and upbringing. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, 
5 Dr. Cunnigham's curriculum vitae is submitted as Exhibit 12. 
6 The transcript of the 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin with the depositions exhibits is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 13. The transcript of the 11116/06 deposition of Amil Myshin 
with the deposition exhibits is attached hereto as Exhibit 14. The transcript of the 
9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr is attached hereto as Exhibit 15. Because the exhibits to 
that deposition are so lengthy, Mr. Hall is submitting them as Exhibits 15A-15B. The 
transcript of the 12/8/06 deposition of D.C. Carr is attached hereto as Exhibit 16. The 
depositions will be cited to as transcript citations, e.g., "Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil 
Myshin, p.l, Ls.l-lO." Mr. Hall requests the Court take judicial notice of the deposition 
transcripts, with their respective exhibits. 
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p.56, Ls.9-22.) As Mr. Myshin rhetorically stated, ''why do all of that [brain imaging], if 
you're not going to use it?" (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.56, Ls.21-22.) 
While Mr. Myshin recognized brain scans showing brain abnormalities or brain damage 
could only have strengthened their mitigation case, he explained that at the time of his 
representation he feared such testing would subject Erick to the prosecution's experts. 
(Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.54, Ls.15-17 (" ... 1 didn't want to open Erick 
up to the state's experts in those areas."); p.58, Ls.14-20 (admitting brain scans showing 
structural or functional defects in the brain would have been favorable evidence); Tr., 
11116/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.409, Ls.12-17 ("I thought it would open up Erick 
to your [State's] experts in a lot of areas, and I didn't want that to happen. So it was not 
so much that it would water it down. I chose not to go that way because I did not want to 
open him up.")f However, elsewhere in his deposition testimony, Mr. Myshin conceded, 
and D.C. Carr agreed at his deposition, that this fear was misplaced; specifically, both 
counsel acknowledged that if the results of the brain scans were not helpful, then the 
defense would not have had to disclose those results to the prosecution. (Tr., 9/14/06 
deposition of Amil Myshin, p.58, Ls.6-1O; Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.91, 
Ls.12-19.) Indeed, Mr. Myshin conceded during his deposition testimony, but apparently 
failed to recognize during his representation, that brain scans could have been conducted, 
and results obtained, prior to making a decision whether to present such evidence to the 
jury. (Tr., 9/14/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.60, L.3 - p.61, L.9.) D.C. Carr agreed. 
7 It is worth noting that Mr. Myshin's response here is to a very broad question from the 
State which encompassed more than just the decision not to conduct brain scans, but 
rather included reference to presenting a mental health mitigation case that would include 
psychological testing, which is beyond the scope of this claim. 
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(Tr., 9/13/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.98, L.IS - p.99, L. 7; Tr., 12/08/06 deposition of 
D.C. Carr, p.383, Ls.1l-14l 
Therefore, based on trial counsels' deposition testimony, there was no objectively 
reasonable basis to forgo brain scans. Instead, trial counsels' decision, even assuming 
without conceding it to be a tactical decision, was based on lack of adequate preparation 
and an ignorance of the relevant law. Negative results would not have been disclosed, 
would not have subjected Erick to the prosecution's experts, and would not have 
undermined the defense experts' testimony because the defense experts' opinions were 
not based or otherwise dependent upon a showing of brain damage. Positive results, on 
the other hand, would have strengthened the mitigation case, and while disclosure of such 
results could arguably potentially have permitted the state to perform additional brain 
scans, it would not have opened the floodgates for additional interviews or interrogations 
by State experts. Further, given the relatively objective nature of brain scans, like PET 
and MRI scans, it would have been difficult for the prosecution to justify spending 
taxpayer money on additional scans, as opposed to merely having their own experts 
interpret the defense scans conducted by the defense. 
b. Prejudice 
In the course of post-conviction investigation, Mr. Hall's counsel enlisted the 
assistance of Dr. James Merikangas, a nationally recognized neurologist and psychiatrist. 
8 Trial counsel's post-conviction concessions are consistent with applicable law. See 
I.C.R. 16(c)(2) (limiting disclosure to the prosecution of "results or reports of physical or 
mental examinations" to results or reports "which the defendant intends to introduce in 
evidence at the trial, or which were prepared by a witness whom the defendant intends to 
call at the trial when the results or reports relate to testimony of the witness."); see also 
I.C. § 18-207(4) (precluding the presentation of expert mental health evidence to a jury 
unless such evidence has been fully subjected to the adversarial process). 
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(See Exhibit 4.) Dr. Merikangas' initial and subsequent examination of Erick indicated 
that further medical testing and brain scans were warranted because Erick exhibited 
evidence of neurological and physical impairment. Erick's blood pressure was extremely 
high, he indicated he had frequent and severe headaches, he was unable to walk on his 
heels or toes, and he was unable to walk tandem without swaying. He had a scar on his 
right parietal scalp. Dr. Merikangas noted that Erick's facial appearance, patterns of hair 
on his scalp, the appearance of his ears, the space between his lips and his nose, and the 
shape of his palate indicated the possibility of congenital malformation of the brain. 
(Exhibit 3.) 
Erick also exhibited psychiatric anomalies. (Exhibit 3.) During the examination, 
Erick drew a "very strange person" ''without a face" and "without genitalia." After 
asking him to draw the face, Erick "drew a face without eyebrows or ears." Under 
standard scoring, this drawing was appropriate for a child of eight or nine years old. 
(Exhibit 3.) On the basis of the examination and of Erick's history, Dr. Merikangas 
requested Erick undergo an MRI scan, a PET scan, and various other blood tests and x-
The results of the brain scans establish trial counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced Erick, as the scans show Erick suffers from both anatomical and functional 
brain damage. First, the MRI scans showed anatomical damage. Specifically, the MRIs 
showed (a) the presence of foci of white matter hyperintensity on Erick's brain, (b) 
9 Dr. Merikangas has recommended, and Mr. Hall's counsel has arranged a further blood 
test for Fragile-X Syndrome, but the results will not be available for at least two weeks. 
However, Mr. Hall asserts that he does suffer from this chromosomal abnormality, and 
will either provide evidence of the abnormality or withdraw this portion of the ineffective 
assistance claim upon receipt of the test results. 
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prominence of the ventricles of Erick's brain, and (c) an abnormally thin corpus 
callosum. (Exhibit 17 (Third Affidavit of Dr. James Merikangas, dated September 26, 
2007).) Second, the PET scan showed abnormally low metabolic activity level (or 
functioning) in the various areas of the brain. Specifically, the PET scan showed (a) a 
severe decrease in activity in the medial temporal regions bilaterally extending to the tips 
of the temporal poles, and (b) a moderate decrease in activity extending from the insular 
regions bilaterally into the posterior aspects of both frontal lobes. The decreased 
metabolic activity level in those areas indicates damage to those areas of Erick's brain. 
i. Anatomical Brain Damage 
With respect to the anatomical abnormalities, based on the MRI scan, 
Dr. Merikangas found Erick suffers from the following brain damage: 
(a) White Matter Hyperintensity 
Dr. Merikangas found that Erick has foci of white matter hyperintensity, called 
lesions, on in his brain, which are abnormal, and "particularly troubling when found in a 
36-year-old." (Exhibit 17.) In Erick's case, the white matter lesions are located in his 
temporal and frontal lobes, which may have a significant impact on behavior. 
Dr. Merikangas explained the roles of the frontal and temporal lobes as follows: 
The temporal lobe is located beneath and behind the frontal lobe. It is 
involved in the processing of auditory sensation and perception, and 
contains the hippocampus, an area of the brain associated with memory 
formation. Temporal lobe damage can result in (1) disturbance of auditory 
sensation and perception, (2) disturbance of selective attention of auditory 
and visual input, (3) disorders of visual perception, (4) impaired 
organization and categorization of verbal material, (5) disturbance of 
language comprehension, (6) impaired long-term memory, (7) altered 
personality and affective behavior, and (8) altered sexual behavior. 
The frontal lobes are considered our emotional control center and home to 
our personality. Most importantly, the frontal lobes are involved in 
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impulse control. There is no other part of the brain where lesions can 
cause such a wide variety of symptoms. The frontal lobes are involved in 
motor function, problem solving, spontaneity, memory, language, 
initiation, judgment, impulse control, and social and sexual behavior. 
Frontal lobe damage can result in (1) disturbed motor function, (2) 
suppressed spontaneous facial movements, (3) inhibited or excessive 
speech, (4) difficulty in interpreting feedback from the environment, (5) 
perseveration on a response, (6) risk taking, (7) impaired associated 
learning, i.e. impaired use of external cues to help guide behavior, (8) 
dramatic change in social behavior, and (9) abnormal sexual behavior. 
This is particularly significant in Erick's case, because of the nature of the 
conviction against him, i.e., a crime involving the sexual homicide of a 
stranger, and other past allegations. The damaged regions of his brain are 
associated with sexual behavior and impulse control. This finding, 
especially in conjunction with his family and social history, provides a 
possible explanation of his criminal behaviors in this case. 
(Exhibit 17.) 
(b) Prominence Of Ventricles 
Erick's MRI also showed damage to his ventricular system, due to atrophy of his 
brain, and probably caused by head injuries: 
... The ventricular system consists of four communicating cavities (ventricles) in 
the brain that are filled with cerebrospinal fluid and are continuous with the 
central canal of the spinal cord. Erick's ventricles are abnormally prominent. 
Large ventricles are caused by either too much pressure inside the brain or 
atrophy of the brain. Atrophy is the loss of brain tissue and causes impairment. 
Alzheimer's disease, for example, is associated with significant brain atrophy, and 
one would see enlarged ventricles because of the atrophy. In other words, when 
the brain shrinks, the fluid cavities (ventricles) become larger. 
In my professional opinion, Erick's ventricles are enlarged because his brain is 
atrophied. In other words, Erick's ventricles are enlarged because he has lost 
brain tissue. Enlargement of the ventricles can exist at birth, occur later in life 
because of disease, or can be the result of head injuries. Given Erick's history, it 
is likely his enlarged ventricles are the result of head injuries. Damage resulting 
from head injuries is cumulative; meaning, several minor head injuries can have 
the same result as one major head injury. Thus, Erick's enlarged ventricles are 
likely the result of his combined head injuries. 
(Exhibit 17.) 
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(c) Thin Corpus Callosum 
Erick's MRI also showed damage to the corpus callosum. Specifically, it was 
abnormally thin or narrow, which is associated with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder 
(FASD). (Exhibit 17). As explained by Dr. Merikangas: 
F ASD is an umbrella term describing the range of effects that can occur in an 
individual who was prenatally exposed to alcohol. Prenatal exposure to alcohol is 
a well known cause of behavioral, cognitive, and psychological problems, and is 
also associated with learning disabilities. F ASD symptoms also include poor 
judgment and poor impulse control. 
FASD is consistent with reports that Erick's mother drank during her pregnancies, 
Erick's low birth weight, Erick's history of behavioral and mood problems, 
Erick's shortened philtrum, and Erick's history of learning disabilities and 
childhood mild mental retardation. Given Erick's history and the results of the 
MRI, it is my professional opinion that [ ] FASD is the likely cause of Erick's 
abnormally thin corpus callosum. FASD is consistent with Erick's problems with 
impulse control and aggressive behavior and, again, offers a possible explanation 
for his criminal activity. 
(Exhibit 17). 
ii. Functional Brain Damage 
With respect to the functional abnormalities, based on the PET scan, 
Dr. Merikangas found the following functional brain damage: (a) a severe decrease in 
activity in the medial temporal regions bilaterally extending to the tips of the temporal 
poles; and (b) a moderate decrease in activity extending from the insular regions 
bilaterally into the posterior aspects of both frontal lobes. (Exhibit 17) The decreased 
activity level in each of those areas of the brain indicates brain damage to those areas. 
(Exhibit 17.) The impact of such damage is significant: 
. . . Regardless of the cause, abnormalities in these areas of the brain are 
associated with aggressive impulsive behavior, poor executive functioning, poor 
judgment and low intelligence. The diminished activity in these areas of Erick's 
brain is consistent with problems with impulse control and aggressive behavior, 
and provides a possible further explanation for his criminal activity. 
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(Exhibit 17.) 
Clearly, the above neurological results are highly significant and highly 
mitigating, and should have been presented to the jury. The evidence of brain damage 
was not cumulative of the evidence presented regarding Erick's horrific childhood. 
Furthermore, brain damage is something entirely outside of Mr. Hall's control, and 
directly affects his adult behavior. Thus, presentation of brain damage could have 
effectively countered the State's argument that Erick made the "choice" to kill. (See Tr., 
p. 5491, Ls.3-17; p.5493, L.11 - p.5495, L.17; p.5503, Ls.l - 19; p.5504, L.16 - p.5505, 
L.2.) Indeed, the State's "choice" argument was premised in part on Erick's lack of brain 
damage: 
Counsel did it again today. He says that the doctors talked about head 
injury, and being hit on the head by his brothers and such. Did the 
Harvard medical doctor and a Ph.D. forensic psychologist give you 
one reason to think that the defendant has somehow been injured in 
his head by being hit on head when he was a kid? Did he say we gave 
the following psychological tests and they clearly show that the defendant 
can't understand consequences, cause and effect, the relation of A to B? 
No. Why didn't they? It's because they're not trying to help you find the 
truth here .... There's not the cause and effect relationship that they want. 
(Tr., p.5496, L. 21 - p. 5497, L.15 (emphasis added).) This argument either would not 
have been presented or would have carried no weight had the jury known that Erick does 
have brain damage. 
At the very least, presenting evidence of brain damage would have provided the 
jury with some explanation for Erick's aggression, lack of impulse control, physical 
violence, and sexual violence. They would have been compelled to give meaningful 
consideration to the neurological damage that, but for trial counsel's failure to investigate 
would have been presented to them: 
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Erick's brain is anatomically and functionally abnormal. Erick has 
anatomical damage to his frontal and temporal lobes, and an abnormally 
developed corpus callosum. Erick's brain is also functionally impaired in 
the temporal lobe regions. It is my professional opinion to a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty that Erick's sexual behaviors and difficulties 
with impulse control and the exercise of good judgment are consistent 
with the brain damage identified by the brain scans. Based on the 
directive of Mr. Hall's attorneys, I have not spoken to Mr. Hall about the 
crime itself However, in light of the evidence presented at trial and 
assuming guilt based on the jury's verdict, it is readily apparent that the 
specific damage to Erick's brain could account for his alleged actions that 
evening and alleged prior criminal behavior. 
The results of the brain scans are consistent with Erick's history of head 
injuries, pervasive developmental deficits, and other childhood deficits, 
disorders, and mistreatment. Moreover, Erick's background would cause 
him to develop mUltiple and serious emotional triggers. While persons 
with undamaged brains may have those triggers and not react violently, it 
is much more difficult for a person with brain damage-particularly brain 
damage affecting impUlse control-to resist the urge to react violently. 
While brain damage does not excuse Erick's violent behavior, it may 
explain and mitigate his actions. Erick's brain simply does not function 
like a healthy adult's brain, and his behavior, therefore, should be judged 
accordingly. 
(Exhibit 17). The jury was thus deprived of compelling evidence of a damaged brain, 
and deprived of the opportunity to infer that Erick's behavior on the night of the crimes in 
question were at the very least performed by a neurologically damaged individual who 
was simply unable to make "choices" in the same manner as a person with an undamaged 
brain. 
The deprivation of this information cannot be understated. When provided with 
this new information of· brain damage, Dr. Mark Cunningham attested that the 
information was "[ e ]xtraordinarily important" and would have dramatically strengthened 
his testimony. (Exhibit 11, p.2.) Dr. Cunningham explained the evidence of brain 
damage was a critical bridge to explaining Erick's deficits and behavior as an adult, 
including at the time ofthe offense: 
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These clinical findings of brain abnonnalities in Mr. Hall as an adult were 
critically absent from infonnation available to me at trial. Though there 
had been documentation of Mr. Hall's deficient cognitive abilities and 
developmental deficits in childhood, I did not have the benefit of these 
clinical findings of abnonnal brain functioning in Mr. Hall as an adult. 
Accordingly, I could neither incorporate this profoundly important 
conclusion into my analysis of damaging deVelopment factors impinging 
on Mr. Hall, his life trajectory, or his mental resources at the time of the 
offense. 
Abnonnal brain functioning and the tragically synergistic combined 
effects of brain damage and pervasively traumatic experience were 
fundamentally important factors in explaining Mr. Hall's disturbed 
development and marginal adult adjustment; as well as his criminal 
history, impulse control deficits, and vulnerability to aggression -
partiCUlarly when accompanied by substance abuse. 
Had I had these findings of brain abnonnalities in Mr. Hall I would have 
offered testimony supporting a nexus between Mr. Hall's brain 
dysfunction and his criminal history and offense conduct. I would have 
testified that there is a relationship between brain dysfunction and violent 
offending, particularly in the face of traumatic experience and substance 
abuse. I would have cited and discussed psychological, psychiatric, and 
neurological literature which identify that brain damage is present in 
disproportionately high incidence among violent offenders. 
(Exhibit 11, p.3.) Dr. Cunningham, who has testified in many capital cases, correctly 
noted the importance of brain damage as mitigation. (Exhibit 11, p.3 ("The diagnosable 
presence of brain dysfunction and its potential association with violent acts can be a 
significant mitigating factor in a jury's deliberation regarding whether a penalty of death 
is justified.") 
Dr. Cunningham also would have testified about Erick's FASD, and the 
relationship between F ASD and related childhood and adult deficits, including deficits in 
impulse control and judgment, had he had some confinnation of FASD, such as the 
results of the recent MRI scan: 
Dr. Merikangas, in his Third Affidavit, further reported that the MRI scan 
had revealed the corpus callosum of Erick's brain to be abnonnally thin or 
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narrow. The corpus callosum is a large group of neuronal fibers 
connecting the two hemispheres of the brain. Such thinning is consistent 
with exposure to alcohol in utereo [sic], i.e., Fetal Alcohol Spectrum 
Disorder (FASD). Also consistent with FASD are the learning deficits, 
attention deficits, impulsivity, and other symptoms exhibited by Erick in 
childhood. Further consistent with FASD is his mother's history of drug 
and alcohol abuse. The information available at trial resulted in me 
suspecting F ASD, but I lacked sufficient confirmatory data to offer this 
factor to the jury. Had I had the. results of the MRI scan and associated 
clinical interpretation, I would have had the necessary level of 
confirmation. Accordingly, I would have described the both the childhood 
implications of F ASD as well as F ASD-related deficits in impulse control 
and judgment that persist in adulthood. 
Because prenatal exposure to alcohol occurs at the most innocent and 
vulnerable stage of life, damaging the child even from earliest formation, a 
capital jury may give this factor particular weight. This is weight is [sic] 
augmented if accompanied by perspectives that alcohol exposures that are 
outside of any conceivable volitional choice of the fetus materially affect 
the quality of volitional choices this fetus-alI-grownup makes in 
adulthood. 
(Exhibit 11, pp.3-4.) Thus, not only would the confirmatory evidence of FASD have 
provided Dr. Cunningham with explanations for Erick's adult behavior, it would also 
have undercut the State's "choice" argument. 
Given the powerfully mitigating nature of brain damage - over which a defendant 
exercises no choice in having, and which has profound implications on impulse control, 
sexual and aggressive behavior, and judgment - there can be no doubt that there is a 
reasonable probability that Erick Hall would have received a life sentence had trial 
counsel investigated and presented evidence of brain damage. 
4. Conclusion 
Trial counsel, without any reasoned basis, did not conduct medical and 
neurological testing to determine whether Mr. Hall exhibited signs of physical or 
neurological damage which would have warranted further testing, including brain scans. 
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This uninfonned and unwarranted decision fell well below the standard of perfonnance in 
a capital case. Because of trial counsel's deficient perfonnance, trial counsel failed to 
uncover highly relevant, and highly mitigating evidence of both anatomical and 
functional brain damage, to areas of Mr. Hall's brain that are inextricably linked to 
impulse control, sexual behavior, aggression, and judgment. But for trial counsels' 
failure to conduct testing, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have 
shown mercy toward Mr. Hall in the fonn of a life sentence. 
B. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Adequately Investigate And Present Mitigating Evidence 
1. Introduction 
Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present 
mitigating evidence and by failing to present evidence to rebut the State's case in 
aggravation, all of which was available upon reasonable investigation. As a result, the 
jury was presented with incomplete infonnation upon which to base their decision to 
impose the death penalty. Had the jury been presented a complete picture of Erick Hall, 
there is a reasonable probability that they would have imposed a life sentence. 
Trial counsel built their sentencing case almost entirely around Erick's 
developmental years. Their apparent goal was for the jury to understand Erick's 
childhood and find mercy in their hearts with that understanding. Trial counsel presented 
expert testimony from both a psychologist and psychiatrist - however, the testimony was 
almost entirely focused on Erick's childhood. However, the presentation of Erick's 
traumatic childhood was incomplete, and it did not present evidence of Erick's positive 
adult behavior. Moreover, trial counsel did not rebut the State's case in aggravation, and 
did not present evidence of co-perpetrator involvement in the crimes at issue. 
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2. Applicable Legal Standards 
The applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in 
Claim A.2, supra. In a capital trial, trial counsel has a duty to conduct a thorough 
investigation in preparation for the penalty phase. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 
(2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). 
This includes both the duty to conduct a thorough mitigation investigation, and a duty to 
conduct an investigation into the State's case in aggravation. The ABA Guidelines 
provide in part: 
At that [penalty] phase, trial counsel must both rebut the 
prosecution's case in favor of the death penalty and affirmatively 
present the best possible case in favor of a sentence other than death. 
If the defendant has any prior criminal history, the prosecution can be 
expected to attempt to offer it in support of a death sentence. Trial counsel 
accordingly must comprehensively investigate--together with the defense 
investigator, a mitigation specialist, and other members of the defense 
team-the defendant's behavior and the circumstances of the conviction. 
Only then can counsel protect the accused's Fourteenth Amendment right 
to deny or rebut factual allegations made by the prosecution in support of 
a death sentence, and the client's Eighth Amendment right not to be 
sentenced to death based on prior convictions obtained in violation of his 
constitutional rights. If uncharged prior misconduct is arguably 
admissible, trial counsel must assume that the prosecution will attempt to 
introduce it, and accordingly must thoroughly investigate it as an integral 
part of preparing for the penalty phase. Along with preparing to counter 
the prosecution's case for the death penalty, trial counsel must develop an 
affirmative case for sparing the defendant's life. A capital defendant has 
an unqualified right to present any facet of his character, background, or 
record that might call for a sentence less than death. This Eighth 
Amendment right to offer mitigating evidence "does nothing to fulfill its 
purpose unless it is understood to presuppose that the defense lawyer will 
unearth, develop, present, and insist on the consideration of those 
'compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties 
of humankind.''' Nor will the presentation be persuasive unless it (a) is 
consistent with that made by the defense at the guilt phase and (b) links 
the evidence offered in mitigation to the specific circumstances of the 
client. 
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ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 1.1 (emphasis added). In short, the 
constitutional demand on counsel to conduct a thorough investigation of the penalty 
phase is high. 
Presentation of some mitigating evidence, even if strong, is not enough if other 
mitigating evidence is available upon reasonable investigation. In Rompilla, the Supreme 
Court found counsel ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate mitigation 
investigation despite consulting with mental health experts and conducting an 
investigation into the defendant's background. Specifically, trial counsel failed to 
examine a court file on the defendant's prior conviction for rape and assault where the 
filed included additional mitigating evidence. In Wiggins, the Supreme Court found 
counsel ineffective based on an inadequate mitigation investigation despite the fact that 
counsel arranged psychological testing for their client and obtained some government 
records to assist in developing their client's social history. Finally, in Williams, the 
Supreme Court found counsel ineffective in failing to adequately investigate their client's 
background despite a "competently handled [the] guilt phase of the trial." Id. at 395-96. 
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized the effectiveness of counsel's assistance will be 
subjected to great scrutiny in a capital case. 
3. Analysis 
This claim is divided into four subclaims: subclaim a addresses trial counsel's 
failure to investigate and present testimony from Erick's family; subclaim b addresses 
trial counsel's failure to investigate and present testimony of Erick's foster parents and 
foster brother; subclaim c addresses trial counsel's failure to investigate evidence of an 
alternate perpetrator of the murder and co-perpetrator of the rape; and subclaim d 
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addresses trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate and present evidence of Erick's 
good character as an adult. 
a. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate And 
Present Evidence Of Erick Hall's Traumatic Childhood 
Through Live Testimony Of Family Members Including 
His Mother And Father 
Trial counsel built the sentencing case almost entirely around Erick Hall's 
developmental years. lO Trial counsel failed to interview all available family members 
and failed to elicit or present compelling mitigation from family members interviewed. 
Trial counsel's failures to investigate and present compelling mitigation evidence left the 
jury with an incomplete picture of Erick. But for trial counsel's deficient performance, 
there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have imposed a life sentence. 
i. Shannon Pambrun 
Shannon Pambrun is Erick's older half-brother. Shannon and Erick had the same 
mother. lI Trial counsel failed to locate Shannon prior to trial. (Exhibit 10, pp.8-9.) Post-
conviction investigators located Shannon and interviewed him. Shannon had a wealth of 
information about Mr. Hall's childhood, including mitigating information that was not 
presented at trial. 
Trial counsel in a capital case must conduct an intense and thorough investigation 
to uncover any mitigating evidence. Specifically, "Because the sentencer in a capital 
case must consider in mitigation, 'anything in the life of a defendant which might militate 
10 Indeed, as discussed below, counsel failed to adequately investigate and present 
mitigating evidence from Erick's later years. In addition, it appears that trial counsel 
spent absolutely no time investigating a defense to the presentation of the State's case in 
aggravation through various witnesses, primarily Norma Jean Oliver. 
11 Erick's birth certificate lists Shannon's father, Roy Pambrun, as Erick's father, but 
their mother has always maintained that Frank McCracken is Erick's biological father. 
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against the appropriateness of the death penalty for that defendant,' 'penalty phase 
preparation requires extensive and generally unparalleled investigation into personal and 
family history.'" (ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.7, quoting Brown v. 
State, 526 So. 2d 903, 908 (Fla. 1988) (citing Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 
(1987»; Russell Stetler, Mitigation Evidence in Death Penalty Cases, THE CHAMPION, 
Jan./Feb. 1999, at 35.)12 In the case of the client charged with a capital offense, the 
investigation begins at the moment of conception. Id. It is absolutely necessary to locate 
and interview the client's family members for the penalty phase investigation. Id. 
According to Rosanne Dapsauski, the trial team's mitigation specialist, she spent 
little time attempting to locate Shannon, even though the trial team believed that Shannon 
might corroborate and provide additional insight into family dynamics and the extent of 
the abuse Erick suffered. (Exhibit 10, pp. 8-9.) Although Ms. Dapsauski recalled using a 
"People Finders" or other similar on-line service, this seems unlikely, as Shannon 
Pambrun is readily locatable using both "People Finder" and "People Finders," which 
both show a Shannon Pambrun located in Duluth, MN. (Exhibit 18; Exhibit 19.) 
Moreover, even if an on-line service produced no results, the defense team should have, 
but did not, utilize a skip tracing service which provides more detailed results. (Exhibit 
10, p.8.) In short, Shannon Pambrun was readily locatable, but the "investigative efforts 
[to locate him] were not exhaustive and seemed to fall to the back burner .... " (Exhibit 
10, pp.8-9.) Given that Shannon was Erick's only older sibling by Jean Hall McCracken, 
12 See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 
586,604 (1978). 
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locating Shannon was critical, and the trial team's failure to locate him constituted 
deficient perfonnance. 
The trial team's failure to locate Shannon prejudiced the sentencing-phase of trial. 
Shannon confinned and expanded upon the frequent abuse that Erick suffered and 
witnessed as a child. He verified how Erick observed Frank punching and choking Jean. 
(Exhibit 20.) Additionally, he described how Erick was frequently beaten by his father 
and, after Frank's departure, by Jean's boyfriends. Shannon confinned that Erick was hit 
in the head by rocks thrown by his siblings. 
As the older brother, Shannon recalls Erick's strange behaviors, which began 
when Erick was very young. As a baby, Erick would be happy one moment, then cry 
uncontrollably for no apparent reason the next. He recalled that Erick would have 
extreme mood swings even at a young age, could be explosive when someone touched 
his head or the back of his neck, and would become "someone else" at times. His anger 
would dissipate as quickly as it came. Shannon recalls that Erick began hearing voices 
when he was approximately eight years old. He described Erick as especially "odd" and 
"different from [the] other siblings." Sometimes when Shannon would fight with Erick, 
Shannon "knew that he was not Erick but someone else." (Exhibit 20.) 
Shannon confinned that Frank beat his mother while she was pregnant. He also 
stated that his mother used alcohol heavily and was a "closet drinker." Shannon also 
attested that Jean abused alcohol during her pregnancies. (Exhibit 20.) 
Shannon conflnned that molestation was an ongoing family theme, and added 
details not provided by other siblings. Erick's uncle Allen tried to molest all of the boys, 
including Erick. Shannon believes that his Uncle Mark was molesting the children. One 
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of Jean's boyfriends molested at least two of the girls. Several of Jean's boyfriends 
sexually abused the children. Moreover, Jean was sexually inappropriate to the boys, 
kissing and hugging Shannon inappropriately, and inappropriately kissing Frankie. In 
retrospect, Shannon now sees how some of Jean's sexual behavior was inappropriately 
directed toward Erick as well. Shannon confirmed that there was sexual activity between 
many of the siblings and cousins, a strong indicator that the children grew up in a 
sexually abusive environment. (Exhibit 20.) 
Given the extent of Shannon's knowledge, the corroboration his testimony would 
have provided, and the new information he could have testified to or provided to the 
experts, there is a reasonable probability that the information obtained from Shannon 
would have changed the outcome of the sentencing trial such that Erick would have 
received a life sentence. Dr. Mark Cunningham, who testified for Erick at the sentencing 
phase of trial, did not have the benefit of the information provided by Shannon. (Exhibit 
11.) Dr. Cunningham would have testified that Erick hearing voices at the age of eight, 
along with accompanying odd behavior, was consistent with recurrent if not longstanding 
psychotic experience in childhood and adolescence. (Exhibit 11, p.5.) Shannon's 
information also would have provided "important perspectives" Dr. Cunningham did not 
otherwise have, regarding sexual molestation and perverse family sexuality. (Exhibit 11, 
p.5.) Most importantly, Dr. Cunningham would have presented the fact that Erick's 
Uncle Allen, attempted to molest Shannon and his brothers, including Erick. (Exhibit 11, 
p.5.) Dr. Cunningham also would have incorporated Shannon's belief that their Uncle 
Mark was molesting the children, and his descriptions of inappropriate kissing between 
Erick's mother (Jean), Erick's brother Frankie, as well as her inappropriate sexualized 
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behavior towards Erick. (Exhibit 11, p.5.) "As Mr. Hall's capital offense had a sexual 
context, experiences and exposures to disturbed sexuality in his background have 
particular importance and relevance." (Exhibit 11, p.5.) This information, in combination 
with the information uncovered in post-conviction regarding sexual molestation while in 
foster care, (see Claim B.3.b.i, infra), was critical, and was not presented solely due to the 
trial team's failure to conduct an adequate investigation. 
ii. Jean Hall McCracken 
Jean, Erick's mother was never called to testify even though she was willing to 
and had planned on doing so. Jean admits that she used drugs during her pregnancy with 
Erick. Jean provides further confirmation and further evidence of head injuries sustained 
by Erick, as well as incidents where Erick "would almost black out in terms of being 
conscious of what he was doing, saying, or engaged in." Jean also describes similar 
experiences she has had, suggesting a genetic component to Erick's behaviors. Based on 
a layperson's perspective, but bolstered by her intimate knowledge of Erick's childhood 
behaviors, Jean believes that Erick is bipolar. Additionally, Jean experienced the loss of 
a loved-one by violence when her father was murdered in 1998. Thus, as a witness, Jean 
would have bridged the gap between the loss the victim's family felt and the loss that a 
convicted murderer's mother feels. Like so many of Erick's family members and friends, 
Jean loved him and did not want to see him executed. Jean was willing to testify to all 
these matters despite the State's efforts to dissuade her from presenting mitigating 
circumstances at her son's sentencing hearing. (See Claim V, infra; Exhibit 6.)13 
13 Jean died in January, 2007. 
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During the course of the post-conviction investigation of this case, Erick has 
discovered that both Jean and Frank would have been willing to testify for the defense. 
Indeed, Jean expected to testify but was told at the last moment by trial counsel that she 
was not necessary. (Exhibit 6.) Jean was necessary, and so was Frank. Both seek to a 
certain extent to downplay the abuse and neglect experienced by all family members, and 
each tend to point the finger at the other, or at failures of institutions established to assist 
them. Nevertheless, Mr. Hall's parents do accept responsibility for their failures, and just 
as importantly, both love their son ... despite his failures. See U.S. v. Honken, 381 
F.Supp.2d 936 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (noting that jury considered mitigating value in the fact 
that the defendant was loved by his mother, and the emotional trauma that she would be 
feel from the execution of her son). 
The jury should have heard their stories, and the stories of other relatives; because 
only by hearing their stories could the jury truly have understood Erick's childhood and 
. "the possibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse 
frailties of humankind." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976). 
iii. Frank McCracken. Sr. 
Frank McCracken, Sr., Erick's father, acknowledged that he was physically and 
verbally abusive to Jean in front of the children. He reported signs of abuse to Erick 
following Erick's return from a juvenile detention center. "When Erick came back to 
California from the boy's home in 1986-87 he had markings on his back from having an 
iron pressed into his body." Frank concluded that he loves Erick, "he is my son, he's 
always been my son, and he will always be my son." (Exhibit 21.) Frank did not testify 
at Erick's trial. 
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iv. Frank McCracken, Jr. ("Frankie") 
Frankie McCracken is Erick's older half-brother. Frankie further confinned the 
degree of violence in the McCracken family. Frankie has also experienced significant 
problems in the criminal justice system, having spent eight years in prison. (Exhibit 8.) 
Frankie did not testify at Erick's trial. 
v. Tiffaney Conner 
Tiffaney Conner is Erick's youngest half-sister. While she has no real memories 
of Erick as a child, she treasure a picture of him holding her when she was a baby. 
Tiffaney feels a strong connection to Erick as an adult and loves him. She hopes to 
continue a relationship with him despite his incarceration. "My letters are my most 
prized possession of my brother." (Exhibit 22.) Tiffaney did not testify at Erick's trial. 
vi. Kenneth Douglas 
Kenneth Douglas is Erick's cousin. Kenneth related further instances of violence 
in Erick's childhood. He also described another serious head injury when Erick fell off a 
second story roof and hit his head on a rock sidewalk. Also, apparently drawing from a 
layperson's perspective, Kenneth describes Erick's childhood behaviors as characteristic 
of "manic depressive, Bi-Polar, and schizophrenic." (Exhibit 9.) Kenneth did not testify 
at Erick's trial. 
vii. John Thompson 
John Thompson is Erick's younger brother. John described the disruption in the 
household and characterizes Erick's childhood mood swings as a "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde" split personality. John also confirmed Shannon's abuse of Erick. (Exhibit 7.) 
John did not testify at Erick's trial. 
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viii. Kimberly Bacon 
Kimberly Bacon was married to Erick's older brother, Shannon, and knew Erick 
when Erick was a teenager. She was never contacted by trial counsel. She provided 
more information confirming family accounts of Shannon's explosive, unpredictable 
violence. Her testimony would have bolstered claims that Shannon was extremely 
abusive, would have added accounts of Erick witnessing Shannon's violence against 
Kimberly, and would have described the relationship between Shannon and Erick as one 
in which "Shannon kept Erick around so he could have a scapegoat." Kimberly, who 
since meeting Erick has worked at Columbia River Mental Health for two years as a 
specialist, describes Erick's behavior as a teenager as "mentally ill, incompetent, and 
[having] developmental delays," suffering from "severe attachment disorder," "major 
mental instability issues," and "extreme mood swings." (Exhibit 23.) Kimberly did not 
testify at Erick's trial. 
In addition to family members who did not testify, Mr. Hall attaches the affidavits 
from testifying family members whose testimony was incomplete due to trial counsels' 
ineffectiveness in interviewing them and preparing them for their testimony: 
ix. Shawnra McCracken Hemming 
Shawnra McCracken Hemming is Erick's older half-sister. Shawnra testified at 
the sentencing phase of Erick's trial, but she felt inhibited from disclosing all details of 
their troubled childhood, because she felt the jury might find the details unbelievable. 
She loves her brother, and notes the important role he plays in their family. (Exhibit 24 
("I was very nervous and felt that because our childhood was so horrific, it was not 
believable. I feel guilty that my testimony did not help him. I wish that I could have 
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been more open with my answers and been better able to explain how bad our living 
situation was growing up.")) 
x. Tamara McCracken 
Tamara McCracken is Erick's older half-sister. Tamara testified at the sentencing 
phase of Erick's trial, but trial counsel failed to elicit mitigating information. Had she 
been asked, Tamara would have testified as to how much she loves her brother, and the 
turmoil that his execution will cause her. In addition, Tamara would have testified that 
the State tried to undermine the effectiveness of her testimony, or even dissuade her from 
testifying. (Exhibit 25.) 
xi. Deanna McCracken 
Deanna McCracken is Erick's younger sister. Deanna testified at the sentencing 
phase of Erick's trial, but would have provided additional information had trial counsel 
asked. Deanna would have testified that she has heard that when her mother was 
pregnant with Erick, her father, Frank, hit and kicked her in the stomach. She also 
describes moments where Erick would "black out and go into rages." In such 
circumstances, after Erick calmed down, he would have no memory of the incident. 
(Exhibit 5.) 
b. Trial Counsel Failed To Locate, Interview, And Present 
The Testimony Of Erick Hall's Foster Parents And Foster 
Brother 
In the capital sentencing context, it is critically important for the trial team to 
investigate all aspects of the client's upbringing, including any foster homes or 
institutions at which the client was housed or incarcerated. ABA Guidelines, 
Commentary to Guideline 10.7 ("If the client was incarcerated, institutionalized or placed 
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outside of the home, as either a juvenile or an adult, the defense team should investigate 
the possible effect of the facility's conditions on the client's contemporaneous and later 
conduct.") In Erick's case, the sentencing investigation failed to uncover critical 
witnesses to sexually abusive foster care situations, as well as mitigating evidence of the 
extraordinary depths of Erick's emotional and psychological fragility from positive but 
short-lived foster care placement. 
i. Linda McQuery And Jeff Langston 
Erick was placed in foster care with Linda McQuery when he was sixteen years 
old. The trial team never attempted to ascertain the circumstances of that placement. 
Ms. Dapsauski verified that she "conducted little investigation" into Erick's foster care 
placement, even though "Erick Hall told us that his foster mother, Linda McQuery had 
'jumped' him, i.e., sexually abused him." (Exhibit 10, p.9.) She acknowledged that she 
located Ms. McQuery, but never attempted to interview her. 
The trial team's failure to adequately investigate Erick's foster placement with 
Ms. McQuery had dire and utterly avoidable consequences. First, despite the fact that 
Erick disclosed being sexually abused by his foster mother, trial counsel did not present 
that information. Dr. Mark Cunningham verified that he did not include the McQuery 
information in his testimony because of the lack of corroboration. (Exhibit 11, p.5 ("I did 
not testify to this at trial as I had no corroboration of such a relationship.") The lack of 
corroboration, however, was the direct result of trial counsel's failure to investigate 
Erick's foster care placement. 14 
14 Mr. Hall contends, moreover, that evidence of sexual abuse should have been presented 
even without corroboration. However, the corroboration was readily available. 
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Post-conviction investigators located and interviewed Erick's foster brother, Jeff 
Langston, who was placed with Erick under Linda McQuery's care. Mr. Langston has 
provided an affidavit in which he states he was seduced by Linda McQuery and 
maintained an incestuous sexual relationship with her during the two months that he and 
Erick resided at McQuery's house. (Exhibit 26, p.3.) Jeffwas seventeen years old; Erick 
was sixteen years old. Dr. Cunningham has verified that, had he known this information, 
he would have incorporated it into his testimony. (Exhibit 11, p.5 ("I would have viewed 
this as providing important confirmation of perverse sexuality in this setting and 
inferentially supportive of his report of also being sexually abused. I would have testified 
to this at trial.,,).)15 The McQuery household, along with confirmation of family incest 
and abuse described by Erick's brother Shannon, would have established the pervasive 
nature of Erick's exposure to perverse, incestuous familial relationships. In a murder 
case involving rape, this was highly relevant information for the jury's consideration. 
Jeff Langston also provided powerful mitigating evidence of psychological 
disorders, including poor attention to hygiene, mood swings, and odd and erratic 
behavior. Jeff stated that Erick described hearing voices, and observed Erick making odd 
comments as though he was reacting to voices speaking to him. He described how Erick, 
without provocation, would begin "ranting and raving" and "pacing and waving his arms 
around." (Exhibit 26, pp.3.) Had Dr. Cunningham had this information, he would have 
testified that it was consistent with a psychotic disorder and, when combined with the 
15 Dr. Cunningham also would have testified that Erick's report of having had an 
incestuous relationship with his foster mother supported that Erick was at least aware of 
the incestuous relationship between McQuery and Jeff Langston. "The highly sexually 
disturbed family context of the McQuery household represented still another instance of 
poor family sexual boundaries." (Exhibit 11, p.5) 
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information provided by Shannon, is "[ c ]onsistent with recurrent if not longstanding 
experience of psychotic experience in childhood and adolescence .... " (Exhibit 11, p.5.) 
ii. Harry And Sophronia Selby 
The trial team also failed to locate and interview Harry and Sophronia Selby. 
Erick was placed with Harry and Sophronia in the fall of 1985, in Tillamook, Oregon. 
The Selbys were Erick's foster parents for approximately five and one-half months. 
(Exhibit 27, p.3 (Affidavit of Sophronia Selby).) According to Rosanne Dapsauski, she 
was unable to locate them; however, she stated that the trial team "should have conducted 
a greater investigation of Erick's foster parents." (Exhibit 10, p.9.) Post-conviction 
investigators successfully located the Selbys living in Idaho. 16 
Both Harry and Sophronia provided heartbreaking and valuable mitigating 
information about Erick. Sophronia described Erick being dropped off at the foster 
home: 
[The placement service] dropped Erick off at the Selby home. Erick did 
not have any personal belongings with him. He only had the clothes he 
was wearing. The clothes that Erick was wearing were very dirty and 
smelled. It was obvious from the smell that the clothes had not been 
washed in a long time. They also smelled like cigarette smoke. 
Erick stayed in the clothes he arrived in for almost a week. We were 
finally able to convince him to shower and change .... 
(Exhibit 27, p.3.) 
16 A simple search for the Selbys in Idaho revealed their current address, and the Selbys 
immediately responded to a letter from the SAPD. 
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Erick's hygiene was problematic while he lived with the Selby'S. They were 
lucky to get him to shower a couple of times a week.17 They remember Erick being very 
quiet, overly scared and insecure. He was extra cautious in everything he did in the 
home, and went out of his way not to be noticed. Erick always stayed physically close to 
Harry Selby and, other than attending school, it was about four months before Erick went 
outside the house without Harry. Additionally, they also reported Erick suffered 
frequently from severe headaches. (Exhibit 27.) 
Shortly after Erick's placement, the Selbys visited Erick's home in order to obtain 
his belongings. The yard was unkempt, the paint was cracking, and there was garbage all 
along the porch. The door to the house was ajar. Two young girls answered Harry 
Selby's knock. They were dirty, minimally dressed, and their hair was uncombed. They 
were home alone. From what Harry' could see through the door, the floor was very dirty, 
and there was garbage strewn about the floor. (Exhibit 28.) 
Sophronia Selby believes that Erick had been sexually abused. Erick never 
wanted to take his coat off, regardless of the weather. He always insisted on remaining 
fully clothed, and would not shower or change even though he had a private bathroom. 
(Exhibit 27, p.5.) Harry Selby noted that, "Erick used his clothing as some sort of 
protection." (Exhibit 28, p.3.) Erick was uncomfortable with demonstrations of affection, 
such as hugs. (Exhibit 27, p.5.) When the Selbys told Erick they had been informed he 
was leaving their care, Erick seemed resigned, sad, and "seemed to start closing in within 
himself again." (Exhibit 28, p.5.) 
17 Erick's problems with hygiene as well as his extremely unstable home life were 
confirmed by Cookie Quirk, who was Erick's probation counselor in Vancouver, 
Washington, from the time Erick was twelve to the time he was seventeen. (Exhibit 29.) 
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The trial team's failure to uncover the information from the Selbys had a 
significant impact on Erick's sentencing trial. First, the Selby's confirm that Erick's 
home was a mess, and the young children were dirty and left unattended. Second, the 
Selbys could have provided powerful testimony of a very frightened teenager, plagued by 
the baggage of his childhood, literally afraid of the external world beyond his clothing. 
Third, Dr. Cunningham would have incorporated the information provided by the Selbys 
as he found it significant that Erick appeared so insecure, vulnerable and anxious as a 
teenager: 
Important in the observations of Harry and Sophronia Selby were their 
recollections of the insecurity, vulnerability, and anxiety exhibited by 
Erick Hall as a teen. Such descriptions provide a compelling 
understanding of the trauma of his childhood, as well as the resultant 
inadequacy and fearfulness that later took expression in his violent offense 
conduct. These observations would have corrected misapprehensions the 
jury might have otherwise had that he was and had been simply 
volitionaUy predatory. Illustrative of Erick's fearfulness, Mr. Selby 
reported that Erick was reluctant to remove his clothing for them to be 
washed or to take a bath because he felt vulnerable without them on. He 
reported that Erick had a pronounced "deer in the headlights" look and 
was reluctant to even venture outside of the house alone for four months. 
Whether Erick's profound feelings of safety and body vulnerability were 
the result of pervasive developmental trauma, or arose from specific 
sexual abuse and trauma, or both, is uncertain. Regardless of etiology, in 
the absence of such anecdotal descriptions the jury had little mechanism 
know or give informed weight to these demonstrations of the extent of 
Erick's traumatic experience in childhood as reflected in extreme anxiety. 
Unfortunately, these were unavailable at the time of trial. 
(Exhibit 11, pp.5-6.) Thus, the result of the inadequate investigation of the case in 
mitigation was that the jury was deprived the description of Erick as a profoundly 
troubled, fearful, vulnerable, and anxious teenager. This information could have bridged 
the gap between the testimony provided about Erick's troubled childhood to the adult 
who the jury found guilty of committing these crimes. 
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c. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate And 
Present Evidence Of An Alternate Perpetrator Of The 
Murder And Co-Perpetrator Of The Rape 
During these post-conviction proceedings, Mr. Hall has established that the DNA 
evidence shows that there was more than one perpetrator involved in the crime of rape. 
See infra, Claim JJ. During the course of this post-conviction investigation, Mr. Hall has 
identified a possible co-perpetrator of the rape, and alternate perpetrator of the murder. 
That person, Patrick Hoffert, was seen with Lynn Henneman the day she disappeared. 
The following day Patrick Hoffert committed suicide. 
i. Deficient Performance 
Trial counsel failed to conduct a reasonable investigation of the possible 
connection between Lynn Henneman's murder and Patrick Hoffert's suicide. Had trial 
counsel conducted an adequate investigation, counsel would have identified a possible 
co-perpetrator of the rape, and possible alternate perpetrator of the murder. This claim is 
divided into three sources of evidence that were readily available to trial counsel 
including: (a) police reports; (b) two witnesses (Lisa Manora Lewis and Peggy Jean Hill); 
and (c) lead sheets. 
(aJ Police Reports 
According to a Boise Police Department report, Lisa Lewis and Peggy Hill told 
Detective Dave Smith and Scott Birch of the Attorney General's Office that they had 
seen and spoken with Lynn Henneman near the Greenbelt on the night she was abducted. 
(Exhibit 30.) According to the report, Ms. Lewis indicated that Ms. Henneman asked for 
directions to the DoubleTree Inn. According to Ms. Lewis, Erick Hall and Patrick 
Bernard Hoffert then arrived, at which point Mr. Hall spoke briefly to Ms. Henneman. 
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Ms. Hill told the police that she noticed Ms. Henneman's yellow sapphire ring and that 
Mr. Hall left with Ms. Henneman. This report was disclosed in discovery. Despite the 
fact that it appears their statements would be helpful to the prosecution, the State did not 
call either Ms. Lewis or Ms. Hill to testify at the trial. I8 
In addition, according to a Garden City Police Department report, the morning 
after Ms. Henneman's disappearance Patrick Hoffert, the other individual placed with 
Ms. Henneman the night before, committed suicide. (Exhibit 31.) An investigation was 
conducted both by the Garden City Police Department and the coroner's office. It is not 
clear whether the police or the prosecution ever actively investigated a connection 
between Ms. Henneman's murder and Patrick Hoffert's suicide. It is clear however that 
at some point the State realized there might be a connection and disclosed this report in 
discovery. However, the trial team failed to adequately investigate these leads, and, as 
discussed below, failed to provide critical testimony that Patrick Hoffert's suicide was 
indeed linked to Lynn Henneman's rape and murder. 
Despite the information provided to trial counsel in discovery, the trial team failed 
to conduct an adequate and independent investigation of Patrick Hoffert's connection to 
Lynn Henneman's disappearance. 
18 See Claim U. It appears that one possible reason the State did not call these witnesses 
is because, as noted below, there is much more to the story than reflected in the police 
report. However, Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim because the Court has denied his 
motion to depose the prosecutors. 
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(b) Lisa Manora Lewis & Peggy Jean Hill 
During the late afternoon or early evening of the day Lynn Henneman 
disappeared, Lisa Lewis and Peggy Jean Hill were outside on Allworth Street in Garden 
City, between 49th Street and Bradley Street. A woman, later identified by both women 
as Lynn Henneman, walked by several times and appeared to be lost. (Exhibit 32 
(Affidavit of Lisa Lewis, dated February 10, 2006); Exhibit 33 (Affidavit of Peggy Jean 
Hill, dated February 10, 2006).) The woman asked Ms. Lewis for directions to the 
Greenbelt and the DoubleTree hotel. While Ms. Hill, Ms. Lewis, and Ms. Henneman 
were talking, Patrick Hoffert and his girlfriend Deirdre Muncy stopped to give directions, 
and Erick Hall stopped on his bicycle. Ms. Lewis and Ms. Hill departed, leaving 
Ms. Henneman with Patrick Hoffert, Deirdre Muncy, and Erick Hall. Later that evening, 
Patrick Hoffert told Ms. Lewis that "he made sure the woman got back to her hotel." 
(Exhibit 32.) The following evening, Patrick Hoffert committed suicide by shooting 
himself in the head. (Exhibit 31.) Just subsequent to Patrick Hoffert's suicide, Deirdre 
Muncie told Ms. Lewis that Patrick had stated he had "raped the girl." (Exhibit 32.) 
By the time Patrick Hoffert killed himself, there were missing person flyers and 
media reports regarding Lynn Henneman's disappearance allover Boise. When police 
showed up to investigate the suicide, Ms. Lewis informed them that she believed she had 
seen Ms. Henneman the previous day. (Exhibit 32.) A few weeks later, while at the 
Garden City Police Department on a separate matter related to dog tags, Ms. Lewis was 
asked about Ms. Henneman's disappearance; however, she was told to mind her own 
business when she began talking about the Patrick Hoffert connection. (Exhibit 32.) 
Ms. Hill called the Garden City Police Department, the Boise Police Department, and the 
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FBI on several occasIOns to report she had seen Ms. Henneman the night of her 
disappearance, but law enforcement did not respond. (Exhibit 33.) Ms. Hill again tried to 
contact local law enforcement after Lynn Henneman's body was discovered, and yet 
again in 2003. (Exhibit 33.) In 2004, Ms. Lewis was interviewed by Detective Dave 
Smith and another man; during this interview she identified Ms. Henneman's photo from 
an array. (Exhibit 32.) In May of 2004, Detective Dave Smith contacted Ms. Hill, and 
she provided him with the information she had regarding Ms. Henneman's 
disappearance. (Exhibit 33.) 
(c) Lead Sheets 
Police lead sheets confirm Ms. Lewis and Ms. Hill contacted law enforcement 
consistent with their recollection, as recounted in their affidavits. (See attachments to 
Exhibits 34 and 35 (containing police lead sheets.) Trial counsel's files contained a mere 
12 lead sheets in the entire Henneman investigation, out of hundreds of lead sheets, and 
thousands of pages of follow-ups to those lead sheets.19 The trial team had access to the 
lead sheets, but none of the lead sheets in trial counsel files were relevant to either Lisa 
Lewis or Peggy Hill's claims. 
Trial c~JUnsel did receive the discovery regarding Patrick Hoffert, but failed to 
adequately pursue the lead sheets, even though the involvement of another person in 
Lynn Henneman's disappearance, rape, or murder could have been highly mitigating for 
Erick Hall, as the true extent of his culpability would have been called into question. 
19 It is unknown whether Glen Elam obtained or reviewed other lead sheets, but even if 
he had, he clearly did not recognize the significance of the lead sheets uncovered by 
Mr. Hall's post-conviction investigator. 
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The investigation of the Hoffert case was presumably assigned to Glen Elam. 
(Exhibit 10, p.ll; Exhibit 36.) Trial counsel's investigator, Glen Elam, interviewed 
Ms. Lewis on August 12,2004.20 (Exhibit 37 (audio of interview of Lisa Lewis by Glen 
Elam); Exhibit 38 (transcript of audio of interview of Lisa Lewis by Glen Elam).) In that 
interview, Ms. Lewis told him about seeing Lynn Henneman on September 24, 2000. 
She explained that she was positive about her identification. She told Mr. Elam she heard 
Deirdre Muncie state several times that Patrick Hoffert said he raped a girl. Mr. Elam 
instructed her that she would be subpoenaed to testify at Erick's trial. (Exhibit 37; Exhibit 
38.) 
Ms. Lewis was never subpoenaed, however, even though she could have provided 
strong evidence that Patrick Hoffert was involved in at least the rape ofLynn Henneman, 
and inferentially, her kidnapping and murder. Ms. Hill could have provided 
corroborating evidence of the events. Mr. Elam told Erick's post-conviction investigator 
that he attempted to contact Deirdre Muncie, but was unsuccessful. However, minimal 
effort was actually made to contact her. Mr. Hall's post-conviction investigator obtained 
notes from Mr. Elam which indicated that Mr. Elam assigned the Deirdre Muncie 
interview to another investigator, who merely left a business card at Ms. Muncie's 
20 Mr. Elam told post-conviction investigator Michael J. Shaw that he had interviewed 
several people who claimed they saw Lynn Henneman lost in Garden City. Mr. Elam 
claims they had inconsistencies in their stories, but post-conviction counsel is unable to 
confirm this because of the Court's denial of the request to depose Mr. Elam, and trial 
counsel's refusal to allow Mr. Elam to sign an affidavit. (Exhibit 36.) However, post-
conviction investigation has not uncovered major inconsistencies. 
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residence and made some telephone calls in an attempt to reach her.21 (Exhibit 36; 
Exhibit 39 (notes from Glen Elam to John Anzuoni regarding interview of Ms. Muncie.) 
There is no indication that any further attempts were made to reach Deirdre Muncie.22 
The explanations for the failure to follow up on the Patrick Hoffert-Lynn 
Henneman connection are nothing more than post hoc attempts to justify a failure to 
adequately investigate, and are based on incorrect memories of that investigation. For 
example, Mr. Elam did not recall that Ms. Lewis even told him that Deirdre Muncie 
heard Patrick Hoffert say he had raped a girl. (Exhibit 36, p.3.) When confronted with 
the statement, Mr. Elam then speculated that he probably did not follow up on Ms. 
Lewis' claim because of her lack of specificity regarding who had been raped. (Exhibit 
36, p.3.) However, it is clear from the taped interview Ms. Lewis was referring to Lynn 
Henneman. (Exhibit 37; Exhibit 38.) 
When trial counsel was presented with the additional facts developed through a 
more thorough investigation than they had conducted by trial counsel, Amil Myshin 
stated, "There seems to be more information about this incident than we knew about at 
the time. And I guess conceivably, had we done a more thorough investigation, perhaps 
we would have found that out." (Tr., 9114/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.72, Ls.19-23.) 
21 Mr. Elam shared limited information and files with Mr. Hall's post-conviction 
investigator; and has since refused to cooperate without the approval of trial counsel, 
Amil Myshin, who has refused any such cooperation. 
22 Deirdre Muncie has denied the statement attributed to Patrick Hoffert to Mr. Hall's 
post-conviction investigator; however, she was not under oath or investigation, and is not 
required to cooperate in any way with post-conviction counsel. Had she failed to 
cooperate with trial counsel, however, they could have subpoenaed her, or cross-
examined her if the State chose to call her. Even if she continued to deny the statement, 
Ms. Lewis could have rebutted her testimony, and Ms. Hill could have bolstered Ms. 
Lewis' testimony - at a minimum, creating doubt for the jury as to the true extent of 
Erick Hall's involvement and culpability. 
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Mr. Myshin conceded that the additional evidence could have helped Mr. Hall's case. 
(Tr., 11116/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, pA13, LsA-12.) Indeed, according to Mr. 
Myshin, he did not know that Deidre Muncy purportedly told others that Patrick Hoffert 
stated he "raped the girl" just after Ms. Henneman's disappearance and just prior to his 
suicide, and that had he known, that "may have changed what I did" at trial. (Tr., 
11116/06 deposition of Ami I Myshin, pA13, L.20 - pAlS, L.14.) 
Trial counsel were questioned whether they investigated the claims contained in 
the report. Amil Myshin testified that they did not conduct a thorough investigation 
because the report was not disclosed until late in the case. (Tr., 9114/06 deposition of 
Amil Myshin, p.68, L.S - p.72, L.18 (indicating that the defense did not receive 
discovery of the Hoffert incident until "late in the case," on or about August 9, 2004).23 
ii. Deficient Peiformance 
Trial counsel's failure to conduct a reasonable investigation left the jury without 
critical infonnation it may have found mitigating. Evidence tending to identify someone 
else as an alternate perpetrator of the murder or the co-perpetrator of rape may obviously 
lessen a defendant's moral culpability.24 Thus, any doubt the jury may have had whether 
23 Again, Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim because the Court denied his request to 
conduct a deposition of Glenn Elam, the individual who would have investigated the 
possible Hoffert connection. D.C. Carr, appears to have a flawed memory on the subject. 
(See Tr., 9113/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.216, L.3 - p.220, L.lS (recalling that the 
defense did not learn ofthe Hoffert incident until sentencing had concluded, and that they 
learned of the incident through their independent investigation, not through discovery 
provided by the State); but see p.221, L.16 - p.22S, L.1O (recalling that the defense 
discussed whether to pursue an alternate or co-perpetrator theory based on Patrick 
Hoffert).) Additionally, trial counsel, Amil Myshin, has refused to allow Mr. Elam to 
sign an affidavit. (Exhibit 36.) 
24 In addition, once the DNA evidence presented by the State is challenged as it has been 
through post-conviction proceedings, i.e., by demonstrating that the DNA sample 
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Erick murdered Lynn Henneman is mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. This type 
of evidence is particularly important in this case because there were no eyewitnesses. See 
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality)(" ... we conclude that the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital 
case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a 
defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the 
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death"); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 
U.S. 104, 112, 113-114 (1982). Therefore, without an eye witness, and the evidence 
there may have been a co-perpetrator or alternate perpetrator, the jury likely would have 
imposed a sentence less than death. The prejudice frOIl) this claim should be considered 
cumulatively with other sentencing phase prejudice. 
d. Trial Counsel Failed To Adequately Investigate And Present 
Evidence Of Erick Hall's Good Character As An Adult 
During sentencing proceedings, the defense offered testimony from family 
members and two experts that described Erick Hall's horrific childhood. However, trial 
counsel failed to adequately investigate Mr. Hall's life as an adult. In their closing 
argument, the State argued this very fact to the jury. Thus, it was difficult for the jury to 
discern that the child, so damaged and abused, nonetheless developed into an adult with 
kind, generous, and loving characteristics. The jury was left with the impression that 
there were no mitigating circumstances in Erick's adult life. 
contained more than one contributor; the evidence of guilt of murder is far from 
overwhelming. While the jury may have still convicted Mr. Hall of rape, there is a 
reasonable probability that the jury would not have convicted Mr. Hall of murder. See 
Claim JJ, infra. 
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Had trial counsel adequately investigated and presented mitigating circumstances 
of Erick's adolescence and adulthood including mitigating evidence near the time of the 
crime, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have imposed a life sentence, 
because they would have seen that Erick had redeeming qualities, and was not defined 
solely by the actions for which the jury convicted him. 
This information was readily available. The post-conviction investigation has 
uncovered evidence of caring, loving relationships, with i) Wendy Levy, ii) Evelyn 
Dunaway, iii) Jennifer Demunbrun, iv) Amber Lynn (Peterson) Fox, v) Timothy Turley, 
and vi) Laura Turley. 
i. Wendy Levy 
Wendy Levy was interviewed by trial counsel and provided them with similar 
information similar to the information she provided during the post-conviction 
investigation, but was never called to testify. (Exhibit 2.) Ms. Levy would have testified 
that Erick played with her children, was good with her children, including her special-
needs daughter, and that her children referred to him as their "Uncle Erick." Erick 
assisted with chores, provided food and money to the family when they were hungry, and 
otherwise attempted to provide for the family. He was never violent in any manner with 
any of the members of the family. He was a talented artist, playful, a good worker, and 
protective of Wendy and her children. Erick referred to Wendy as his sister. 
ii. Evelyn Dunaway 
Evelyn Dunaway, who testified for the State at sentencing regarding violent 
incidents between herself and Erick, nonetheless had loving things to say about him, 
which were never elicited by trial counsel. Erick tried to help Evelyn quit a meth habit 
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and she describes him as "very caring with regard to talking to [her], and supporting [her] 
as [she] tried to stay off drugs." (Exhibit 40.) Erick exhibited compassion and generosity 
toward her children and the children of another family living with them-spoon-feeding 
them medicine when they were sick, drawing pictures for them, and purchasing a 
drawing book for them. Evelyn, the same woman the State used to depict Erick as a 
violent monster, states that he "had a lot of good qualities," and would pick her flowers 
almost every day and "did a number of very kind things" for Evelyn. Erick was 
"genuinely nice and wanted to help people" and took in homeless people and fixed up 
bicycles for people who had no transportation. Evelyn continues to hold onto a 
photograph of herself and Erick, and likes "to think about the good times [they] shared 
together." To this day, she has feelings of care and concern for Erick. To the best of 
Evelyn's recollection, trial counsel did not interview her. 
iii. Jennifer Demunbrun 
Jennifer Demunbrun is Wendy Levy's daughter. She was interviewed by a 
member of the defense team, and Jennifer indicated her willingness to testify for Erick. 
However, she was never subpoenaed or otherwise called to testify. Jennifer would have 
testified that Erick lived with her family when she was approximately twelve years old. 
She referred to Erick as her uncle. Erick was a great babysitter: 
He was gentle, he never raised his voice toward us, he never hit us, and he 
did not neglect us or leave us alone. Erick treated us as though we were 
his children. He took us to the park to feed the ducks, cooked meals for 
us, and if we were sick he would encourage us to eat or take our medicine. 
Erick never behaved in a violent manner with any members of my family. 
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(Exhibit 41.) Erick took care of Jennifer when she was sick in 2000 or 2001. He would 
wake her up to eat, to drink water, to take medicine, and he watched Jennifer's children 
for her. Clearly, trial counsel should have called Jennifer to testify on Erick's behalf. 
iv. Amber Lynn (Peterson) Fox 
Amber Lynn Fox was a friend and roommate of Jennifer Demunbrun. Amber had 
a consensual sexual relationship with Erick Hall. They had sex a few times over the 
course of a month. Erick was always gentle with her and never engaged in rough or 
abusive behavior. Erick never choked her or engaged in any other bizarre or violent 
behavior with Amber. (Exhibit 44.) 
v. Timothy Turley 
Tim Turley is a long-time friend of Erick's. He was interviewed by a member of 
Erick's defense team, and was told he would be called to testify. Tim was transported 
from jail to the courthouse, but was never called to testify or given a reason why he was 
not called. Tim met Erick around 1987 or 1988. They became good friends. Tim's 
family came to know and love Erick, and his daughters still refer to him as "Uncle 
Erick." Tim considers Erick to be his brother. Erick is the godfather to one of Tim's 
children. In the summer of 2000, Erick prevented Tim from committing suicide: 
In the summer of 2000, Erick happened to show up at my house. I had 
been out of prison for a few months, and was having a very difficult time. 
I had been planning to kill myself that day, and had a gun. I was in the 
process of putting the gun up to my head and in my mouth. Erick ran over 
to me and knocked the gun out of my mouth. He picked me up, took me 
out to his car, and drove around with me for several hours. He gave me 
food, cigarettes, and talked to me until I got to the point where I could 
think again and figure out what to do. A week or two after that I left Idaho 
and moved to a different state to try to put my life back together. 
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(Exhibit 42.) Erick was an advocate for the underdog, and Tim never feared Erick or saw 
him behave in a violent manner. Erick tried to help Tim quit drugs. To this day, he is 
very bitter that he was not called to testify for Erick, and believes his testimony about 
Erick's character and intervention when Tim tried to commit suicide could have made a 
difference in the jury's sentence. 
vi. Laura Turley 
Laura Turley is Tim Turley's cousin's ex-wife. Laura was never interviewed by 
the defense, but would have told them and would have testified that she and Erick 
became pen pals and frequently talked on the telephone when Erick was incarcerated in 
1993. Laura states that Erick was her "Rock of Gibraltar," and was a steady, positive, 
important part of her life. Erick called her when she was in labor, and became the 
godfather of her youngest daughter. Erick was always loving, friendly, and giving. 
Laura has never seen Erick act in a frightening or violent manner. (Exhibit 43.) 
C. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Consult A Pathologist To Assist In Challenging The State's Presentation 
Of Dr. Glenn Groben's Testimony And To Present A Compelling Case In 
Rebuttal Of Such Testimony 
Trial counsel has a duty to investigate the case for evidence in mitigation as well 
as evidence that can be used to rebut the State's case in aggravation. ABA Guidelines, 
Guideline 10.11 (A). 
Counsel should prepare for the prosecutor's case at the sentencing phase 
in much the same way as for the prosecutor's case at the guilt/innocence 
phase. Counsel should use available discovery mechanisms to ascertain 
the aggravating and rebuttal evidence the prosecution intends to introduce, 
and then thoroughly investigate to determine whether this evidence can be 
excluded, rebutted, or undercut. 
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ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11. To prepare for the State's evidence, 
expert assistance is often necessary. See ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 4.1 
("Analyzing and interpreting such evidence is impossible without consulting experts-
whether pathologists, serologists, microanalysts, DNA analysts, ballistics specialists, 
translators, or others.") 
Trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present expert testimony challenging the 
testimony of Dr. Glen Groben, the county medical examiner who performed the autopsy 
on Ms. Henneman. In fact, trial counsel never consulted with an independent pathologist, 
until the case had already concluded. Consequently, counsel permitted the virtually 
uncontested testimony of Dr. Groben on crucial issues at the guilt phase, i.e. cause of 
death, and the sentencing phase, i.e., manner of death. Trial counsel's performance is 
clearly deficient. As the Supreme Court has stated, trial counsel "has a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular 
investigations unnecessary." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,691 (1984). With 
respect to experts, trial counsel must act reasonably in deciding whether or not to seek or 
retain a particular expert. See e.g., Dugas v. Coplan, 428 F.3d 317, 327-334 (1st Cir. 
2005) (analyzing why trial counsel's failure to thoroughly investigate a "not arson" 
defense in an arson case, and consult with an arson expert, was not an informed, tactical 
decision, but was deficient performance). 
In this case, trial counsel conducted no investigation into the cause and manner of 
Lynn Henneman's death. Trial counsel was asked about their failure to consult a 
pathologist during their depositions. Amil Myshin testified that he did not anticipate the 
effect of the hogtie reenactment and if he could do it again, then he would have utilized 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 49 
011 ()1 
Dr. Aiken instead of simply trying to argue that Dr. Groben's testimony was consistent 
with the defense theory that Ms. Henneman died quickly. (Tr., Deposition of Amil 
Myshin, 9/14/06, p.64, L.13 - p.67, L.14.) This is not a matter of hindsight, as 
Mr. Myshin testified, "1 didn't make a conscious choice not to talk to [Dr.] Sally [Aiken]. 
It just didn't happen. Or 1 didn't think of it, or something happened that 1 didn't do it. 
And 1 wish 1 had." (Tr., 9/14/06, deposition of Amil Myshin, p.76, Ls.16-20.) 
Competent counsel on the other hand would have consulted a forensic pathologist 
or other expert to review Dr. Groben's fmdings and to make an independent 
determination of cause of death or injuries inflicted upon Ms. Henneman before and after 
her death. Trial counsel should have obtained independent consultation in each of these 
areas to truly subject the prosecution's case to the level of adversarial testing demanded 
in capital cases at both the guilt and penalty phases at trial. 
The State presented evidence, and argument, that Ms. Henneman was not only 
hogtied, but hogtied while conscious, and that she suffered a terrifying and tortuous 
death. (Exhibit 45 (powerPoint disc used by State in case no. H0300518).) The State 
used Dr. Groben's testimony as the basis for setting out an egg timer to support a finding 
of premeditated murder, and further, to dramatize the horror of dying in this manner to 
support, at a minimum, the utter disregard aggravator: 
This utter disregard aggravating factor refers to the defendant's lack of 
conscience regarding the killing of a human being. Again doesn't this jury 
instruction look like it was written for Erick Hall? Doesn't it look like it 
was written to describe him? You know that it fits. Last Thursday 
Mr. Bourne talked to you about this utter disregard and how Lynn was 
killed. He did it with his egg timer and you've been in the courtroom with 
a lot of high tech things. But what has been more dramatic at showing you 
what this was like with this egg timer? 
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(Tr., p.5452, Ls.11-22.) The State's argument was based nearly entirely on testimony 
elicited from Dr. Glenn Groben. 
Mr. Hall's post-conviction investigation has included consultation with Dr. Sally 
Aiken, a pathologist with the Spokane County Medical Examiner's officer in Spokane, 
Washington. (Exhibit 46.) Dr. Aiken actually consulted with trial counsel in the 
underlying criminal case, but not until after the trial and jury sentencing had already 
concluded. (Tr., 9114/06, deposition of Amil Myshin, p.61, L.16 - p.64, L.8; Exhibit 
46.) Had trial counsel consulted with Dr. Aiken in a timely manner, they would have 
been able to preclude, rebut, or otherwise undermine much of Dr. Groben's testimony, 
most notably his testimony regarding the cause and manner of Ms. Henneman's death. 
Dr. Groben testified that Ms. Henneman died of ligature strangulation, and that it 
would have taken three to five minutes for death to occur. (Tr., p.3989, Ls.507; p.4040, 
Ls.19-20). Dr. Aiken strongly disagrees: 
An article of clothing around the neck is not enough evidence to draw the 
conclusion that strangulation occurred. Dr. Groben's opinion in this 
regard is speculation. The decedent had no internal neck injuries. . . . 
Dr. Groben cannot exclude the possibility that this ligature was applied 
after death to aid in moving the body, for example. In my opinion, the 
cause of death would have been listed most accurately as "homicidal 
violence of unknown etiology." 
(Exhibit 46.) 
In addition, Dr. Aiken strongly disavows Dr. Groben's re-enactment of ligatures 
because it was "not based on a reasonable degree of medical probability." (Exhibit 46.) 
Dr. Aiken disputes that ligatures were necessarily applied at all, and rejects Dr. Groben's 
testimony to the jury that there was no way to know whether the ligatures, if any, were 
applied before or after death. (See Tr., p.4078, L.19 - p.4079, L.3.) Dr. Aiken would 
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this ligature being present premortem. (Exhibit 46.) 
Had counsel consulted with Dr. Aiken, there would have been doubt as to the 
cause of death, no consideration of speculative theories about the cause of death, and no 
consideration of speculative theories about horror endured by the victim. Trial counsel 
could have kept highly prejudicial speculative displays from the jury. In short, trial 
counsel completed failed to subject this vital part of the State's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing. But for trial counsel's failures, there is a reasonable probability that 
the jury would not have found the aggravators, or at least would not have concluded that 
they outweighed the mitigation. 
D. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate The State's Case In Aggravation: Norma Jean 
Oliver 
1. Introduction 
The jury at Mr. Hall's October 2004 capital sentencing was presented evidence 
that nearly thirteen years earlier in December 1991, Erick kidnapped, forcibly raped, and 
threatened to murder Norma Jean Oliver. At that time, Norma Jean was seventeen years 
old, and Erick was twenty. The evidence the jury heard was based on Norma Jean's 
allegations which had originally led to an Indictment against Mr. Hall for two counts of 
forcible rape. (Exhibit 47 (Garden City Police Department, General Report by Detective 
Hess, dated December 4, 1991, regarding alleged forcible rape of Norma Jean Oliver); 
Exhibit 48 (Indictment); Exhibit 55 (State v. Erick Hall, Ada County Case No. HCR 
18591, PSI (filed under seal)).) However, the charges were eventually amended, and in 
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to one count of statutory rape. (Exhibit 49; Exhibit 50.) 
The State pieced together this story for the jury through the testimony of three 
witnesses: Norma Jean Oliver, Detective Daniel Hess (who initially investigated the 
allegations), and Jay Rosenthal (who initially prosecuted and negotiated the plea 
agreement on behalf of the State). The State called Norma Jean first. Norma Jean 
struggled with her memory throughout her testimony.25 Norma Jean testified that at age 
seventeen, she was living with her parents in Fruitland, Idaho. (Tr., p.4758, Ls.12-14.) 
She was not "getting along with [her] parents very well" and often ran away, on occasion 
to Boise, Idaho. (Tr., p.4758, Ls.18-25.) Sometime in late November or early December 
1991, she once again ran away to Boise; her plan this time was to go all the way to 
California. (Tr., p.4760, Ls.6-9.) While still in Boise, she went a local bar and pool hall 
called Mountain Billiards. (Tr., p.4759, LS.5-16.)26 While at the bar/pool hall, she met up 
with Charles ("Chuck") Barton and Erick Hall. (Tr., p.4759, L.21- p.4762, L.7.) Chuck 
and Erick were roommates, sharing a trailer in Garden City, Idaho. (Tr., p.4759, L.25 -
p.4762, L.12i7 At some point, Chuck told Norma Jean that he would help her get to 
California, and Norma Jean agreed to come back to their trailer. (Tr., p.4760, Ls.2-12.) 
Norma Jean ended up going to the trailer that night. (Tr., p.4759, L.5 - p.4762, 
L.12.) At the trailer, she, Erick, and Chuck hung out for awhile before calling it a night. 
25 Without objection, the State elicited much of Norma Jean's testimony through leading 
questions. 
26 See also testimony of Detective Hess. (Tr., p.4807, Ls.12-13 (describing Mountain 
Billiards as "a local bar and pool room").) 
27 See also testimony of Detective Hess. (Tr. p.4797, Ls.23-25 (indicating that Chuck and 
Erick lived together in the trailer).) 
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(Tr., p.4762, Ls.l3-18.) Erick and Chuck slept on their bunk beds; Chuck on top, Erick 
on bottom. (Tr., p.4763, Ls.4-6, 14-17.) Norma Jean testified that she chose to sleep on a 
chair near the door in the trailer. (Tr., p.4763, Ls.7-9.) 
Sometime that night and into the early hours of the next morning, Norma Jean 
testified that she was awakened by Erick choking her. (Tr., p.4763, L.18 - p.4764, L.5.) 
She testified that Erick continued to strangle her until she passed out. (Tr., p.4764, Ls.5-
22.) She testified she awoke in a shed outside the trailer with her arms bound by her own 
clothes. (Tr., p.4764, Ls.21-22; Tr., p.4765, Ls.I-24.) She then testified she "think[s]" 
Erick forced her to have sexual intercourse with him, and described how he began to have 
anal sex but then switched to vaginal intercourse. (Tr., p.4767, Ls.2-8.) Afterward, Erick 
unbound her, wrapped her in a blanket, and took her back to the trailer to his bottom 
bunk. (Tr., p.4767, Ls.9-19.) She testified that she could not remember whether they had 
sex again in the trailer. (Tr., p.4769, Ls.3-7.) Norma Jean explained that Chuck never 
heard any of the commotion because he was sleeping and because she kept quiet to avoid 
upsetting Erick. (Tr., p.4767, Ls.20-23; p.4768, Ls.2-7.) 
Norma Jean testified that after forcing her to have sex, Erick then held her against 
her will for the better part of the day, threatening to kill her with a hammer and throw her 
body into the Boise River. (Tr. pp.4756-4783.) However, Norma Jean stated that Erick 
let her go take a shower in the trailer home on the property. (Tr., p.4769, Ls.14-19.) She 
could not recall if there was anyone else at the trailer home, but after taking her shower, 
she returned to the smaller trailer and Erick. (Tr., 4769, Ls.23-25.) Norma Jean testified 
that her name came across a police scanner and Erick said they had to get out of there. 
(Tr., p.4770, Ls.5-13.) During the confusion, Norma Jean fled the trailer, hopped some 
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fences, and made her way to some friends at the Sands Motel in Boise. (Tr., p.4770, Ls.9-
21.) Eventually she was taken to Intermountain Hospital where she informed hospital 
personnel of the rape. (Tr., p.4771 , Ls.7-11.) 
Norma Jean described her injuries from the attack, including bruises, cuts, 
scratches, and a blown blood vessel in her eye. (Tr., p.4772, L.19 - p.4774, L.15 (noting 
in part that, "[o]n the one eye, the white part of my eye was all red from being strangled. 
It broke all the blood vessels in my eye.").) Norma Jean testified that she must have 
scratched Erick at some point, because he said something to the effect that "he was going 
to scratch me because I scratched him." (Tr., p.4774, Ls.6-7.) 
During cross-examination, trial counsel elicited evidence that Norma Jean was 
receiving social security benefits and at some point had been prescribed medication for 
an unspecified mental health condition that she described as a "chemical imbalance." 
(Tr., p.4777, Ls.2-7; p.4780, Ls.3-18; p.4783, Ls.17-18.) During re-direct examination, 
the State elicited testimony suggesting that Norma Jean did not require medication for her 
condition. (Tr., p.4777, Ls.5-7 ("Okay. Have you taken some [medication] in the past but 
you don't take it now? A. Yes.").) 
The State's next witness was Detective Daniel Hess from the Garden City Police 
Department. Detective Hess testified that he was contacted by Intermountain Hospital 
regarding Norma Jean's allegations. (Tr., p.4786, Ls.3-13.) Detective Hess's 
investigation of the allegations included interviews of both Norma Jean and Erick. (Tr., 
p.4787, Ls.9-12; p.4795, Ls.14-18.) During his interview with Norma Jean, Hess 
obtained some preliminary information about her background before discussing her 
allegations. For instance, Hess testified that Norma Jean told him a little bit about some 
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problems. (Tr. p.4806, Ls.18-25 (Q. Were you aware that Miss Oliver had had an 
extensive history of family trouble? A. Just from my conversation with her, yes. Q. Did 
you know what the nature of that trouble was? A. I have no idea. Q. Did you ever try to 
find out? A. No.").) After obtaining preliminary information from Norma Jean, Hess 
obtained her statement. 
Without objection, Detective Hess testified to the details of the rape as stated to 
him by Norma Jean. (Tr., p.481O, L.12 - p.4811, L.14.) Hess also testified that while 
interviewing Norma Jean, he noticed several cuts and bruises on her body. Photographs 
of Norma Jean's injuries, including scratches and bruises on her arms, were introduced as 
evidence through Hess. (Tr., p.4790, L.13 - p.4795, L.3) 
During his interview with Erick, Detective Hess confronted Erick with Norma 
Jean's allegations. Erick admitted to having sex with Norma Jean, but claimed it was 
consensual. (Tr., p.4780, Ls.7-8 ("He, of course, denied it and said that they had had no 
physical altercation.").) Hess asked Erick about a scratch under his eye. According to 
Hess, Erick first said that a cat had scratched him, before admitting that Norma Jean had 
actually scratched him when they were playing around. (Tr., p.4799, L.9 - p.4800, L.1.) 
Erick was taken into custody and eventually charged with two counts of forcible rape. 
The State completed their presentation of evidence on the prior rape allegations 
through Jay Rosenthal, the former prosecutor who represented the State in the prior 
prosecution. Rosenthal testified that pursuant to a plea agreement, the State agreed to 
amend the charge to statutory rape. The reason for amending the charge was to spare 
Norma Jean the trauma of having to testify. (Tr., p.4952, L.25 - p.4953, L.3.) 
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Specifically, due to her fragile state, Rosenthal had been informed by Norm Jean's 
medical providers at Intermountain that they did not believe Norma Jean could withstand 
cross-examination. (Tr., p.4953, Ls.4-25.) Erick was sentenced to five years in prison. 
(Exhibit 50.) 
The State argued that Norma Jean's testimony supported the "propensity" 
statutory aggravating circumstance. (Tr., p.5455, L.18 - p.5457, L.16.) Indeed, the State 
spent a good deal of their argument discussing the Norma Jean rape and specifically 
compared the similarities between that rape and the murder of Lynn Henneman, 
illustrating the purported similarities in their PowerPoint presentation. (Tr., p.5456, L.20 
- p.5457, L.ll; Exhibit 45.) The jury found the "propensity" aggravating circumstance 
beyond a reasonable doubt and sentenced Mr. Hall to death.28 
2. Applicable Legal Standards 
The applicable standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims is set forth in 
Claim A.2, supra. 
3. Analysis 
A reasonable investigation must be "thorough and independent." ABA 
Guidelines, Guideline 10.7 (stating that counsel has "an obligation to conduct thorough 
and independent investigations relating to the issues of both guilt and penalty"); see also 
Haliym v. Mitchell, 492 F.3d 680, 717 (6th Cir. 2007) (relying in part on the ABA 
Guidelines, Guideline 10.7). "To assume the accuracy of whatever information the client 
may initially offer or the prosecutor may choose or be compelled to disclose is to render 
28 Mr. Hall maintains that due to inadequate jury instructions and improper closing 
argument by the prosecution, the jury relied on such testimony not only in finding the 
propensity aggravator, but also in finding other statutory and non-statutory aggravating 
circumstances, and in weighing the mitigation. 
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ineffective assistance of counsel." ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 1.1. The 
duty to make a thorough and independent investigation extends to any alleged prior 
misconduct. As stated in the ABA Guidelines, 
If the defendant has any prior criminal history, the prosecution can be 
expected to attempt to offer it in support of a death sentence. Defense 
counsel accordingly must comprehensively investigate-together with the 
defense investigator, a mitigation specialist, and other members of the 
defense team-the defendant's behavior and the circumstances of the 
conviction . . . . If uncharged prior misconduct is arguably admissible, 
defense counsel must assume that the prosecution will attempt to introduce 
it, and accordingly must thoroughly investigate it as an integral part of 
preparing for the penalty phase. 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 1.1 (footnotes omitted)~ see also 
Commentary to Guideline 10.7 ("Counsel must also investigate prior convictions, 
adjudications, or unadjudicated offenses that could be used as aggravating circumstances 
or otherwise come into evidence."). 
Trial counsel did not make a reasonable investigation of Norma Jean's 
allegations. They did not interview available witnesses or even review available 
transcripts of Norma Jean and Detective Hess's prior grand jury testimony. Instead, trial 
counsel relied on the minimal discovery disclosed by the State. 
Q. Did you reinvestigate the 1991 case as part of this case? 
A. As far as reviewing it, all the evidence, yes. As far as going out and seeking 
witnesses, no. 
Q. Did you have the grand jury transcript from the '91 rape case at Erick's trial? 
A. Was there a grandjury? 
Q. Yes, there was. 
(Tr., 11116/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.330, Ls.14-22.) 
The minimal discovery provided by the State included a police report prepared by 
Detective Hess, summarizing his investigation. The report referenced tape-recorded 
interviews of Norma Jean and Erick Hall. (Exhibit 47, p.2 ("I began my interview [of 
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Trial counsel relied solely on Detective Hess's written report. See footnote 83, infra; R., 
p.373 (stating that the only available evidence to prepare for Nonna Jean's allegations 
consisted of "one sided" police reports "oflittle assistance to the defense.") 
With the State's assistance, trial counsel conducted a last minute interview of 
Nonna Jean. By the time the interview occurred, the guilt phase had concluded, trial 
counsel had already given their opening statement for the sentencing phase, and Nonna 
Jean, the State's first witness, was less than two hours away from taking the stand. (Tr., 
pA751, Ls.14-24 (indicating to the jury that they will be in recess to give trial counsel the 
opportunity to speak to witnesses they had not spoken to yet); pA755, L.21 - pA756, 
L.3.) The interview was conducted by Amil Myshin without the assistance of the defense 
team's investigator.29 The interview took place at the prosecutor's office, with the 
prosecutors present. The interview was discussed at the post-conviction depositions. 
Q. And do you recall why you did that interview at the prosecutor's office? 
A. We interviewed her. We hadn't had a chance to interview her. Amil 
interviewed. 
Q. And why hadn't you had a chance. 
A. She lived in another state. 
Q. Do you remember if there were any attempts to contact her prior to this? 
A. I do not know. 
29 Trial counsel should not conduct witness interviews. See, fn. 39 infra. Indeed, trial 
counsel agreed that he prefers to have investigators interview witnesses. (Tr., 11116/06 
deposition of Amil Myshin, p.343, LsA-22.) This is further evidence that trial counsel 
was unprepared to conduct a meaningful interview of Norma Jean. It appears that trial 
counsel conducted the Nonna Jean interview because he was pressed for time and could 
not wait for Glenn Blam or another investigator. (Tr., 11116/06 deposition of Amil 
Myshin, p.344, Ls.8-ll ("I tend to be a run-and-gun guy. I move fast. I think fast. I do 
things quickly. I don't wait for people. We don't have a ton of investigators").) Such a 
"run-and-gun" approach by an attorney unfamiliar and ill equipped to deal with Nonna 
Jean's mental problems and unprepared to address numerous weaknesses in her story, 
rendered it a near certainty that the interview of Nonna Jean would be a bust. 
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(Tr., 12/8/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.299, Ls.11-19); see also (Tr., 11/16/06 deposition 
of Amil Myshin, p.327, 1.24 - p.328, 1.1 (indicating that they "didn't know where she 
was.,,);30 p.328, 1.2 - p.329, 1.16, p.331, 1.10 - p.333, 1.5; p.329, Ls.6-17; Tr. 9/13/06 
deposition of D.C. Carr, p.200, 1.1-p.207, 1.24 (failing to recall whether there were any 
pretrial attempts to interview Norma Jean); Tr., 12/8/06 deposition of D.C. Carr, p.300, 
Ls.16-19 (indicating that Amil Myshin conducted the interview without an investigator); 
Exhibit 10 (affidavit of Rosanne Dapsauski, indicating that the mitigation specialist did 
not seek to interview Norma Jean).)31 Not surprisingly, the eleventh hour interview 
yielded little information. (Tr., p.4755, 1.21 - p.4756, 1.3 (stating that Norma Jean "was 
too distraught" to effectively interview her prior to her testimony). 
Trial counsel understandably objected to the introduction of the evidence on 
grounds that evidence of forcible rape that allegedly occurred thirteen years earlier would 
be very difficult to defend. (Tr., p.765, Ls.18-19 ("[T]he case is so old and so stale that 
it's going to be very difficult to rebut.").) In addition, trial counsel believed that the 1992 
presentence investigation report had been destroyed and that potential witnesses had died. 
(R., p.373; Tr., p.765, 1.9 - p.766, 1.16.) However, once the Court ruled that the 
30 This answer does not make sense. All trial counsel had to do was ask the State where 
Norma Jean could be located and the State would have been required to provide her 
address. See I.C.R. 16(b) (6). 
31 This Court has refused to allow the deposition of Glenn Elam, the defense team's 
investigator. Mr. Elam is unwilling to cooperate with post-conviction counsel without 
Amil Myshin's approval. Mr. Myshin has specifically stated to the SAPD's investigator, 
"I wish you would leave him alone." (Exhibit 36.) Accordingly, Mr. Hall asserts that his 
state and federal due process rights to meaningful post-conviction proceedings have been 
violated. 
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evidence would be admissible, trial counsel had an obligation to pursue reasonable 
avenues of investigation. 
A reasonable investigation would have uncovered a wealth of favorable 
infonnation that could have been used to preclude, or at least rebut, the evidence 
presented. The favorable evidence is set forth in the following subclaims: subclaim a 
addresses trial counsel's failure to investigate Nonna Jean's mental health problems; 
subclaim b addresses trial counsel's failure to investigate Nonna Jean's inconsistent 
statements and motive to lie and retaliate against Mr. Hall; subclaim c addresses trial 
counsel's failure to investigate Nonna Jean's problems at home; subclaim d addresses 
trial counsel's failure to investigate Nonna Jean's prior misconduct; subclaim e 
addresses trial counsel's failure to identify inaccuracies in Detective Hess's report; and 
subclaim f addresses trial counsel's failure to identify the degree of leniency reflected in 
Erick Hall's plea agreement. Each of these subclaims independently, and in conjunction 
with each other, establishes both prongs of the Strickland standard. See infra, section 4. 
a. Trial Counsel Failed To Investigate Nonna Jean's Mental 
Health Problems 
The Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right to cross-examine adverse witnesses and "includes the opportunity to show that a 
witness is biased, or that the testimony is exaggerated or unbelievable." Pennsylvania v. 
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 673, 678 (1987). A criminal defendant may question a witness's 
credibility or even competency to testify by eliciting evidence of the witness's 
compromised mental health. See Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 987-988 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(recognizing that evidence calling into question a witness's competency to testify is 
powerful impeachment material); Freeman v. U.S., 284 F.Supp.2d 217, 225-226 (D. 
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Mass. 2003) (recognizing that a witness's untreated bipolar disorder calls into question 
the reliability of the witness's testimony); Commonwealth v. Barroso, 122 S.W.3d 554, 
562-563 (Ky. 2003) (recognizing that certain mental disorders are highly probative on the 
issue of credibility); Gage v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 
365 F.Supp.2d 919, 928 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (noting that "Bipolar disorder, like 
schizophrenia, can distort a witness' reaction to events."); (Exhibit 63 (DSM IV-TR, 
description of bipolar disorder).) Based on trial counsel's inadequate investigation, and 
resulting ineffective cross-examination, the jury had very little information about Norma 
Jean's mental health condition both at the time of the alleged rape and at the time of her 
testimony. 
i. Deficient Performance 
Following their last minute interview, trial counsel realized that Norma Jean had 
obvious mental problems and counsel even questioned her competency to testify. 
However, counsel did not pursue an investigation of her mental health, or request an 
inquiry into her competency, but instead hoped that her "hysteria" might cut in their favor 
at trial. 
Q. What was her demeanor at the interview? 
A. She was a mess. I don't know if "hysterical" is a fair word. I don't 
think she was that, but it was -- how would I describe it? It was 
obvious to me she has mental problems. I could say that much about 
her. 
*** 
Q. Given her demeanor in the interview, did you have any questions 
about her competency to testifY? 
A. I suppose. I mean, I don't think I released that. I mean, I thought --
under some of those circumstances, the hysteria cuts both ways .... I 
don't remember the question and answer, but I think there was a lot of 
things she didn't remember. 
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(Tr., 11/16/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.329, Ls.5-1O; p.332, Ls.14-22.) Had trial 
counsel conducted an earlier interview of Nonna Jean or at least requested and reviewed 
her 1991 grand jury testimony, they would have known to further investigate her mental 
health well in advance of trial. At the very least, trial counsel should have requested a 
private interview ofNonna Jean, outside the presence ofthe prosecutors. 
(a) Interviewing Norma Jean 
Trial counsel was woefully unprepared to interview and cross-examine Nonna 
Jean. Trial counsel even acknowledged to the Court their pretrial interview was 
ineffective. (Tr., p.4755, 1.21 - p.4756, 1.3 (noting that Nonna Jean ''was too distraUght" 
to effectively interview her prior to her testimony).) Had trial counsel conducted a 
meaningful investigation, they would have located and interviewed Nonna Jean.32 
Based on her post-conviction interview, Nonna Jean would have readily 
discussed with trial counsel her mental health history. Trial counsel would have learned 
Nonna Jean has been to Intennountain Hospital on multiple occasions, has been 
diagnosed with mental illness, and has even been given a brain scan, all prior to the 
alleged forcible rape. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52.i3 Specifically, Nonna Jean has been 
32 There is no reason to believe that Nonna Jean would not have agreed to an interview or 
answered specific questions about her mental health history. Indeed, Nonna Jean agreed 
to give a tape-recorded interview during these post-conviction proceedings. The 
interview was conducted at her house in West Virginia. She was fully infonned that her 
interviewer was working on behalf of Erick Hall. (Exhibit 51 (audio of interview); 
Exhibit 52 (transcript of audio of interview).) If for some reason Nonna Jean would 
have refused to cooperate with trial counsel, then counsel could have moved to depose 
her or at least conduct a meaningful interview well in advance of her testimony and 
without the prosecutor's presence. 
33 Intennountain is short for Intennountain Hospital, a psychiatric hospital located in 
Boise, Idaho that provides various services including acute inpatient treatment. 
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diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder. Moreover, counsel would have learned that Nonna Jean was not taking 
her medication at the time of the alleged forcible rape. 
(b) Norma Jean's 1991 Grand Jury Testimony 
Trial counsel neither requested nor reviewed Nonna Jean's prior grand jury 
testimony, apparently unaware that she had previously testified regarding her rape 
allegations. In fact, Nonna Jean testified before a grand jury on December 19, 1991. 
(Exhibit 53 (filed under seal).) The transcript of her testimony was available to trial 
counsel in the State's file. Even if Nonna Jean had not been as forthcoming with trial 
counsel as she was in these post-conviction proceedings, a cursory review of the grand 
jury transcript would have put counsel on notice to further pursue Nonna Jean's mental 
health as part of an attack on her credibility or competency to testify. The grand jury 
transcript provides in part: 
Q. Okay. What are they treating you for at Intennountain? Do you 
know? 
A. Just -- well, when I got there, it was like they didn't want me to 
go home, because they know my history. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And I have -- I have been there before. And so, they're -- like, 
they were trying to find out what was wrong and why I had 
made some of the decisions I did, and they came up with that I 
had a chemical imbalance. 
Q. Okay. You're not crazy? They're not telling you you're crazy, are 
they? 
Admission for inpatient treatment requires a probable DSM-IV Axis I diagnosis and one 
or more other criteria including, but not limited to, a recent history of substantial self-
mutilation or other self-endangering behavior; disordered, psychotic or bizarre behavior 
such that the patient cannot function in everyday activities; severe depression with 
functional impainnent; and severe anxiety with functional impainnent. See 
http://www.intennountainhospital.comlacuteIT.php.Mr. Hall requests that the Court take 
judicial notice of these facts. 
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(Exhibit 53, Grand Jury Tr., 12/19/91, p.22, Ls.6-17 (emphasis added).)34 Based on this 
testimony alone trial counsel would have known there was something about Norma 
Jean's home life that concerned her treatment providers at Intermountain, she had 
previously been treated at Intermountain, and she suffered from some sort of "chemical 
imbalance" that had been diagnosed prior to the alleged forcible rape. 
Had trial counsel conducted even a minimal investigation, then they would have 
known to search for additional information of Norma Jean's mental health through 
available medical, mental health records, and social security records. 35 
ii. Prejudice 
Norma Jean's testimony, in conjunction with the testimony given by Detective 
Hess and Jay Rosenthal, was critical to the State's case in aggravation and its effort to 
obtain the death penalty for Mr. Hall. 36 Accordingly, it was vitally important for trial 
counsel to undermine the State's evidence. However, due to trial counsel's lack of 
investigation, preparation, and resulting ineffective cross-examination, the jury had no 
reason to question Norma Jean's testimony, her credibility, or her competency to testify. 
In fact, the jury knew only that she suffered from a "chemical imbalance" at the time of 
34 The term "crazy" can describe someone diagnosed with a mental illness. See Bowles v. 
McGivern, 680 N.W.2d 378 at *2 (Iowa App. 2004) (unpublished). As noted above, it 
appears that Intermountain diagnosed Norma Jean with at least one mental illness; 
therefore, to elicit testimony that they were not telling Norma Jean that she was "crazy," 
is misleading. 
35 Mr. Hall is currently awaiting the Court's in camera review and disclosure of relevant 
medical, mental health, and social security records. This claim will have to be amended 
upon receipt of any relevant records. 
36 A full discussion of the State's case is reserved for the section below addressing the 
cumulative prejudice from trial counsel's deficient performance. See section 4, infra. 
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her testimony which apparently did not require medication. (Tr., p.4777, Ls.2-7; p.4780, 
Ls.3-18; p.4783, Ls.l7-18.) 
The jury did not have a full understanding of Norma Jean's compromised mental 
health. The jury should have been informed that the real reason Norma Jean was not 
taking medication at the time of her testimony was not because it was unnecessary, but 
rather because she had trouble finding the help of "good doctors." (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 
Tr., p.36, Ls.13-25 (emphasis added).) In addition, the jury should have been informed 
that Norma Jean was suffering from serious mental disorders at the time of the alleged 
forcible rape and was not taking any medication at that time. 
Due to trial counsel's deficient performance, the jury did not realize that Norma 
Jean's untreated mental disorders likely undermined her capacity to accurately perceive 
reality, to conform her behavior to accepted norms, and ultimately to testify truthfully. 
Indeed, the symptoms of Norma Jean's mental disorders shed new light on important 
elements of the State's evidence. The symptoms of Norma Jean's mental disorders, e.g., 
borderline personality disorder and bipolar disorder, are discussed in turn. 
As noted, the jury never heard that Norma Jean suffers from borderline 
personality disorder. The jury should have been informed that Norma Jean's disorder "is 
marked by at least five of the following symptoms: (1) [I]mpulsiveness in, inter alia, 
substance abuse; (2) instability of mood, interpersonal relationships and self-image; (3) 
sieges of depression, irritability and anxiety; (4) lack of anger control and recurrent 
physical fights; (5) threats of suicide and attempts at self-mutilation; (6) uncertainty about 
career or long-term goals; and (7) persistent feeling of boredom or emptiness." McGoffin 
v. Barnhart, 288 F.3d 1248, 1250 n.2 (10th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). Individuals like 
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Nonna Jean who suffer from this disorder may display impulsivity in at least two areas 
that are potentially self-damaging, including unsafe sex and self-mutilating behavior such 
as cutting themselves. Salazar v. Barnhart, 468 F.3d 615, 622 (10th Cir. 2006) (citation 
omitted); (see also Exhibit 64, Diagnostic And Statistical Manual Of Mental Disorders 
(4th ed. - Text Revision 2000) (herein "DSM IV-TR"), p.71O. Common symptoms of 
this mental illness include sexual impulsivity and self-mutilation. Sexual impUlsivity 
would have tended to support Erick's version of his encounter with Nonna Jean, from her 
sexual aggressiveness, including "grabbing his parts," to their consensual sex. Sexual 
impulsivity was also consistent with Joi Reno's observations that Nonna Jean was 
"physically promiscuous" at the Sands Motel. (Exhibit 54, p.2.) Self-mutilation would 
have offered an alternate explanation for the physical observations by law enforcement 
and medical personnel and supported the statements of both Erick Hall and Wendy Levy 
that they did not see any injuries on Nonna Jean when she left the trailer. (Exhibit 2.) 
In addition, the jury never heard that Nonna Jean suffers from Bipolar Disorder. 
The jury should have been infonned that Nonna Jean's disorder is marked by extreme 
changes in mood, thought, energy and behavior. If left untreated, the disorder tends to 
worsen, and the person experiences full-fledged manic and depressive episodes. Some 
symptoms of manic episodes include: grandiose delusions, inflated sense of self-
importance; racing speech, racing thoughts, flight of ideas; impulsiveness, poor 
judgment, distractibility; reckless behavior; and, in the most severe cases, delusions and 
hallucinations. (See Exhibit 42.) Bipolar disorder, "like schizophrenia, can distort a 
witness' reaction to events." Gage v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater 
Chicago, 365 F.Supp.2d 919, 928 (N.D.Ill.2005); Keats v. State, 115 P.3d 1110, 1119 
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(Wyo. 2005) (finding trial counsel ineffective in failing to obtain defendant's medical 
records where counsel was aware that defendant had been diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder, an "illness [that] distorts a person's sense of reality."); (see also Exhibit 3, 
pp.382-397.) Erick Hall has always maintained that he had consensual sex with Norma 
Jean. (Exhibit 56A (audio of interview of Erick Hall by Detective Hess); Exhibit 57A 
(transcript of interview of Erick Hall by Detective Hess).) He also has maintained that he 
forced her to leave and called the police on her. (Exhibit 56A; Exhibit 57A.) It is entirely 
reasonable, in light of the nature of Norma Jean's mental illness, to accept that Norma 
Jean may have a distorted sense of what actually happened. In addition, when Erick was 
interviewed by Detective Hess, he described some of the symptoms of bipolar disorder 
when he claimed he overheard Norma Jean laughing and crying on the phone after he 
initially rejected her sexual advances. (Exhibit 47, p.4 (according to Erick, Norma Jean 
"started grabbing his 'parts'" and "he told her that she couldn't be doing that. He then 
said that she used his phone and that she was talking to a friend she would laugh then cry 
and stated that some one was messing with her. .. ").) 
b. Trial Counsel Failed To Identify And Investigate Norma 
Jean's Inconsistent Statements And Motive To Lie And 
Retaliate Against Erick Hall 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses to uncover possible bias, expose the witness's motivation in testifying, 
contradict the witness's testimony with prior inconsistent statements, or undermine the 
witness's credibility with prior bad acts. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678 
(1983); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-316 (1974); California v. Green, 399 U.S. 
149, 158-159 (1970); State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 38, 752 P.2d 632, 640 (Ct. App. 
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1983) (describing impeachment with prior acts as "a proper and important function of the 
constitutionally protected right of cross-examination"). The failure to conduct an 
effective cross-examination of state witnesses may require a new trial. See, e.g., Nixon v. 
Newsome, 888 F.2d 112 (lIth Cir. 1989) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel for the 
failure to impeach a state witness despite being based upon strategic reasons); United 
States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that "a competent lawyer would 
have recognized the critical importance of using the prior inconsistent statements for 
impeachment"). 
Based on trial counsel's inadequate investigation, and resulting ineffective cross-
examination, the jury did not hear numerous inconsistencies and material omissions in 
Norma Jean's story. In addition, the jury did not hear evidence that she had a motive to 
lie and retaliate against Mr. Hall. 
i. Deficient Performance 
This subclaim addresses different aspects of Norma Jean's testimony juxtaposed 
with evidence that was readily available to counsel had they conducted an adequate 
investigation. The evidence is set forth in five sections: section (a) addresses Norma 
Jean's trouble with the law; section (b) addresses Norma Jean's reason to retaliate 
against Mr. Hall; section (c) addresses Norma Jean's encounter with Erick Hall at 
Mountain Billiards; section (d) addresses the sleeping arrangements at Erick's trailer and 
events during the night; section (e) addresses Norma Jean's testimony about Erick's odd 
behavior and expression of remorse; section (1) addresses Norma Jean's escape from the 
trailer; and section g addresses Norma Jean's delay in reporting the rape and other 
activities at the Sands Motel. 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 69 
0-1-191 
(a) Problems With The Law 
The jury was informed that after Norma Jean escaped from the trailer, she made 
her way to the Sands Motel where the police ultimately took her to juvenile detention and 
Intermountain Hospital. The jury was not specifically informed that Norma Jean was 
arrested; indeed, the jury had every reason to believe that the police who responded to the 
Sands Motel were responding to rape allegations and transported her to juvenile detention 
and Intermountain as a matter of protocol when dealing with juveniles outside their 
jurisdiction. The jury should have been informed that Norma Jean was actually arrested 
at the Sands Motel on juvenile runaway charges and that she would have been returned 
home for prosecution but for the fact that she alleged to have been raped. 
Had trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation, they would have learned 
that Norma Jean was a chronic runaway. Indeed, police reports indicate that between 
November 1990 and December 1991, she was arrested three times in Boise for being a 
runaway. (Exhibits 58-62.) These reports contain favorable evidence, directly relevant to 
Norma Jean's rape allegations. Specifically, one police report indicates that Norma Jean 
was arrested at the Sands Motel on December 2, 1991. According to the report, Norma 
Jean was to be returned to her home in Fruitland and prosecuted by Payette County. 
(Exhibit 61, p.l.) Apparently Norma Jean ran away from home the very next day, 
returning to Boise and the Sands Motel because a second police report indicates that in 
the late evening of December 3, 1991, Norma Jean was arrested again. (Exhibit 62 ("At 
that location, we did find a runaway (Norma Jean Oliver), who I had arrested for the 
same offense at the same location just two nights earlier. Nonna Jean was taken into 
custody by Officer Lowe.").) 
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It appears that the alleged forcible rape occurred at Erick Hall's trailer prior to 
both arrests, likely on December 1, 1991. The jury should have been informed that 
Norma Jean had multiple opportunities to disclose the rape to law enforcement but never 
did so until it was clear she was facing big trouble in Payette County. See infra, section g. 
In fact, it appears that once Norma Jean reported that she had been raped, rather than 
being returned home, she was admitted to Intermountain Hospital's long-term care unit. 
(Exhibit 55, p.8 (noting that at the time of her interview, Norma Jean was "currently 
committed to Intermountain Hospital on the residential unit."); p.9 ("Ms. Oliver says 
[that after reporting the rape] she was then placed into the long-term unit and is receiving 
counseling for the rape. She expects to be discharged from Intermountain by June Ist.").) 
At this time, it is not clear whether Norma Jean was ever returned home and prosecuted 
in Payette County, or whether she remained in the care of Intermountain Hospital until 
her eighteenth birthday.37 
(b) Reasons To Retaliate 
The jury had no reason to believe that Norma Jean was in any way motivated to 
falsely accuse Erick Hall of forcible rape. The jury should have been informed that Erick 
Hall turned Norma Jean in to the police leading to her arrest on December 2, 1991. The 
police report detailing the arrest indicates that the police had been informed of Norma 
Jean's whereabouts at the Sands Motel by "an anonymous caller named only 'Eric' .... " 
(Exhibit 61, p.l) Indeed, Erick Hall told Detective Hess "that he called the Cops on her 
because of being a runaway and he knew she was going to the Sands Motel in Boise." 
37 Until receipt of records from Intermountain Hospital and Payette County it cannot be 
stated with certainty when Norma Jean was released from Intermountain, whether she 
ever returned home, or whether she was ever prosecuted for her offenses. 
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(Exhibit 47, p.5.) Erick's reporting Norma Jean to the police, led to her arrest, thwarted 
her plans to go to California, led to her return to her home in Fruitland,38 and set the stage 
for her prosecution by Payette County authorities. Thus, Norma Jean had a reason to 
retaliate against Erick which the jury never heard. 
(c) Meeting Erick At Mountain Billiards 
Norma Jean testified that she met Erick at Mountain Billiards, and suggested that 
this was the first time she had ever met him. (Tr., p.4759, Ls.5-20; p.4761, L.24 - p.4762, 
L.4.) In addition, she testified that she was not acting like she was eighteen years old and 
was not drinking alcohol at Mountain Billiards. (Tr., p.4778, Ls.1O-21.) 
Q. Okay. Do you remember what you were doing at Mountain Billiards? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you drinking beer? 
A. No, not that I know ofbecause I wasn't a drinker. 
(Tr., p.4778, Ls.I0-15.) Thus, Norma Jean told the jury that she knew that she did not 
drink beer that night, despite her lack of specific recollection, because she ''wasn't a 
drinker." As a relative stranger who was completely sober, Norma Jean's testimony that 
she refused to have sex with Erick made sense. 
Contrary to the strong implications of her sentencing testimony, Norma Jean had 
seen Erick "approximately six or seven times" prior to meeting him at Mountain 
Billiards. (Exhibit 55, p.8.) Further, she told Detective Hess during her taped interview 
that she had sexual intercourse on two prior occasions, and that one time she was drunk. 
(Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.20).) Thus, apparently Norma Jean was not quite as 
averse to alcohol as she alleged. This has been confirmed by interviewing her other 
38 See infra, subclaim c, addressing the abuse that Norma Jean faced at her home. 
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acquaintances in December 1991. Trial counsel could have presented the testimony of 
Joi Reno on this matter. As Ms. Reno stated in her affidavit, 
I recall I had met Norma Jean Oliver within a few months prior to 
December 1991 at a Boise bar called Mountain Billiards, and she was new 
to this circle of friends. Ms. Oliver went by the alias "D.J.," and stayed 
with several of my friends at the Sands Motel. ... I used 
methamphetamine, marijuana, and drank alcohol with Ms. Oliver on 
numerous occasions with this circle of friends off and on over the course 
of about six to eight weeks. I saw Ms. Oliver drink alcohol that had been 
purchased by other friends over the age of 21 while at Mountain Billiards. 
(Exhibit 54.) Trial counsel should have cross-examined Norma Jean about these facts 
(and presented the testimony of Joi Reno and Detective Hess if necessary). This 
evidence would have raised questions in the jury's mind whether Norma Jean 
intentionally falsified her testimony, and in fact had been drinking and portraying herself 
as an adult, thus raising the likelihood that she agreed to have sex with Erick and 
corroborating Erick's version to Detective Hess that he believed Norma Jean was 
eighteen but realized she was a runaway when her name came across the police scanner. 
(d) Sleeping Arrangements At The Trailer 
Norma Jean testified at Erick's sentencing that she chose to sleep in a chair rather 
than sleep with Erick in the lower bunk bed. (Tr., p.4762, L.19 - p.4764, L.5.) Norma 
Jean's choice to sleep apart from Erick was completely consistent with her testimony that 
she refused to have sex with him. However, contrary to her sentencing testimony, Norma 
Jean told the presentence investigator that she at least initially joined Erick in his bed. 
According to the investigator: 
After Ms. Oliver arrived at the camper she states the defendant invited her 
to sleep in his bed rather than sleeping on the floor. Ms. Oliver believes 
she made it "perfectly clear" to the defendant that she would not have sex 
with him. According to Ms. Oliver when the defendant began taking her 
underwear off she got up and curled up on a tiny chair in the camper. 
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(Exhibit 55, p.8 (emphasis added).) Nonna Jean gave a similar version of events in her 
tape-recorded interview with Detective Hess. The fact that Nonna Jean started the night 
with Erick in his bed was omitted from Detective Hess's written report; accordingly, this 
fact was unknown to trial counsel and never heard by the jury. Had the jury heard such 
evidence, it would have given additional weight to Erick's version of facts that they 
engaged in consensual sex that night. 
( e) Erick's Impulses And Remorse 
Trial counsel sought to elicit testimony from Nonna Jean that Erick seemed to 
lose control during the alleged rape but then regained his composure, stopped, and even 
apologized for what he did to her. 
Q. Okay. When some of this had happened do you remember when Erick 
stopped? 
A. What? 
Q. Do you remember a time when Erick stopped doing what he was 
doing? Do you remember he stopped and said --
A. When we were asleep. 
Q. Yeah, okay. 
A. I'm not - I'm confused. 
Q. All right. Well, do you remember Erick stopping and saying, "Oh my 
God, I'm sorry"? 
A. Not that -- I don't know. 
Q. Okay. Did Erick apologize to you? 
A. I'm not sure. I'm thinking but I'm not - it's - I'm not sure. 
Q. Do you remember telling me that he apologized to you? 
A. I remember saying that I think that he apologized. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I was sitting there trying to think, to see what was going on. Maybe I 
wanted him to say sorry, I remember because -- but that I did because I 
wanted him to. 
Q. I see. Okay. 
(Tr., p.4778, L.22 - p.4779, L.21.) In this instance, trial counsel knew the answers to the 
questions he was asking, apparently through his last minute interview, and possibly his 
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review of Detective Hess's report. However, counsel was unprepared to either refresh 
Nonna Jean's recollection or impeach her with prior inconsistent statements.39 
When Nonna Jean testified she could not recall whether Erick suddenly stopped 
and apologized, trial counsel should have played her own tape-recorded statement to 
Detective Hess in which she said exactly that, or at least refreshed her recollection with 
her statements in Detective Hess's report. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B, p.15; Exhibit 47, 
p.2 (" ... and suddenly snapped out of it and stated 'what have I done' ... "); Exhibit 55, 
p.9) (indicating that Erick "all of a sudden he came to" and when he realized what had 
occurred he said, "my God, what have I done, I can't believe what Ijust done.").) Along 
these lines, trial counsel failed to establish that Nonna Jean actually felt sorry for Erick 
because he "did something like that and because he didn't know better." (Exhibit 55, 
p.1O.)40 Due to trial counsel's inability to conduct an effective examination, the jury 
heard no evidence to support the theory that Erick may have blacked out or otherwise 
39 Because trial counsel himself conducted the interview of Nonna Jean, without the 
presence of the defense team's investigator, he was unprepared to impeach her and nearly 
made himself a witness by posing the question, "Q. Do you remember telling me that he 
apologized to you?" The ABA Guidelines warn against trial counsel conducting relevant 
investigation, stating in part: 
Counsel lacks the special expertise required to accomplish the high quality 
investigation to which a capital defendant is entitled and simply has too 
many other duties to discharge in preparing the case. Moreover, the 
defense may need to call the person who conducted the interview as a trial 
witness. 
ABA Guidelines, commentary to Guideline 4.1 (footnote omitted). 
40 While it seems reasonable that Nonna Jean may have forgotten these important details 
thirteen or fourteen years later, she somehow re-remembered them during her post-
conviction interview. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 (Tr., p.50 ("I think, I think for a brief 
moment, he had uh, said uh, 'Oh, God what have I done,' you know, but I'm not 
sure.")).) 
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been overcome by impulses at the time he assaulted Norma Jean and again thirteen years 
later, when he assaulted Ms. Henneman.41 
(f) Norma Jean's "Escape" 
"There is little doubt that an alleged rape victim's conduct after the fact is 
probative of whether a rape in fact occurred." See Henson v. State, 535 N.E.2d 1189, 
1193 (Ind. 1989). Norma Jean testified that after the rape and after being held against her 
will for the better part of the day, she took advantage of confusion that occurred after 
Erick heard her name come across a police scanner in the trailer. (Tr., p.4 770, Ls.9-1 0.) 
She testified that the next thing she remembered was that she ''took off away from him" 
and "started hopping a couple of fences here and there" until she ultimately "ended up 
over at the Sands Motel" with some friends. (Tr., p.4 770, Ls.11-25.) At some point after 
her arrival at the Sands Motel, Norma Jean testified that she remembers going to 
Intermountain Hospital. (Tr., p.4771, Ls.l-14.) 
In a post-conviction interview, Norma Jean stated that after she escaped, she 
asked a neighbor in the area to drive her to the Sands Motel. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 (Tr., 
p.25).) Trial counsel would have known to investigate this story had they requested and 
reviewed Norma Jean's grand jury testimony. (Exhibit 53, p.17, L.20, - p.18, L.7.) When 
questioned about the neighbor's assistance, Norma Jean volunteered that rather than 
going directly to the Sands Motel, and to presumed safety, Norma Jean first asked the 
neighbor to drive her back to the trailer, the very place where she had allegedly been 
forcibly raped and held against her will in mortal fear. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 (Tr., 
41 Had trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation, they would have obtained the 
testimony of numerous family members detailing incidents of head injuries and black 
outs. See supra, Claim B.3.a. 
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p.24).) Nonna Jean states that she then went back to the trailer to get her belongings. She 
did not know whether Erick would be at the trailer upon her return. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 
52 (Tr., p.22).) Immediately returning to the scene of a kidnapping and rape after 
escaping her captor, rather than seeking safety, does not appear to be the type of conduct 
one would expect from a rape victim. This additional infonnation would have further 
undermined Nonna Jean's story and would have weighed heavily in support of Erick's 
version that he kicked Nonna Jean out of the trailer when he realized that she was wanted 
as a runaway. 
(g) Norma Jean's Delay In Reporting The Rape 
And Other Activities At The Sands Motel 
Nonna Jean testified that she could not recall whether, after her arrival at the 
Sands Motel, she was arrested and taken into police custody; however, she did recall 
eventually being taken to Intennountain Hospital. (Tr., p.4771, Ls.1-14.) She did not 
testify how long she was at the Sands Motel before being taken to Intennountain. The 
jury had no reason to suspect there was any delay in reporting the rape. (Tr., p.4771, 
Ls.15-18 ("Q. Okay. When you were at Intennountain Hospital did you tell some people 
there what had happened to you at Erick's? A. Yes.") In short, as far as the jury was 
aware, Nonna Jean reported the rape to law enforcement as soon as possible following 
her return to safety at the Sands Motel. 
Nonna Jean testified that she went to the Sands Motel where some of her friends 
were staying. (Tr., p.4770, Ls.17-25.) According to a police report readily available to 
trial counsel, one witness at the Sands Motel was Joi Reno. (Exhibit 62.) Ms. Reno 
would have testified that she saw Nonna Jean at the Sands Motel shortly before her arrest 
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and that at that time Nonna Jean was sexually provocative with their male friends and 
certainly did not act like she had recently been raped. 
I recall I had met Nonna Jean Oliver within a few months prior to 
December 1991 at a Boise bar called Mountain Billiards, and she was new 
to this circle of friends. Ms. Oliver went by the alias "D.J.," and stayed 
with several of my friends at the Sands Motel. ... On December 4, 1991, 
I received a telephone call from one of my friends at the Sands Motel 
asking me to go to the motel and pick up Ms. Oliver, since she needed a 
ride and I was the only person who had a car at that time. I had little 
regard for Ms. Oliver, and reluctantly went to the motel to pick her up. I 
don't recall where she wanted to go. While I was at the Sands Motel, the 
police came to the motel looking for a runaway. Ms. Oliver lied to me and 
denied that she was a runaway or that the police were looking for her. We 
were both arrested, and I recall that my father was contacted and came to 
pick me up. . .. That day, Ms. Oliver never told me that she had been 
raped by anyone. To the contrary, her behavior was flirtatious, and [she 
was] comfortable engaging in physical and sexual behavior with the other 
males at the Sands Motel after the date of her alleged rape. 
(Exhibit 54.) While courts are reluctant to pennit the admission of evidence about a 
victim's sexual history, there are elements of a witness's sexual history that are 
recognized as highly relevant.42 For instance, evidence of a victim's sexual history may 
be relevant and admissible to show consent, other false allegations of rape, or the 
witness's sexual behaviors with others around the time of the alleged rape. See I.R.E. 412 
(b)(2)(B-D); see also e.g., State v. Botelho, 753 A.2d 343, 347 (R.1. 2000) (noting that 
prior or subsequent allegations of sexual abuse against other individuals, regardless if 
proven false, may be relevant and admissible to challenge a victim's credibility in a rape 
42 Idaho Code § 18-6105 and I.R.E. 412, generally govern the admissibility ofa victim's 
prior sexual history. The statute and rule, however, apply by their plain language to rape 
prosecutions, not capital sentencing proceedings. Further, the statute and rule do not 
establish a complete ban to the admissibility of such infonnation. For instance, I.C. § 18-
6105 sets forth a procedure for a defendant to establish the admissibility of such evidence 
outside the presence of the jury. Under I.R.E. 412, evidence of a victim's sexual history 
may be admissible to show consent, other false allegations of rape, or sexual behaviors 
with others around the time ofthe alleged rape. See I.R.E. 412 (b)(2)(B-D). 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST -CONVICTION RELIEF 78 
case). In this case, had trial counsel interviewed available witnesses, counsel would have 
discovered that after the alleged forcible rape, Norma Jean returned to the Sands Motel 
and was sexually active with men in the motel room.43 This would not only be 
inconsistent with someone who had just been raped, it is also consistent with someone 
who suffers from an untreated Borderline Personality Disorder. See supra, section D.3.a.; 
(Exhibit 64.)44 
As noted above, the jury was informed that after Norma Jean escaped from the 
trailer, she made her way to the Sands Motel where the police ultimately took her to 
43 It appears that Norma Jean may have told some of her friends that she had been raped. 
In a post-conviction interview with Kate Elg, Ms. Elg states that she was at the Sands 
Motel in the early morning of December 2, 1991, when she saw Norma Jean come into 
the motel and go directly to the bathroom. Ms. Elg states that she saw Kevin Leo Bates 
follow her into the bathroom. Norma Jean was arrested a short time later based on Erick 
Hall's report to the police. While Norma Jean did not allege to her arresting officer that 
she had been raped, according to Ms. Elg, she was told by Edwin Sammis that Norma 
Jean had been raped. Ms. Elg's statement is based on multiple layers of hearsay and thus 
not likely admissible. However, if it were admissible, then it would tend to undermine 
only that portion of Mr. Hall's claim that Norma Jean did not act like a rape victim 
immediately after she left the trailer. Ms. Elg's statement does not undermine any other 
aspect of Mr. Hall's claims and further, is not inconsistent with Ms. Reno's statement that 
two days later, on December 4, 1991, Ms. Reno saw Norma Jean at the Sands Motel 
acting sexually promiscuous with the young men in the room, behavior that one would 
not expect a rape victim to engage in within days of being raped. 
44 Norma Jean's statement in her post-conviction interview suggest that there may be 
prior allegations or incidents of rape or other abuse in her background. For instance, 
Norma Jean was somewhat equivocal stating that she did not think she had been raped in 
the past. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52.) Further, she stated that she believes she was a virgin at 
the time of the rape. (Exhibit 51; Exhibit 52 (Tr., p47).) However, Norma Jean told Dr. 
Lawrence Vickman that she was not a virgin, and last had consensual sex on November 
13, 1991, and November 28, 1991,just weeks and days prior to the alleged forcible rape. 
(Exhibit 65 (medical report of Dr. Vickman, dated 12/04/01, p.l.) In addition, she told 
Detective Hess that she had sex on two prior occasions, and on one of those occasions 
was a little bit drunk. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B.) Mr. Hall is still awaiting the Court's in 
camera review of and receipt of any relevant records from various medical and mental 
health facilities. This claim may need to be amended upon receipt of any relevant 
records. 
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juvenile detention and Intermountain Hospital. The jury was not specifically informed 
that Norma Jean was arrested; indeed, the jury had every reason to believe that the police 
who responded to the Sands Motel were responding to rape allegations and transported 
her to juvenile detention and Intennountain as a matter of protocol when dealing with 
juveniles outside their jurisdiction. The jury had no idea that Norma Jean actually 
delayed reporting the rape to law enforcement through two arrests. (Exhibit 103 (Affidait 
of Wade Spain).) Indeed, it was only after Intermountain Hospital personnel suggested 
that Norma Jean had been raped, that she first reported the rape. 
Q. Okay. And I take it Margaret asked you what had taken place? 
A. Yeah. I go -- I said -- I told her that I had gotten into a little fight. 
She goes, "Did you get raped?", and I'm like, "Well, yeah." She 
goes, "Well do you [sic] me to call the cops," and I go, "Well, 
yeah, if you want to." 
(Exhibit 53, p.19, Ls.19-22.)45 Accordingly, contrary to the evidence before the jury, 
there was significant delay in reporting the rape. The jury should have known that during 
the interim between the purported forcible rape and reporting the rape, Norma Jean had 
been taken back to her home in Fruitland, run away back to Boise, and returned to the 
Sands Motel where she was at a minimum sexually provocative with others at the motel. 
It is entirely likely that Norma Jean would never have reported her rape, and continued 
her quest to evade her parents and law enforcement, but for the fact that she was arrested 
a second time. 
45 Mr. Hall is still awaiting medical and mental health records from Intermountain 
Hospital and Margaret Farmer. This claim will be amended upon receipt of relevant 
records. 
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ii. Prejudice 
The jury had no reason to question Norma Jean's allegations. Her testimony, 
along with the testimony of Detective Hess and Jay Rosenthal, was virtually 
unchallenged. The jury should have been informed of the numerous inconsistencies in 
her story, as well as her motivation to lie to avoid prosecution and an abusive home life, 
and finally the reason she had to retaliate specifically against Erick Hall. Independently, 
and taken in conjunction with trial counsel's other deficiencies; there is a reasonable 
probability that Mr. Hall would not have been sentenced to death but for trial counsel's 
failure to conduct a reasonable investigation of Norma Jean and her allegations. See infra, 
section 4. 
c. Trial Counsel Failed To Investigate Norma Jean's 
Problems At Home 
Norma Jean testified that she was having some problems at home, but she did not 
describe the nature or extent of her problems. (Tr., p.4758, L.12 - p.4760, L.9; p.4777, 
L.25 - p.4778, L.7 (testifying that she ran away because she did not like the way she 
''was being treated" at home).) Neither the prosecution nor trial counsel posed any 
additional questions regarding Norma Jean's home life and why she was a runaway. 
i. Deficient Performance 
Trial counsel failed to request or review Detective Hess's tape-recorded interview 
of Norma Jean. See footnote 83, infra. The taped interview reveals that Norma Jean 
stated that her father abused her at home. (Exhibit 56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.34.) The 
abuse had lasted from her childhood through her late teenage years, and was one reason 
that Norma Jean continually ran away from home. The abuse included beatings. (Exhibit 
56B; Exhibit 57B (Tr., p.34 (describing being thrown across the room by her father».) 
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This history is not reflected in Detective Hess's written report, and thus not uncovered by 
trial counsel's nominal preparation. 
Similarly, trial counsel failed to request or review the 1991 grand jury transcript. 
Nonna Jean's grand jury testimony reveals that her treatment providers at Intennountain 
Hospital were concerned about her problems at home, and did not want her to return. 
(Exhibit 53, (Tr., p.22, Ls.6-9 ("[T]they didn't want me to go home, because they know 
my history.")).) Trial counsel never reviewed the tape-recorded interview or the grand 
jury testimony. 
ii. Prejudice 
The jury was presented with evidence of Nonna Jean's injuries, allegedly 
sustained at the hands of Erick Hall. (Tr., p.4772, L.19 - p.4774, L.15; p.4790, L.13 -
p.4795, L.3) The jury should have been infonned that Nonna Jean was being physically 
abused by her father at home and that such abuse included being thrown across the room. 
Such abuse could have accounted for Nonna Jean's injuries since she was taken back to 
her home after the alleged forcible rape.46 In fact, Wendy Levy, a witness present at the 
camper where Nonna Jean showered after the alleged forcible rape, and who was never 
questioned by trial counsel about the incident, would have testified that she did not see 
any injuries on Nonna Jean. According to Ms. Levy: 
Erick Hall told me Ms. Oliver had bought him drinks at Mountain 
Billiards, and that they had had consensual sex in the camp trailer. I 
46 As noted below, the jury believed that Nonna Jean was taken to Intennountain 
Hospital on the day she escaped from Erick. As such, it is hard to explain how she could 
have received her injuries from home. However, had trial counsel conducted a 
reasonable investigation, they would have learned that after the alleged rape, Nonna Jean 
was arrested at the Sands Motel and taken back home, only to return again to Boise and 
the Sands Motel where she was arrested a second time and taken to Intennountain. See 
subclaim b.i.(a) supra. 
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believe Ms. Oliver followed Erick to my home from Mountain Billiards 
and was interested in him. 
The following morning, Ms. Oliver used the shower and I saw her come 
out of the bathroom. She was wearing a tank top and jeans, and I saw no 
marks, scratches, bruises, or injuries of any kind on her face, neck, 
shoulders, arms, or hands. While she was on my property, I did not see 
Ms. Oliver carrying a duffel bag, backpack, or extra clothing of any kind. 
I told Erick I believed there was something wrong with Ms. Oliver and 
asked him to ask Ms. Oliver to leave my property. 
(Exhibit 2.) Based on this additional evidence, readily available to trial counsel, it is 
entirely conceivable that Norma Jean was abused by her father (perhaps for running away 
and for being arrested), suffering the injuries that were later photographed and ultimately 
presented to Mr. Hall's capital sentencing jury. 
d. Trial Counsel Failed To Investigate Norma Jean's Prior 
Misconduct 
A witness's prior misconduct may be relevant to her credibility. Norma Jean 
was not questioned regarding any prior misconduct. Had counsel conducted even a 
minimal investigation, they would have discovered information involving pnor 
misconduct calling into question her credibility and character for truthfulness. 
i. Deficient Performance 
The jury had no reason to believe that Norma Jean would lie to a law enforcement 
officer, in this case Detective Hess. However, the jury should have known that Norma 
Jean was perfectly capable oflying to the police, and had done so in the past. 
Had trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation, they would have 
discovered a police report detailing Norma Jean's arrest approximately one year prior to 
her allegations against Erick Hall. Specifically, on November 19, 1990, Norma Jean was 
arrested as a runaway and gave a false name and date of birth to police officers during 
their criminal investigation. (Exhibit 60.) Norma Jean's prior conduct constituted a 
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criminal act and an act of dishonesty that trial counsel could have used to undennine her 
credibility. See I.C. § 18-5413 (2) ("A person is guilty of a misdemeanor ifhe knowingly 
gives or causes to be given false infonnation regarding his or another's identity to any 
law enforcement officer investigating the commission of an offense."); I.R.E. 608(b) 
(pennitting inquiry into specific instances of conduct concerning the witness's character 
for untruthfulness).47 In this context, Nonna Jean's "use of a false name [and date of 
birth] is an indication of dishonesty that goes to the very heart of the question of [her] 
testimonial credibility .... " People v. Walker, 633 N.E.2d 472, 476 (N.Y. 1994). 
ii. Prejudice 
As noted through this claim, it was vitally important for trial counsel to 
undermine the State's evidence. However, due to trial counsel's lack of investigation, 
preparation, and resulting ineffective cross-examination, the jury had no reason to 
question Nonna Jean's credibility; specifically, the jury had no reason to think that she 
would lie to law enforcement. The cumulative prejudice of counsel's deficient 
perfonnance identified in this subclaim is discussed below in conjunction with the other 
subclaims. See infra, section 4. 
e. Trial Counsel Failed To Identify Inaccuracies In Detective 
Hess's Report 
Detective Hess's testimony was important to the State's presentation of Nonna 
Jean's allegations in two respects. First, Detective Hess provided the foundation for the 
47 The Court allowed the State to reach thirteen years into Mr. Hall's past for prior 
conduct which purportedly reflected on his character. It is hard to conceive that the Court 
would have precluded Mr. Hall from eliciting prior bad conduct of Nonna Jean just one 
year prior to her allegations, where such conduct is clearly probative of her character for 
untruthfulness. Indeed, failure to pennit such cross-examination would have constituted 
a violation of Mr. Hall's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 
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introduction of photographs of Norma Jean's injuries. Second, Detective Hess filled in 
numerous gaps in Norma Jean's testimony by testifying to statements she made to him 
during his interview with her. See infra, Claim Y. It appears that Detective Hess testified 
relatively consistent with his written report. However, there were numerous inaccuracies 
in Detective Hess's report and testimony that trial counsel should have identified for the 
Jury. 
i. Deficient Performance 
Trial counsel failed to cross-examine Detective Hess about inconsistencies 
between his testimony and his taped interviews of Norma Jean and Erick. Specifically, in 
cross-examination, trial counsel asked Detective Hess whether he had spoken to Norma 
Jean about her trouble at home. 
Q. Were you aware that Miss Oliver had had an extensive history of 
family trouble? 
A. Just from my conversation with her, yes. 
Q. Did you know what the nature of that trouble was? 
A. I have no idea. 
Q. Did you ever try to find out? 
A. No. 
(Tr. p.4806, Ls.18-25.) This is false testimony. Had trial counsel (and possibly Detective 
Hess), reviewed Detective Hess's taped interview of Norma Jean they would have 
discovered that Detective Hess spoke at length with Norma Jean about her history of 
family trouble. Indeed, Norma Jean told Hess that she had been physically abused by her 
father for years. Abuse included being thrown across the room. The abuse occurred 
throughout her childhood and up to the point of her interview with Hess. It was because 
of the abuse that Norma Jean so often ran away from home. Indeed, this abuse provided 
Norma Jean a strong motive to fabricate a story to prevent her from being taken back 
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home and also provided an alternate explanation for the injuries that were observed by 
Detective Hess. 
In addition, trial counsel failed to cross-examine Detective Hess about 
inconsistencies between his observations of Norma Jean's injuries and Norma Jean's 
testimony. Norma Jean testified that Erick caused blood vessels to blow in her eye when 
he was strangling her. (Tr., p.4772, L.19 -p.4774, L.15 (noting in part that, "[o]n the one 
eye, the white part of my eye was all red from being strangled. It broke all the blood 
vessels in my eye.").) Trial counsel should have elicited testimony from Detective Hess 
that he never observed such injuries. Indeed, the presence of such injuries is not reflected 
in Hess's report, in the photographs, or in Dr. Vickman's report.48 
Finally, Detective Hess suggested in his testimony that Erick made inconsistent 
statements to him. First, Hess testified Erick initially stated that he believed Norma Jean 
was eighteen years old, but then later admitted he knew she was a juvenile runaway. 
Q. At first did he say what he thought her age was? 
A. He said he thought she was 18. Someone had told her -- told him that 
she was 18. 
Q. Someone had told him? 
A. Yes. 




48 If trial counsel could not elicit this inconsistency from Detective Hess, then counsel 
should have elicited such testimony from Dr. Vickman or at least admitted 
Dr. Vickman's report which does not indicate the presence of such injuries. (Exhibit 65.) 
It is unimaginable that Detective Hess and Dr. Vickman would have failed to note the 
hemorrhaged blood vessels in her eye when such is commonly understood as 
corroborative of strangulation. See e.g., State v. O'Leary, 903 A.2d 997, 1002 (N.H. 
2006); State v. Ford, 592 S.E.2d 294 at *2 (N.c. App. 2004) (unpublished). 
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Q. All right. Now, at some point did he say that he knew that she was a 
run-away, that is that Norma Jean was a run-away and that he had run 
her off? 
A. He did. 
(Tr., p.4797, Ls.14-22; p.4799, Ls.4-8) The State exploited this alleged inconsistency in 
argument. (Tr., p.4738, Ls.I-4 ("The defendant said at first ... that he thOUght she was 18 
but later said he knew she was a run-away and shooed her away and run her off .... ").) 
However, Erick was not inconsistent in his statements. Instead, Erick told Hess that he 
initially believed Norma Jean was eighteen years old based on what he was told and 
based on the fact that she was drinking beer at Mountain Billiards. Later, when he heard 
her name come across the police scanner, he realized that she was a juvenile runaway. 
Accordingly, he told her that she had to leave. Thus, Erick was consistent in his 
statements. The jury should have been told the truth rather than lies that tended to 
undermine Erick's version of events. 
In addition, Detective Hess also testified that Erick changed his statement 
regarding how he received scratches on his face. 
Q. Did you -- when you were looking at the defendant did you observe 
whether or not he had any scratches on him? 
A. He had one on the left side of his face. 
Q. Close to his eye? 
A. Just below the eye. 
Q. Did you ask him how that scratch got there? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did he say? 
A. At first he said a cat had scratched him, that they were playing with a 
cat. And then he went on to say that someone had clawed him and I 
said who and he said Norma Jean. 
Q. Did he say that -- what the circumstances were that caused her to claw 
him? 
A. He just said they were playing around and foolishness and that type of 
thing. 
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(Tr., p.4799, L.9 - p.4800, L.l.) The State also exploited this alleged inconsistency in 
argument. (Tr., p.4738, Ls.6-8 ("When asked how come he had a scratch under his eye he 
said that the cat had scratched him and then that this Norma Jean had charged him ... ").) 
However, Erick did not give inconsistent statements. Instead, Erick told Hess that the 
scratches were a result of a combination of being scratched by his cat and Norma Jean. 
Erick told Hess that Norma Jean pulled the cat's tail and the cat scratched him. Thus, 
Erick was consistent in his statements. It is worth repeating that the jury should have 
been told the truth rather than lies tending to undermine Erick's version of events. 
ii. Prejudice 
The rape case was essentially a "he said, she said" case where Norma Jean's 
credibility and Erick's credibility were central to the jury's consideration. Trial counsel 
failed to utilize Detective Hess to undermine Norma Jean's version of the facts, notably, 
by failing to elicit testimony that he did not observe any injuries to her eyes and by 
failing to elicit testimony that would have established an alternate explanation for the 
injuries he did observe. Conversely, trial counsel allowed Detective Hess to testify in an 
untruthful manner which portrayed Erick as a liar. 
In a case like this, counsel's deficient performance was highly prejudicial. In 
short, as noted in the other subc1aims, due to trial counsel's failures, the jury had no 
reason to question Norma Jean's credibility, while being supplied plenty of invalid 
reasons to question Erick Hall's credibility. See e.g., U.S. v. Hermundson, 210 F.3d 386 
at * 9 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (unpUblished) ("[I]n a he-said she-said 
case, the jury has to decide who is lying. Evidence that someone presents him or herself 
so differently in different settings as to suggest lack of authenticity can be very helpful to 
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the jury."); Watson v. State, _ A.2d _, 2007 WL 2622110 at * 4-5 (Del. Supr ,2007) 
(unpublished) (discussing the importance of witness credibility in "he said, she said" rape 
cases). 
f. Trial Counsel Failed To Identify The Degree Of Leniency 
Reflected In Erick Hall's Plea Agreement 
A prosecutor's willingness to enter a favorable plea agreement with a criminal 
defendant is clearly dependent upon a number of factors, including the prosecutor's belief 
about the defendant's degree of actual culpability versus the degree of punishment 
available under the crimes charges, and the prosecutor's assessment for a successful 
prosecution. In this case, the jury heard that Erick was sentenced to five years in prison 
pursuant to a plea agreement. The jury believed the sole reason for the favorable plea 
agreement was because of Norma Jean's fragile mental condition. 
Q. Did you discuss her testimony with her medical health professionals? 
A. I did. She was at Intermountain Hospital in the Adolescent Unit. She 
was, as I recall, being treated by Lamar Heyrend who was a 
psychiatrist, she had a case worker discussed it with those individuals. 
And I spent a great deal of time, along with a victim witnesses 
coordinator, with her trying to prepare her to testify. 
Q. And ultimately did you decide that you could not proceed to trial with 
her as a witness? 
A. I did. It was my decision, as well as the recommendation of the those 
people who were treating her. 
Q. SO how did you proceed? 
A. Proceeded with a reduction to a statutory rape and a negotiated 
resolution. 
Q. And that was because of the weakness in your case? 
A. It was because of the inability of Norma Jean to be able to sit in a 
situation like this and in front of a jury and be subjected to cross 
examination. 
(Tr., p.4953, L.12 - p.4954, L.9.) Because five years is not an insubstantial sentence, the 
jury had no reason to believe that the leniency in the agreement was in any way reflective 
of a reduced degree of culpability on Erick's behalf, or in any way reflective on any 
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difficulty in proving the forcible rape charges. Trial counsel could have demonstrated 
both through an effective examination of Jay Rosenthal. 
Trial counsel should have elicited from Mr. Rosenthal that Erick faced up to a life 
sentence for the charged offenses. See I.e. § 18-6104 (prescribing minimum sentence of 
one year and maximum sentence of life imprisonment). Further, trial counsel should 
have elicited testimony that the State actually recommended more than the actual 
sentence imposed. Specifically, the State recommended a seven year sentence, with two 
years fixed, and a 180 day rider. The jury should have heard that after reviewing 
Mr. Hall's presentence report, the presiding district court judge, the Honorable Alan 
Schwartzman, sentenced Erick to a five year sentence, with just one year fixed, and 
where Erick had already served a minimum of 160 days in jail. (Exhibit 55 (cover).) 
Had the jury known that Erick faced a life sentence, then they would have known 
just how favorable the plea agreement was, and had the jury further known that a district 
court judge imposed a lesser sentence than that recommended by the State, then the jury 
would have known that Erick's culpability was deemed minimal at best. Mr. Hall asserts 
that in conjunction with the other errors by trial counsel he has established the requisite 
level of prejudice to have his death sentence vacated. 
4. The Cumulative Prejudice Due To Trial Counsels' Ineffective 
Investigation Of Nonna Jean Oliver's Allegations Satisfies The 
Preiudice Prong Of Strickland 
While Mr. Hall asserts that each of the subc1aims above satisfy both prongs of 
Strickland, this Court need not decide whether the individual deficiencies alone meet the 
prejudice standard because the Court can find the requisite prejudice from the totality of 
counsel's errors and omissions. See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1992) 
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(applying the doctrine of cumulative error to Strickland claims). Thus, to demonstrate 
prejudice, Mr. Hall must show that but for all of the deficiencies noted above (and 
elsewhere in this petition), there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his 
sentencing would have been different. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376, 
385 (2004). 
The State relied heavily on Norma Jean Oliver in its case. This fact is reflected in 
both the opening statement and closing arguments. The State spent nearly half its 
opening statement discussing the anticipated evidence involving the rape, and even 
greater emphasis was placed on the evidence during closing argument, which included a 
side-by-side illustrative comparison of the rape with the murder ofLynn Henneman. (Tr., 
p.4734, L.9 - p.4739, L.13; p.5456, L.20 - p.5457, L.ll.); (Exhibit 45.) 
Without the evidence of the Norma Jean rape, the State had little evidence to 
support the "propensity" aggravating circumstance. Specifically, other than the rape, the 
State relied on the following to support the propensity aggravator: 1) a 1991 conviction 
for Grand Theft (possession of stolen property); 2) a 1995 conviction for escape; 3) 
various acts of violence attributed to Mr. Hall through the testimony of former girlfriends 
and acquaintances, Evelyn Dunaway, Michelle Deen, and Rebecca McCusker. 
The grand theft conviction involved a guilty plea to possession of stolen property 
thirteen years before sentencing. (Tr., p.4919, Ls.19-20.) The property was a 1974 
station wagon. (Exhibit 66 (cover).) The crime, involving a co-defendant, did not involve 
any violence. The victim was not a person, but an entity, B.P. Auto Sales. The car was 
recovered with minimal damage. This evidence was far from compelling, was 
FINAL AMENDED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 91 
n-t-t"-" 
mishandled by trial counsel, and should never have been admitted. (See Exhibit 66, p.l 
("Victim's Statement"»; see infra, Claim 1.1. 
The escape occurred in 1994 when Erick left prison grounds without permission 
while working in the dairy of the South Idaho Correctional Institution, outside the walls 
of the Idaho State Penitentiary. (Tr., p.4920, Ls.18-22.) Erick claimed that he left 
because he had reason to believe his loved ones were in danger. He admitted his guilt. 
No one was injured. His conditions of confinement were not even close to the conditions 
he is facing in a maximum security institution. This evidence was far from compelling, 
was mishandled by trial counsel, and should never have been admitted. (See Exhibit 67); 
see also infra, Claim 1.2. 
The remaining evidence relied upon by the State was the testimony of Evelyn 
Dunaway, Michelle Deen, and Rebecca McCusker. This evidence varied in degrees of 
alleged violence, none of which rose to the level of rape or homicide. (Tr., pp.4839-4855; 
pp.4813-4839; pp.4856-4875.) This evidence was far from compelling, was mishandled 
by trial counsel, and should never have been admitted. See infra, Claim I.3. 
Because the other evidence in support of the "propensity" aggravator was so 
weak, it was vitally important for trial counsel to aggressively defend Mr. Hall against the 
previously-untested allegations of forcible rape and kidnapping. The wealth of favorable 
evidence available through a reasonable investigation is summarized in Chart A below, 
and consisted of evidence that undermined all aspects of the State's presentation of 
evidence in support of Norma Jean's allegations that Erick forcibly raped her - from 
evidence of Norma Jean's improper motive and bias to evidence undermining her 
credibility and competency to testify. Had trial counsel rendered effective ~sistance, not 
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only is there a reasonable probability that the jury would not have found the propensity 
aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt, but there is also a reasonable probability that the 
jury would not have found any of the aggravating factors, or at least found the 
aggravators did not outweigh the mitigation. See infra, Claim Q (noting that the failure to 
provide instructions on the use of the rape evidence undermines all the jury's findings). 
ChartA 
CLAIM: Trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to conduct 
a reasonable investigation of Norma Jean Oliver's allegations that Erick Hall 
kidnapped, violently raped, and threatened to murder her. 
FAVORABLE EVIDENCE WHICH WAS NOT SOURCE OF EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED TO THE JURy 
• Norma Jean suffers from Borderline Personality • Transcript of Norma Jean's 
Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Post-Traumatic 1992 grand jury testimony 
Stress Disorder located in the prosecutor's 
• Norma Jean suffered from these disorders at the file, requested and received in 
time of the rape (to be confirmed upon receipt post-conviction discovery 
of medical records) • Tape-recorded interview of 
• Norma Jean likely was not taking her Norma Jean by Sharon Callis, 
medication at the time of rape conducted during post-
• Norma Jean was not taking her medication at conviction proceedings 
the time she gave her testimony not because it • Anticipated medical, mental 
was not necessary but rather because she was health, and social security 
having trouble finding "good doctors" records for the Court's in 
camera reVIew 
• Norma Jean was a~ victim of child abuse at • Tape-recorded interview of 
home; the abuse included Norma Jean being Norma Jean by Detective 
thrown across the room; her injuries included Hess referenced in his written 
black eyes and could have accounted for the report, requested and received 
scratches and bruises observed by Detective in post-conviction discovery 
Hess and medical personnel • Anticipated medical, mental 
• Norma Jean apparently ran away from home health, and social security 
due to continuing abuse in December 1991 records (referenced above) 
• Norma Jean gave a false name and date of birth • Boise Department Police 
to law enforcement on November 18, 1990, Report, no.026815, dated 
during their investigation of a curfew violation 11119190, requested and 
received in post-conviction 
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discovery 
• Norma Jean testified that she does not drink; • Tape-recorded interviews of 
however, she told Detective Hess that she would Erick Hall and Norma Jean by 
drink on occasion and noted that she was drunk Detective Hess (referenced 
the first time she ever had sex; Joi Reno saw above) 
Norma Jean drunk on numerous occasions in • Detective Hess's police 
late 1991 report, dated 12/04/91, 
• Norma Jean testified that she went to sleep in a disclosed during the 
chair at Erick's trailer; however, she told underlying criminal case 
Detective Hess that she initially joined Erick in • Boise Police Department 
his bed Report, no.127-536, dated 
• Norma Jean was acting sexually promiscuous 12/02/91, requested and 
and otherwise inconsistent with the expected received in post-conviction 
behavior of a victim of violent rape within two discovery 
days of the alleged forcible rape • Boise Police Department 
• Norma Jean told Detective Hess that she had sex Report, no.127-686, dated 
twice before, the first time awhile ago when she 12/04/91, requested and 
was a little bit drunk and the second time more received in post-conviction 
recent; Norma Jean told Dr. Vickman that she discovery 
last had consensual sex twice in the previous • Presentence Report, State v. 
month on 11113191 and 11128/91 Hall, Ada County, case no. 
• Erick heard Norma Jean's name come over the M9108836IHCR18591 
police scanner indicating that she was in fact a • Tape-recorded interview of 
juvenile; Erick told Norma Jean to leave the Norma Jean conducted during 
trailer and then reported her to the police post-conviction proceedings 
• Wendy Levy saw Norma Jean go to the shower (referenced above) 
but did not notice any injuries or behavior • Affidavit of Wendy Levy, 
consistent with someone who had been raped obtained during post-
• Wendy Levy told Erick to have Norma Jean conviction proceedings 
leave the trailer because she was odd • Affidavit of Joi Reno, 
• Erick's report led to Norma Jean's arrest and obtained during post-
return home for prosecution conviction proceedings 
• Norma Jean told Detective Hess and the • Saint Alphonsus Emergency 
presentence investigator that Erick seemed to Room report by Dr. Lawrence 
snap out of it, stopped what he was doing, and Vickman, dated 12/04/91, 
apologized for his behavior disclosed during the 
• Norma Jean told the presentence investigator underlying criminal case 
that she felt sorry for Erick 
• Norma Jean (after escaping) returned to the 
trailer to get her clothes without regard for her 
safety 
• Norma Jean delayed reporting the rape to 
authorities until arrested for being a runaway at 
the Sands Motel (the second time she had been 
arrested in two days) 
• Norma Jean was placed in the care of 
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Intennountain Hospital and may never have 
been returned home or prosecuted for her 
offenses 
• Detective Hess gave false testimony regarding • Tape-recorded interview of 
the alleged discrepancies in Erick's statement Erick Hall by Detective Hess 
• Detective Hess gave false testimony regarding referenced in his written 
his alleged lack of knowledge of the nature and report, requested and received 
extent of Nonna Jean's problems at home in post-conviction discovery 
• Neither Detective Hess's report, nor the • Tape-recorded interview of 
photographs indicate that Nonna Jean had Nonna Jean by Detective 
broken blood vessels in either eye; the lack of Hess (referenced above) 
injuries to her eyes is corroborated by • Saint Alphonsus Emergency 
Dr. Vickman's report and inconsistent with Room report by Dr. Lawrence 
Nonna Jean's testimony Vickman (referenced above) 
• Erick faced up to life in prison based on Nonna • Idaho Code § 18-6104 
Jean's allegation but was sentenced by the • Court file: State v. Hall, Ada 
district court to a five year tenn with one year County, case nos. 
fixed; the judge gave a more lenient sentence M9108836IHCR18591 
then that recommended by Jay Rosenthal 
E. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate The State's Case In Aggravation: Evelyn Dunaway 
& Michelle Deen 
1. Trial Counsel Conducted An Inadequate Investigation Of Evelyn 
Dunaway 
Evelyn Dunaway is a fonner girlfriend of Erick Hall. In the course of 
investigating evidence to support the death penalty, the State interviewed Ms. Dunaway 
on multiple occasions and eventually called her as a witness at Erick's sentencing. 
(Exhibit 40, p.4.) Through her testimony, the State elicited aggravating (though 
irrelevant) testimony about specific instances in which she and Erick fought, and he 
allegedly choked her. (Tr., p.4846, Ls.7-9.) 
Trial counsel never conducted an interview of Ms. Dunaway. (Exhibit 40, p.4.) 
Ms. Dunaway was interviewed during these post-conviction proceedings. After 
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interviewing Ms. Dunaway, it is clear that the jury was presented with an incomplete 
picture of Erick Hall as an adult. 
In her affidavit, Ms. Dunaway explains how she met Erick and almost 
immediately moved in with him in September 2001. (Exhibit 40, p.2.) At that time, 
Ms. Dunaway was heavily addicted to methamphetamine. (Exhibit 40, pol.) Erick was 
not using drugs at that time. According to Ms. Dunaway: 
I was using about a gram of meth every day, injecting intravenously. 
Erick was not using at that time, and I was trying to quit. Erick was very 
caring with regard to talking to me, supporting me as I tried to stay off 
drugs, and even keeping my drug-using friends away from the trailer 
home. 
(Exhibit 40, p.2.) According to Evelyn, Erick eventually began using methamphetamine 
again. Then, in March 2002, an incident occurred which Evelyn described to the jury. 
Specifically, Ms. Dunaway described her breakup with Erick. (Tr., p.4844, L.21 -
p.4856, L.6 (describing how Erick pulled her through the window of her car, slammed 
her on her head and said he was going to kill her).) However, neither the State nor Mr. 
Hall's trial counsel elicited the full story. For instance, at the time of the incident, Erick 
was coming down from a high on methamphetamine, and was not thinking clearly: 
Erick and I broke up in March 2002. On the day of the break-up, I know 
that Erick was upset and coming down from a methamphetamine high. He 
was paranoid and yelled that I had betrayed him. 
(Exhibit 40, p.4.) In addition, Ms. Dunaway gave a written statement to the police 
regarding this incident which further explains the nature of Erick's paranoia. According 
to Ms. Dunaway in her report, Erick was angry with her because he believed she was 
using drugs. (Exhibit 68, p.l.) It is not clear whether Ms. Dunaway's written statement 
and her affidavit are completely consistent or not; however, it is clear that there was 
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much more to the story than the jury heard. Moreover, if trial counsel had interviewed 
Ms. Dunaway, then they would have known that she could have given additional 
testimony to refute the more aggravating version of the story told by Rebecca McCusker 
in her testimony. Ms. McCusker testified that Erick threatened to kill her when she came 
to the trailer that night. However, as Ms. Dunaway stated in her affidavit, "Erick never 
threatened to kill Rebecca, in contrast with her trial testimony." (Exhibit 40, pA.) 
Ms. Dunaway also testified about some of her sexual experiences with Erick. (Tr., 
pA847, Ls.2-16.) The State used isolated and incomplete stories about Erick's 
relationship with Evelyn to portray him as a sadistic hunter of women. This is a gross 
distortion of the truth, utilized by the State to obtain the death penalty; and trial counsel 
did nothing about it. Trial counsel should have given the jury the full range of Evelyn's 
experience with Erick, and the jury would have seen Erick (and his relationship with 
Evelyn) in an entirely different light. As stated in the ABA Guidelines, 
Family members and friends can provide vivid first-hand accounts of the 
poverty and abuse that characterize the lives of many capital defendants. 
These witnesses can also humanize the client by allowing the jury to see 
him in the context of his family, showing that they care about him, and 
providing examples of his capacity to behave in a caring, positive way .... 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11. Had trial counsel conducted a 
reasonable investigation, Ms. Dunaway could have given the following testimony: 
There was another family living in Erick's house at that time, and they had 
four or five children. One of their little boys, Wesley, became sick, and 
was coughing uncontrollably. I saw Erick sit Wesley up to ease his cough, 
and then Erick spoon fed him some medicine to make him feel better. I 
told Erick, "What are you doing? You're stealing my heart." Erick's 
behavior really made me take notice of him because of the compassion he 
showed Wesley. Erick [also] spent time with my children when we met at 
Pojos and would draw pictures for my son Billy, who was approximately 
eleven years old at the time. Billy still has the drawings, and is interested 
in art and drawing. On one occasion, Erick bought Billy a drawing book. 
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*** 
Erick [ ] had a lot of good qualities. He picked and brought flowers to me 
almost every day, which I really enjoyed. . .. Erick was genuinely nice 
and wanted to help people. .,. Erick did a number of really kind things 
such as allowing homeless people to stay with him in his trailer home, and 
fixing up bikes for people who had no transportation. On one occasion in 
2002, Erick talked with my friend Carrie Smith and me about repairing 
and giving bikes to all of the homeless people in Boise. 
*** 
I continue to hold on to a photograph of Erick and me together, and I like 
to think about the good times we shared together. 
*** 
I have feelings of care and concern for Erick and I do not want him to get 
the death penalty. 
(Exhibit 40, p.5.) 
In conclusion, the State used Evelyn Dunaway to prove the propensity aggravator 
and to otherwise put non-statutory aggravating evidence before the jury. As the State 
argued in closing, 
You know what he did to Lynn. You know what he did to Michelle. You 
know what he did to Evelyn. It's all pretty much the same, except he only 
killed once so far in that group. Now then does that mean that he has a 
propensity? Does he have an appetite that he likes to hurt women? Is he 
sadistic? Does he like to hunt them? 
(Tr., p.5507, Ls.14-20.) Had trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation, they 
could have rebutted aspects of Ms. Dunaway's aggravating testimony. Further, counsel 
could have elicited additional mitigating evidence. There is a reasonable probability that 
but for trial counsel's deficient performance, i.e., their failure to even interview 
Ms. Dunaway, the jury would not have found the propensity aggravating circumstance 
and would not have found that the aggravators outweighed the mitigation. 
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2. Trial Counsel Conducted An Inadequate Investigation Of Michelle 
Deen 
Michelle Deen testified against Mr. Hall at his sentencing. (Tr., pp.4813-39.) She 
testified that she had one prior felony conviction. Had trial counsel conducted an 
adequate investigation, they would have discovered that Ms. Deen has two prior felony 
convictions (only one of which was disclosed by the State). (Exhibit 70; Exhibit 71.) 
Both of Ms. Deen's prior felony convictions arose from drug use around the timeframe in 
which she testified about incidents with Erick Hall. The jury should have heard that 
Ms. Deen was using methamphetamine during the timeframe in which she testified about 
events. The use of methamphetamine clearly would have called into question Ms. Deen' s 
ability to accurately perceive events at the time and then to recall such events years later. 
In addition, had trial counsel conducted an adequate investigation, they would 
have discovered that Ms. Deen, on at least one prior occasion, had attempted to negotiate 
favorable treatment by turning State's evidence. Specifically, Mr. Hall has located a 
handwritten note among other court documents in Ms. Deen's court file which states: 
2-9 - narc. arrest made by patrol. D arrested at 18.4 g meth (+). D wanted 
to talk to police re: "deal." D said meth not hers & didn't want to go down 
on someone elses dope. D then failed to contact cops after they spoke. 2 
syringes found wi dope 
(Exhibit 69.) This appears to be a note reflecting the circumstances surrounding 
Ms. Deen's arrest on February 9, 2002, for multiple drug-related offenses, including 
felony possession of a controlled substance, State v. Michelle Deen, Ada County, case 
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no. H0200584.49 Trial counsel could have used this note to further undennine 
Ms. Deen's credibility. 
Finally, Mr. Hall has discovered in his post-conviction investigation of the case 
that that Ms. Deen underwent court-ordered substance abuse and psychological 
evaluations in the case of State v. Deen, Ada County, case no. H0301398. (Exhibit 71.) 
Trial counsel could have used this infonnation to further undennine Ms. Deen's 
credibility. 
F. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Failing To 
Adequately Investigate The State's Case In Aggravation: April Sebastian50 
April Sebastian testified against Mr. Hall at his sentencing. At the time of her 
testimony, she was actively represented by Mr. Hall's trial counsel, Amil Myshin, in her 
upcoming "rider" hearing in the case of State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County 
case no. H0400228. (Exhibit 72); see Claim G.1, infra. Mr. Hall asserts that trial 
counsel's investigation and subsequent cross-examination of April Sebastian was both 
deficient and prejudicial under Strickland, at a minimum when taken in light of the 
accumulation of prejudice due to counsel's errors at sentencing. During cross-
examination, trial counsel seemed more concerned with Ms. Sebastian's well being than 
with impeaching her testimony: 
Q. Tell him that. How were you making a living? 
49 Mr. Hall's post-conviction counsel interviewed Ms. Deen, who stated that she failed to 
follow through with a deal. She also said she had no recollection of the matter. In either 
event, the note shows that Ms. Deen is willing to cut deals in return for leniency, which 
could have been used to impeach her credibility on cross-examination. 
50 Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting the Court's in camera 
review of April Sebastian's presentence report and addendum to presentence report, and 
any attached documentation, in State v. April Sebastian, Ada County, case no. H0400228. 
See Order Regarding Discovery, p.8, filed 2116107. 
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A. I was stealing from stores, you know, ashamed of myself now, but, 
yeah, I stole from stores and re-sell stuff, sell it to people to make a 
living, pay my bills. 
Q. In fact, that's not an uncommon way for some folks to make a living? 
A. Huh-uh, it's not. 
Q. Stealing and either taking it back to stores or selling it to people, things 
like that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. But you're doing better now? 
A. Oh, yes. 
Q. In fact, I think you were telling me that you're working on your GED? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you're feeling pretty good about the future? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. 
A. Yes, new programs out. 
Q. You think you're benefiting from them? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. And I'm sure when you get out you're going to have a happy life? 
A. Yeah, a totally different life. 
Q. Good. Good for you, April. Thanks. 
A. Yes. 
(Tr., p.4895, L.6 - p.4896, L.9.) Amil Myshin was asked in his deposition about 
preexisting relationship and subsequent cross-examination of his client, April Sebastian.51 
Mr. Myshin could not recall whether a conflict caused him to hold any punches in his 
cross-examination of Ms. Sebastian. (Tr., 11116/06 deposition of Amil Myshin, p.386, 
Ls.6-22 (indicating a fondness for Ms. Sebastian); p.387, Ls.3-9 (failing to recall whether 
a conflict could have caused him to refrain from cross-examining Ms. Sebastian); p.423, 
L.5 - p.424, L.18 (acknowledging that it would be difficult to know if he were holding 
back during a cross-examination because he liked someone and stating that it would be 
difficult to conceal liking a witness, which "probably isn't a good thing.") Trial 
counsel's cross-examination of a critical witness who testified that Mr. Hall told her that 
51 Trial counsel's approach to Ms. Sebastian was no doubt influenced by his ongoing 
attorney-client relationship with her. See infra, Claim G. 
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he hits people over the head and takes their money, amounted to nothing more than a 
friendly "chat" with a friend, rather than the "crucible" of adversarial testing demanded 
by the Sixth Amendment. 
G. Trial Counsel Labored Under Multiple And Varied Conflicts Of Interests 
That Adversely Affected Their Performance 
1. Trial Counsel Actively Represented April Sebastian52 
April Sebastian testified against Mr. Hall at his sentencing. At the time of her 
testimony, she was actively represented by Mr. Hall's trial counsel, Amil Myshin, in her 
upcoming "rider" hearing in the case of State of Idaho v. April Sebastian, Ada County 
case no. H0400228. (Tr., pp. 4868-70; pp. 4875-96.) Mr. Myshin cross-examined Ms. 
Sebastian without ever receiving a waiver from her of confidential matters, including 
information learned through the attorney/client relationship or through Mr. Myshin's 
investigation and research on her behalf. Nor did Mr. Myshin seek a waiver from Mr. 
Hall. 
Following her testimony, Ms. Sebastian appeared for her "rider" hearing with her 
counsel, Amil Myshin (Exhibit 72.) The district court presiding over the case granted her 
probation with recommendation from the State. The extent to which Ms. Sebastian's 
cooperation with the State assisted her in getting probation is being investigated, and Mr. 
Hall is awaiting in camera review of Ms. Sebastian's PSI and related documents. 
Mr. Hall has reasonable grounds to believe that the State offered Ms. Sebastian 
benefits in exchange for her testimony against Mr. Hall. For instance, based on a review 
52 Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim as he is still awaiting the Court's in camera 
review of April Sebastian's presentence report and addendum to presentence report, and 
any attached documentation, in State v. April Sebastian, Ada County, case no. H0400228. 
See Order Regarding Discovery, p.8, filed 2/16/07. 
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of court documents, Ms. Sebastian was not a good candidate for probation, appearing to 
have failed on probation twice previously (Exhibit 73; Exhibit 74.) 
Even if the State did not offer any benefit to Ms. Sebastian in exchange for her 
testimony, trial counsel should have aggressively cross-examined her regarding her 
expectation of any benefits. Ms. Sebastian was well acquainted with the criminal court 
system. Instead of an aggressive cross-examination, however, Ms. Sebastian received 
kind, gentle questions - exactly the kind one would expect from one's own attorney. 
2. Trial Counsels' Caseload53 
It is common knowledge that public defenders carry heavy caseloads. See Bell v. 
Quintero, 125 S.Ct. 2240 (2005) (noting the "shuffle of a heavy caseload" carried by 
public defenders). The American Bar Association has described the problems associated 
with excessive case loads. 
One of the most significant impediments to the furnishing of quality 
defense services for the poor is the presence of excessive workloads .... 
All too often in defender organizations[,]... attorneys are asked to 
provide representation in too many cases .... Unfortunately, not even the 
most able and industrious lawyers can provide quality representation when 
their workloads are unmanageable. Excessive workloads, moreover, lead 
to attorney frustration, disillusionment by clients, and weakening of the 
adversary system. 
ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 6.1 (citations, footnotes, and quotations 
omitted). 
Mr. Hall is aware that one of his trial lawyers, D.C. Carr, left the Ada County 
Public Defender's Office. Mr. Hall asserts that heavy caseloads influenced Mr. Carr's 
decision to leave the office and enter private practice. (Tr. 9/13/06, deposition of D.C. 
Carr, p.24, Ls.11-24.) There were times during the underlying criminal proceedings that 
53 Mr. Hal cannot fully state this claim because his request for documentation of trial 
counsel's caseload was denied. Order Denying Discovery, pp.21, 22. 
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Mr. Carr was not present, presumably attending to his other cases.54 Further, one of the 
lead attorneys at the Ada County Public Defender's Office, August Cahill, has previously 
testified that an attorney's caseload in that office is not decreased if the attorney is 
assigned a capital case. Mr. Cahill also conceded that he was not familiar with the ABA 
Guidelines governing workload. (Exhibit 75 (Michael Jauhola v. State, Ada County case 
no. SPOT0100492D, (Tr., p. 4083, L. 22 - p. 4085, L. 14)); Exhibit 76 (State v. 
Abdullah, Ada County case no. H0201384 (R., pp.114-115 (Gus Cahill's motion stating 
that "Counsel for the Defendant currently has a complete felony case load in addition to 
the case at hand; R.pp.142-146 (Toryanskis' motion stating that, "The Public Defender's 
Office is currently operating under a high and record-setting caseload .... " Tr., Vol. I, 
p.27, Ls.11-16)).55) See a/so ABA Guidelines, Guidelines 6.1, 10.3, and accompanying 
Commentary. 
Mr. Hall asserts that heavy case loads led to the deprivation of the effective 
assistance of counsel and both the guilt and sentencing phases of his capital trial. 
H. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In Failing To 
Preclude The Testimony Of Nonna Jean Oliver 
1. Trial Counsel Failed To Preclude The Testimony Of Nonna Jean 
Oliver Due To Her Lack Of Competency To Testify 
Ms. Oliver was incompetent to testify. Ms. Oliver was "too distraught to even 
talk to" trial counsel, a fact brought out prior to her testimony. (Tr., pp.4755-4756) Ms. 
Oliver had been on medication but was not on medication at the time she testified, even 
though she admitted having a chemical imbalance. (Tr., p.4777, Ls.2-7, p.4783, Ls.l7-
54 (See e.g., Tr., p. 3682, L.24 - p. 3683, L.2.) 
55 Mr. Hall requests the Court take judicial notice of the portions of the Jauhola and 
Abdullah cases, submitted as Exhibits 75 and 76. 
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18.) On direct, Ms. Oliver could not recall critical events relating to the rape. (Tr., 
p.4760, L.I5 ("I only remember bits and pieces"); p.476I, L.IS ("I can't remember"); 
p.4762, Ls.4-5 (she met Mr. Hall at Mountain Billiards "I think, but I'm not sure"); 
p.4762, L.IS (she's "not quite sure" whether they sat around in the trailer at all); p.4763, 
LS.24-25 ("I closed my eyes - I don't' know [what happened]. I can't remember"); 
p.4764, L.12 ("I can't remember [if she couldn't talk because Mr. Hall was strangling 
her]. I don't think I could."); p.4764, L.14 ("I don't know [if I was scared]."); p.4765, 
L.3 ("I can't remember [what it was like when I woke up.]"); p.4765, L.21 ("I can't 
remember"); p.4766, L.3 ("I can't remember), L.6 ("I can't remember), L.9 ("I don't 
know. I'm sorry"), L.17 ("I'm not sure."); p.4768, L.1 ("I don't know."), L.1O ("I don't 
remember); p.4769, L.7 ("I can't remember"), L.13 (does "not really" remember getting 
up the next morning); p.4771, L.3 ("can't really remember" being arrested at the Sands 
Motel); p.4771, L.6 ("can't really remember" getting put into back seat of police car at 
Sands Motel); p.4771, L.9 ("doesn't know" if she wound up at the juvenile detention 
jail); p.4771 , L.21 ("can't remember" meeting with police officer at Intermountain 
Hospital because "it's a blur").) On cross-examination, Ms. Oliver explained that she 
was on SSI because she has a chemical imbalance and is unable to keep a job. (Tr., 
p.4780, Ls.6-18) 
In addition, on this record, the Court had an independent duty to inquire into 
Ms. Oliver's competency, and move to strike her testimony sua sponte. I.R.E. 602 
(witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a 
fmding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter); State v. Johnson, 92 Idaho 
533,447 P.2d 10 (1968) (holding where a witness said he remembered nothing about a 
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certain time period, he effectively declared himself incompetent to answer questions 
relating to that period); State v. (Patrick) Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255 (Ct. App. 
1986) (holding trial judge erred in allowing testimony of victim who expressed 
uncertainty as to whether his testimony was based on actual memories; corroboration by 
other testimony does not establish that the testimony by the witness is based on his own 
perception rather than on information acquired from others). 
Trial counsel was fully aware of her state of mind prior to Ms. Oliver taking the 








Okay. Who is your first witness? 
Norma Jean Oliver. 
And you have had the opportunity, Mr. Myshin, to 
prepare for this? 
Yeah. 
All right. 
I mean she was too distraught to even talk to. 
Okay. All right. And then the second witness 
tonight, sir was? 
(Tr., p.4755, L.21 - p.4756, L.3.) 
Trial counsel should have moved to exclude Ms. Oliver's testimony based on a 
lack of competence. Trial counsels' failure to object to or move to strike Ms. Oliver's 
testimony based on her incompetence was both deficient and prejudicial under Strickland. 
Trial counsel obviously heard the testimony of Ms. Oliver, yet failed to move to strike 
her testimony or preclude further testimony. A witness' laCK of recollection is grounds 
for exclusion of testimony. I.R.E. 602; see Claim D.3.a, supra, State v. Johnson, supra, 
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State v. (Patrick) Hall, supra. The admission of this testimony violated the Sixth 
Amendment, and because this was a capital sentencing proceeding, the admission of this 
testimony violated the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
I. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Adequately Litigate Factual And Legal Challenges To The Introduction 
Of Evidence Of Prior Criminal Acts By Erick Hall 
The State introduced Mr. Hall's prior convictions through the testimony of Dennis 
Dean. See Claim DA, supra. There were three judgments of conviction introduced: a 
grand theft by possession of stolen property conviction from 1991, the rape conviction 
stemming from the guilty plea to the statutory rape of Norma Jean in 1992,56 and an 
escape conviction from 1995. (Tr., pA919, Ls.3-20). In addition, prior bad acts involving 
Erick Hall's girlfriends were introduced. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
argue, on both legal and factual grounds, that the convictions and prior bad acts involving 
girlfriends should be excluded. The introduction of this testimony was highly prejudicial 
to Mr. Hall. The State specifically argued that they would establish propensity based on 
prior bad acts: 
At the conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, we'll argue to you firmly 
supports the aggravating circumstance that the defendant probably 
constitutes a continuing threat to society, not just because, if it wasn't 
enough that he killed Lynn Henneman, but because ofthe way he lived his 
life before, up to and including that time and afterwards. 
(Tr., pA742, Ls.17-23.) This argument specifically referred to the grand theft conviction, 
the escape conviction, and the prior bad acts regarding girlfriends. (Tr., pA733, L.2 -
pA742, L.23.) At the end of the sentencing phase, the State presented the same 
56 Trial counsel's failure to preclude Norma Jean Oliver's testimony is discussed 
elsewhere in the Petition. See Claims D and H. 
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arguments for propensity, and used a time line to discuss prior convictions and bad acts 
as the basis for that aggravator. (Exhibit 45; (Tr., p.5454, L.20 - p.5459, L.21).) 
1. Grand Theft Conviction 
Trial counsel failed to object to the introduction of the 1991 grand theft 
conviction. (See R, pp.372-374 (motion in limine); pA05 (motion to exclude).) Trial 
counsel should have argued that the grand theft conviction was inadmissible because it 
was irrelevant under I.RE. 401, its probative value was substantially outweighed by 
unfair prejudice and was excludable under I.RE. 403, and violated Mr. Hall's Fifth, 
Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial and to present a defense. See 
Claim J.2, infra. 
Trial counsel failed to argue that the facts surrounding the grand theft conviction 
were factually irrelevant to the capital sentencing. The grand theft conviction involved a 
guilty plea to possession of stolen property thirteen years before the sentencing trial in 
this case. The "official" version of the crime shows that someone other than Erick stole 
an automobile - Erick's crime was possession of the stolen vehicle. (Exhibit 66.) The 
"victim's" version of the crime shows minimal harm. The property was a 1974 station 
wagon, with an estimated value of $400. The crime did not involve any violence. The 
victim was not a person, but a business entity, B.P. Auto Sales. The car was recovered 
with minimal damage. The owner of B.P. Auto Sales, Mr. Kelley, said he didn't 
particularly care if he was reimbursed for the $60 it cost to repair the car, because it had 
already been sold. (Exhibit 66.) This evidence was completely irrelevant to Erick Hall's 
sentencing in this case, and should never have been admitted. 
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The introduction of the grand theft conviction was prejudicial. The State used the 
conviction in arguing the propensity aggravating factor to the jury. (Tr., p.4733, L.1-
p.4734, L.8 (arguing that what the jury was about to hear about Erick Hall, including the 
grand theft conviction, would convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
propensity aggravator); p.5455, Ls.7-17 (talking about propensity on a time line showing 
acts committed through Erick's adult life, including the grand theft, and arguing that 
mitigation involved events much farther in the past); (Exhibit 45). The admission of the 
grand theft conviction also violated the Eighth Amendment. See section 3.d, infra. 
2. Escape Conviction 
While trial counsel moved to preclude introduction of the escape conviction, the 
motion was superficial and inadequate. Trial counsel filed a "Motion In Limine" on 
September 8, 2004. (R., pp.372-374.) In that motion trial counsel moved to exclude the 
"1994 case involving escape" on the sole ground that "The crime of escape has no 
relevance here and details of it should be excluded." (R., p.372, 373.) Trial counsel cited 
no authority and offered no factual detail. Indeed, trial counsel did not even cite to the 
case number for the escape. At a motions hearing, trial counsel argued that the escape 
conviction was irrelevant, but did not cite any authority. (Tr., p.771, L.25 - p.772, L.5.) 
Trial counsel noted that the escape involved Mr. Hall walking away from a minimum 
security arrangement. 
As with the grand theft conviction, trial counsel should have argued that the 
escape conviction was inadmissible because it was irrelevant under LR.E. 401, its 
probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice and was excludable 
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under I.R.E. 403, and violated Mr. Hall's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights 
to a fair trial and to present a defense. See Claim J.2, infra. 
Trial counsel should have argued that any relevance to future escapes or 
dangerousness was superficial at best, i.e., that the facts of the 1994 escape were so 
dissimilar to any possible future circumstances to preclude its introduction. The escape 
occurred in 1994 when Erick left the dairy of the South Idaho Correctional Institution. 
(Exhibit 67.) Erick walked away from the dairy without permission. The dairy is located 
outside the walls of the Idaho State Penitentiary. (Exhibit 67.) Any argument that the 
facts of this "escape" were relevant to the propensity aggravating circumstance should 
have been easily rebutted by trial counsel by referencing the facts of the crime. 
The introduction of the escape conviction, like the grand theft conviction, was 
used to establish the propensity aggravating factor, and was therefore highly prejudicial. 
(Tr., p.4739, L.I4-p.4740, 1.5; 4742, Ls.17-23.) 
Furthermore, for the jury to hear that Mr. Hall had an escape conviction, when 
that jury was to decide between life imprisonment and the death penalty is beyond the 
pale given the factual circumstances of the escape conviction. Had the jury imposed a 
life sentence, there was no chance that Erick would be in circumstances similar to those 
surrounding the 1994 escape-i.e., able to just walk away from the institution-yet the 
jury was left with the possibility of Erick's future escape based upon his past "escape." 
Its introduction was therefore totally irrelevant and highly prejudicial. The admission of 
the escape conviction also violated the Eighth Amendment. See section 3.d, infra. 
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3. Prior Bad Acts Involving Girlfriends And Acquaintances 
On September 15, 2004, trial counsel filed a "Motion to Exclude" the testimony 
of "the various women that [Erick Hall] has lived with who knew him in 2001, 2002, and 
2003." (R., p.405.) The motion was one page, did not identify any of the women, and 
merely argued that the evidence should be excluded under I.R.E. 404 as the evidence was 
being offered to show the defendant acted in conformity with a character trait, which the 
State was arguing would be evidence for the propensity aggravator. (R., p.405.) Trial 
counsel cited no additional authority, and no legal or factual analysis. (See Tr., pp.771-
793 (arguing only that rules of evidence apply to State's case in aggravation, but not 
defense case in mitigation).) 
Evelyn Dunaway, Michelle Deen, and Rebecca McCusker testified for the State. 
This evidence varied in degrees of alleged violence, none of which rose to the level of 
rape or homicide. (Tr., pp.4839-4855; pp.4813-4839; pp.4856-4875.) This evidence 
should never have been admitted. See Claim D.4. Trial counsel should have argued, 
both factually and legally, that the evidence was irrelevant and highly prejudicial to Mr. 
Hall. Had trial counsel raised any number of the legal grounds available to exclude the 
evidence, then the evidence would never have been admitted. These grounds are 
discussed in tum. 
a. I.R.E.401 and 402 
The evidence was introduced was to establish the propensity aggravator. 
However, evidence of the prior acts was not relevant for purposes of establishing a 
propensity to commit murder, and therefore should not have been admitted. The fact 
that Mr. Hall had allegedly engaged in abusive conduct toward previous girlfriends, even 
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if true, does not make it more probable that he has a propensity to commit murder; 
therefore, evidence of the prior bad acts should have been excluded as irrelevant. See 
Claim J.l, infra. 
b. I.RE.403 
To the extent trial counsel failed to specifically cite I.RE. 403 in the motion to 
exclude, counsel rendered ineffective assistance. The purported relevance of the 
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See I.RE. 403. 
Here, there was an impermissible risk that the jury would "convict" Mr. Hall of the 
propensity aggravating circumstance (or simply as an evil person) and would use the 
evidence against him in the weighing process of all aggravators. See Claim 1.2, infra. 
c. Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right To Have All 
Elements Proven Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
It is a basic principle of due process that a criminal defendant's conviction must 
be based on a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of each element of 
the crime charged. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511, (1995). The Supreme 
Court has stated "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States 
the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense." Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 
263,265, (1989) citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Mr. Hall asserts that the 
failure to hold the State to the burden of proving the prior bad acts beyond a reasonable 
doubt violated his rights to due process oflaw. See Claim J.5. 
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d. Idaho Code § 19-2515, Due Process, And The Eighth 
Amendment 
To the extent the prior bad acts were not admissible to support or to establish any 
statutory aggravating circumstance, they were inadmissible for any reason. Mr. Hall 
asserts that in light of jury sentencing, the list of aggravating circumstances under Idaho 
Code § 19-2515 is exclusive. Thus, non-statutory aggravating circumstances are 
inadmissible under Idaho's statue, the introduction of which violates Mr. Hall's right to 
due process under the federal and state constitution. Further, their admission violates the 
Eighth Amendment since the jury was not instructed how they could be used. See Claim 
P, incorporated herein by reference; see Claim J.l O. 
e. Fifth, Eighth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right To 
Heightened Reliability In Capital Cases 
The Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment are implicated by virtue of 
the fact that heightened reliability in capital cases is required to insure that the death 
penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary manner. See Claim J .11, infra. The introduction of 
uncharged prior bad acts lacks the degree of reliability necessary in capital cases as 
required by due process and the Eighth Amendment. 
f. Fourteenth Amendment: Right To The Presumption Of 
Innocence 
Mr. Hall was entitled to the presumption of innocence in the penalty phase of his 
capital case on the uncharged prior bad acts. That presumption of innocence was violated 
when a jury, having found him guilty of capital murder, was charged with determining 
whether he committed prior bad acts for which he was never convicted. See Claim J.12, 
infra. 
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g. Trial Counsel's Failure To Rebut The Prior Bad Acts: The 
Sixth Amendment Right To The Effective Assistance Of 
Counsel 
Trial counsel should have been prepared to offer evidence rebutting the State's 
picture of Erick as abusive, as there was ample evidence of Erick's loving nature. Trial 
counsel's failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance. See Claim B.3.d (noting 
Erick's positive characteristics as an adult). 
J. Trial Counsel Rendered Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel By Failing To 
Raise And Adequately Preserve Legal Challenges To The Introduction Of 
Evidence Of Alleged Prior Criminal Acts By Erick Hall Against Norma 
Jean Oliver 
The duty to investigate prior misconduct encompasses a duty to make available 
legal challenges to prior convictions. ABA Guidelines, Commentary to Guideline 10.11 
("If the prosecution relies upon a prior conviction (as opposed to conduct), counsel 
should also determine whether it could be attacked as the product of an invalid guilty 
plea, as obtained when the client was unrepresented by counsel, as a violation of double 
jeopardy, or on some other basis" (footnotes omitted).) 
In this case, trial counsel filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence of the 1991 
rape case. (R., p.372.) The legal grounds for counsel's motion were that the evidence 
was irrelevant under LR.E. 404(b), and even if relevant, that the probative value was 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. A hearing was held during which counsel 
summarized the factual basis for their motion as follows: 
[T]his 1991 case was charged as a forcible rape. It was resolved as a 
statutory rape and, of course, there were -- there's a dispute in the evidence 
as to whether or not it was forcible or not. There probably is no dispute in 
the evidence that sex occurred and that Ms. Oliver was a minor at the time 
and Mr. Hall was an adult. He obviously went to prison for that case. The 
problem, of course, is as I've stated in my motion, is that the case is so old 
and so stale that it's going to be very difficult to rebut. 
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(Tr., p.765, Ls.9-19.) Trial counsel also noted that a potential witness was now deceased 
and that the presentence report generated in the case had been destroyed. (Tr., p.765, L.12 
- p.766, L.16.i7 Without conceding lack of relevance, the State focused its argument on 
the premise that the rape case, and other bad acts, reflect on Mr. Hall's character, the 
central focus of the sentencing hearing, and thus were admissible. (Tr., p.779, Ls.12-21 
("This is generally relevant about the defendant's character .... The rape is relevant. The 
escape is relevant. Beating up his girlfriends is relevant. Not working is relevant and 
everything else about him is relevant for the jury to decide the particularized sentence 
that fits him and fits society.").) 
The Court indicated that it would permit the evidence of the rape so long as the 
State gave trial counsel sufficient notice of the evidence they sought to elicit. (Tr., p.779, 
L.22 - p.781, L.18.) Accordingly, the Court denied the motion. 
At Mr. Hall's sentencing, the State used the evidence to argue the existence of the 
utter disregard aggravator and the propensity aggravator. In addition, the Sate presented 
the evidence as generally reflective of Mr. Hall's poor character, i.e., as nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstances. 
Had trial counsel raised any number of the legal grounds available to exclude the 
evidence, then the evidence would never have been admitted. These grounds are 
discussed in turn. 
57 See Exhibits 98 and 99, showing that the 1992 PSI was ordered released. However, 
purportedly, no one from the State could find the PSI until after Erick was sentenced to 
death. 
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1. I.R.E. 401 and 402 
The primary purpose for which the evidence was introduced was to establish the 
propensity aggravator.58 However, evidence of a prior rape is not relevant for purposes 
of establishing a propensity to commit murder, and therefore should not have been 
admitted. LR.E. 401 provides a definition of relevant evidence as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Additionally, I.R.E. 402 states that only relevant evidence is admissible; irrelevant 
evidence is therefore not admissible. The fact that Mr. Hall had previously been 
convicted of statutory rape does not make it more probable that he has a propensity to 
commit murder; therefore, evidence of the prior rape should have been excluded as 
irrelevant. Likewise, even if the evidence were to establish that Mr. Hall forcibly raped 
Nonna Jean, such evidence would still only show (arguably) a propensity to rape or even 
to commit violent acts, but not a propensity to murder. 59 
In State v. Dunlap,125 Idaho 530, 534, 873 P.2d 784, 788 (1993), the Idaho 
Supreme Court considered whether evidence of a pending murder charge was relevant to 
58 The State also used the evidence to support the utter disregarding aggravator. Mr. Hall 
asserts that the lack of relevance to that aggravator is clearly self-evident but reserves the 
opportunity to respond to any argument the State presents related to this issue. The use 
of the evidence as a non-statutory aggravating circumstance is discussed elsewhere. See 
infra, Claims P and llO. 
59 The Idaho Legislature chose to define the propensity statutory aggravating 
circumstance narrowly rather than broadly. Specifically, I.C. § 19-2515 (9)(h) provides 
this aggravator exists only where the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the 
defendant "by prior conduct ... has exhibited a propensity to commit murder .... " 
Idaho arguably could have, but chose not to, define the aggravator as one involving a 
propensity to commit violent acts. 
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prove that defendant had the propensity to commit murder. The defendant did not 
contest whether he committed the crime; instead, he only objected to such evidence on 
the basis that it was not relevant because he had not been convicted of the crime at the 
time of his sentencing hearing. Id. at 535, 873 P.2d at 789. In fact, the defendant agreed 
the district court could consider that he actually committed the crime if the court 
determined the evidence was admissible. Id. at 534 n.3, 873 P.2d at 788 n.3. The district 
court ruled that the evidence of the Ohio killing was admissible because it was both 
reliable and was otherwise admissible under the law. Id. at 535, 873 P.2d at 789. 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling. The court relied on 
its earlier decision in Creech, where it had defined propensity as "a proclivity, a 
susceptibility, and even an affinity toward committing the act of murder." State v. 
Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 371, 670 P.2d 463, 472 (1983). Applying this definition, the 
court found that Mr. Dunlap's pending homicide charge was relevant to whether he had a 
propensity to commit murder." Dunlap, 125 Idaho at 535, 873 P.2d at 789. The court 
further found that the introduction of the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, relying on 
its decision in Sivak v. State, 112 Idaho 197, 731 P.2d 192 (1986) where the court stated 
that a "sentencing judge is entitled to consider a wide range of relevant evidence when he 
evaluates what the appropriate sentence for each particular defendant he sentences must 
be." Sivak, 112 Idaho at 214, 731 P.2d at 209.60 
60 The Sivak court relied heavily on the law that at a capital sentencing hearing at that 
time, factfinding was the province of the district court. All these cases must be 
reconsidered in light of subsequent Supreme Court cases. Prior to Ring, for example, the 
Idaho Supreme Court relied on the presumption that judges, unlike juries, were capable 
of weeding through irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. See State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 
860, 877, 781 P.2d 197, 214 (1989) (recognizing that Idaho's "especially heinous, 
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In both in Dunlap and Creech, the defendants did not challenge whether they 
actually committed the homicides for which they had not yet been convicted, but simply 
alleged that such crimes were not relevant because they had not been convicted. See 
Dunlap, 125 Idaho at 535-536, 873 P .2d at 789-790. In contrast, the prior crime at issue 
in Mr. Hall's case was not a prior homicide, and there was certainly no concession of 
guilt to the crime since Mr. Hall only pled guilty to statutory rape, not forcible rape. In 
addition, at least in Dunlap, the court relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Michael Estess 
that Dunlap "has the propensity to commit murder in the future." ld. at 536, 873 P.2d at 
790. There was no such corroboration in Mr. Hall's case. Thus, under the narrowly 
defined statutory propensity aggravator, Mr. Hall's prior conviction of statutory rape, 
which was alleged to have been forcible but never tried as such, would not demonstrate a 
propensity to commit violence or murder and is therefore irrelevant and inadmissible. 
2. I.R.E. 403 
To the extent trial counsel failed to specifically cite I.R.E. 403 in their motion, 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. The purported relevance of the 
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See I.R.E. 403. 
I.R.E. 403 provides any evidence, even relevant evidence, should be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. State v. 
Rhoades, 119 Idaho 594, 603 (1991). Here, there was an impermissible risk that the jury 
would "convict" Mr. Hall of the propensity aggravating circumstance (or simply as an 
evil person) and would use the evidence against him in the weighing process of all 
atrocious or cruel" aggravating circumstance may be unconstitutional if relied upon in a 
jury sentencing). 
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aggravators. See Porous Media Corp. v. Pall Corp., 173 F.3d 1109,1117 (8th Cir.1999) 
(acknowledging the risk that prior bad acts "often invite the jury to base its decision upon 
sheer hostility toward a party or upon the impermissible inference that the party acted in 
conformity with its prior misdeeds,,).61 
3. Fifth, Sixth, And Fourteenth Amendment: Right To A Fair Trial 
And To Present A Defense 
Mr. Hall was deprived of his right to a fair trial when the State introduced 
evidence of a prior charged offense that allegedly occurred thirteen years prior to his 
capital sentencing proceeding. Trial counsel indicated that they were unprepared to 
defend the case due to a lack of investigative resources, the loss of witnesses, and the 
destruction of evidence. As the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, 
It is utterly repugnant to fairness and justice to accuse a person with the 
perpetration of a specific and definite crime, and then make that a pretext 
for trying him, without notice, for another alleged offense against which 
he is unprepared to defend, thereby producing a prejudice and bias against 
him in the minds of the jury. 
State v. Larsen, 42 Idaho 517, 518, 246 P. 313,314 (1926). In other words, to "comport 
with prevailing notions of fundamental fairness ... criminal defendants [must) be 
afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense." California v. 
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); see also Chambers v. MiSSissippi, 410 U.S. 284, 
294 (1973) ("[T]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the 
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations.") Mr. Hall did not 
have a full and fair opportunity to defend against the charge because of the passage of 
time, the lack of investigative resources, and the loss or destruction of evidence. 
61 Similarly, there is the danger that the jury, having convicted Mr. Hall of rape and 
capital murder, would not be able to afford him the presumption of innocence on the 
charge of forcible rape. See infra, section 1.12, incorporated herein by reference. 
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4. Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right To Know Consequences 
Of A Guilty Plea 
Due process requires that a guilty plea be knowing and voluntary. Boykin v. 
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969). The defendant must have "a full understanding 
of what the plea connotes and of its consequences." Id. at 243-244 (noting that a guilty 
plea waiver involves privilege against self-incrimination, right to trial by jury, and right 
to confront accusers). In 1992, Mr. Hall entered a guilty plea to the amended charge of 
statutory rape. He gave up significant constitutional rights by pleading guilty in 
exchange for the State's agreement to drop one count of forcible rape and amend the 
other to statutory rape. While Mr. Hall may have been informed of the consequences of 
pleading guilty to statutory rape, he properly presumed that the forcible rape charges had 
been finally adjudicated and that he would not be either tried or punished for such 
charges. Accordingly, to utilize the forcible rape charges to aggravate Mr. Hall's 
sentence from life to death violated due process. 
5. Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right To Have All Elements 
Proven Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
It is a basic principle of due process that a criminal defendant's conviction must 
be based on a jury fmding beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of each element of 
the crime charged. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511, (1995). The Supreme 
Court has stated "The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies States 
the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense. Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 
263,265, (1989) citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Mr. Hall asserts that the 
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failure to hold the State to the burden of proving the forcible rape beyond a reasonable 
doubt violated his rights to due process of law. 
6. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process: Right To Rely On The Plea 
Agreement 
By entering into a plea agreement with Mr. Hall, the State became constitutionally 
bound to its tenns. The disposition of criminal charges by agreement between the 
prosecutor and the accused has been universally recognized as an important component 
of our system of justice. State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 912, 693 P.2d 1112, 1115 
(1985) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971)). In Santobello, the 
Supreme Court established that plea bargains implicate due process. "[W]hen a plea 
bargain rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so 
that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled." ld. at 262. In this case, the State promised to finally adjudicate the charged 
offenses as a statutory rape. The State cannot now renege on its promise because it suits 
its purposes in seeking the death penalty. As the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, "a 
party to an agreement cannot refuse to adhere to the tenns of a bargain because it later 
discovers infonnation which may have caused it to enter a different bargain without 
suffering the consequences of a breach." Rutherford, 107 Idaho at 914, 693 P.2d at 1116 
(quoting Matter ofPalodichuk, 589 P.2d 269, 271 (Wash. App. 1978).) 
As eloquently stated by Justice Brandeis, "[O]ur government is the potent, the 
omnipresent, teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example." 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
Expounding on these words was the Florida Court of Appeals in State v. Davis, 188 
So.2d 24 (FI. App. 1966), where that court stated: 
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If the government breaks its word, it breeds contempt for integrity and 
good faith. It destroys the confidence of citizens in the operation of their 
government and invites them to disregard their obligations. That way lies 
anarchy. We deal here with a pledge of public faith -- a promise made by 
state officials -- and one that should not be lightly disregarded. 
Id. at 27. To allege that Mr. Hall forcibly raped Norma Jean Oliver constitutes a breach 
of that plea agreement. Trial counsel should have sought specific performance of the 
deal, i.e., the State could only allege that he had committed a statutory rape, or sought to 
set aside the conviction. 
7. Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right Against Double Jeopardy 
The State was precluded from arguing that Mr. Hall violently raped Norma Jean 
where they had previously reached a negotiated plea agreement for a conviction to non-
violent statutory rape. The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides 
that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb." The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy has been held to consist of 
three separate guarantees: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same 
offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense 
after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishment for the same offense. 
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969). 
When the government enters into a plea bargaining agreement and the court 
accepts the accused's guilty plea to a lesser offense, the prosecutor is precluded from 
changing its position to prosecute the defendant for the greater offense. See United States 
v. Sanchez, 609 F.2d 761, 762 (5th Cir.1980). The double jeopardy provision serves to 
"preserve finality of judgments in criminal prosecutions and to protect the defendant from 
prosecutorial overreaching." Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 795 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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In this case, the State was allowed to prosecute Mr. Hall for the same or greater 
offense of forcible rape to aggravate Mr. Hall's sentence from life to death. This second 
prosecution violated double jeopardy. 
8. Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right Against Double Jeopardy 
(The Doctrine Of Collateral Estoppel) 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits courts from 
convicting a defendant of multiple offenses, arising from the same set of facts, occasion, 
time, and place. This is known as the doctrine of collateral estoppel which has been 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court as a concept integrated into the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 
(1970). Collateral estoppel provides that "when an issue of ultimate fact has once been 
determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the 
same parties in any future lawsuit." Id. at 443. Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of an 
issue previously decided in a judicial or administrative proceeding if the party against 
whom the prior decision is asserted had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate that issue 
in an earlier case. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95 (1980) (citations omitted). 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been restated as follows: 
When there is an identity of the parties in subsequent actions, a party must 
establish four essential elements for a successful application of issue 
preclusion to the later action: (1) the issue sought to be precluded must be 
the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have been 
actually litigated; (3) the issue must have been determined by a valid and 
binding final judgment; and (4) the determination of the issue must have 
been essential to the judgment. 
Grella v. Salem Five Cent Savings Bank, 42 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1994). 
In this case, the State had a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the forcible rape 
charges in 1992, but sought the benefit of a plea agreement to avoid trial. The issue of 
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forcible rape was actually litigated, and at a minimum, detennined by a valid and binding 
final judgment, i.e., the plea agreement. Thus, application of collateral estoppel would 
have precluded the State from relitigating the facts of the forcible rape charges. 
9. Fifth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right Against Double Jeopardy 
(The Doctrine Of Res Judicata) 
The doctrine of res judicata, like collateral estoppel, "relieve[ s] parties of the cost 
and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve[ s] judicial resources, and, by preventing 
inconsistent decisions, encourage[ s] reliance on adjudication." Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 94 (1980). Idaho law follows a transactional approach to res judicata which bars 
the relitigation of not only matters that were litigated between parties in a preceding 
action, but also any matters that could have been litigated in that action. U.S. Bank Nat'l 
Ass'n v. Kuenzli, 134 Idaho 222, 226,999 P.2d 877,881 (2000). 
It is ''well established" in Idaho law that "in an action between the same 
parties upon the same claim or demand, the fonner adjudication concludes 
parties and privies not only as to every matter offered and received to 
sustain or defeat the claim but also every matter which might and should 
have been litigated in the first suit." Under the doctrine of res judicata, or 
claim preclusion, "a valid and final judgment rendered in an action 
extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions out of which the cause of action arose." 
Id. at 226,999 P.2d at 881 (citations omitted). 
Judicial economy and fairness are both considerations which mandate an end to 
litigation and "[a]fterthoughts or after discoveries however understandable and morally 
forgivable are generally not enough to create a right to litigate anew." Matter of Reilly v. 
Reid, 379 N.E.2d 172, 175 (N.Y. 1978). While the State did not realize in 1992 that 
thirteen years later it would help their case to litigate the forcible rape charges, it simply 
does not matter. Because the State had a prior opportunity to litigate the case, it would 
not be judicially efficient or fair to Mr. Hall to litigate it thirteen years later after the State 
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agreed to a plea agreement and the guilty plea to statutory rape was entered. Thus, 
application of res judicata would have precluded the State from relitigating the facts of 
the forcible rape charges. 
10. Idaho Code § 19-2515, Due Process, And The Eighth Amendment 
To the extent the forcible rape case was not admissible to support or to establish 
any statutory aggravating circumstance; it was inadmissible for any reason. Mr. Hall 
asserts that in light of jury sentencing, the list of aggravating circumstances under Idaho 
. 
Code § 19-2515, is exclusive. Thus, non-statutory aggravating circumstances are 
inadmissible under Idaho's statue, the introduction of which violates Mr. Hall's right to 
due process under the federal and state constitution. Further, their admission violates the 
Eighth Amendment since the jury was not instructed how they could be used. See Claim 
P, incorporated herein by reference; see Claim J.lO. 
11. Fifth, Eighth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right To Heightened 
Reliability In Capital Cases 
The Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment are implicated by virtue of 
the fact that heightened reliability in capital cases is required to insure that the death 
penalty is not imposed in an arbitrary manner. See e.g. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (explaining that the Eighth Amendment imposes a heightened 
standard "for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a 
specific case."); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-638 (1980) (recognizing that capital 
sentencing procedures are entitled to a heightened level of due process). In this case, due 
to the passage of time, the loss and destruction of evidence, and significantly, the 
difficulties that Norma Jean had with her own memory of the incident, the evidence 
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supporting the charges of forcible rape lack the degree of reliability necessary in capital 
cases as required by due process and the Eighth Amendment. See Claims H and J. 
12. Fourteenth Amendment: Right To The Presumption Of Innocence 
"The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a 
basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice." Estelle v. Williams, 
425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,363 (1970) (noting that 
the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt "plays a vital role in the American 
scheme of criminal procedure" in that it "provides concrete substance for the presumption 
of innocence."). The Supreme Court has recognized that the presumption of innocence 
applies to unrelated criminal conduct at capital sentencing. See Johnson v. Mississippi, 
486 U.S. 578, 585 (1988) (invalidating death sentence in which prior conviction that 
served as an aggravating factor was overturned by state court because "unless and until 
petitioner should be retried, he must be presumed innocent of that charge."). 
Accordingly, Mr. Hall was entitled to the presumption of innocence in the penalty 
phase of his capital case on the unrelated charge of forcible rape.62 That presumption of 
innocence was violated when a jury, having found him guilty of capital murder, was 
charged with determining whether he committed a rape for which he was never 
convicted. This is so because it is likely that the jury, given the nature of Norma Jean's 
allegations, allowed the proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the conviction of capital 
murder and rape to impact its consideration of whether the 1991 rape occurred as alleged 
62 While the presumption of innocence no longer applies "once the defendant has been 
afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for which he was charged," Mr. Hall was 
never convicted of forcible rape. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,399 (1993). 
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by Nonna Jean and the State. As a consequence, Mr. Hall's due process right to the 
presumption of innocence was violated. 
13. Sixth And Fourteenth Amendment: Right To A Fair Trial63 
Jay Rosenthal testified that the reason he settled the case was solely because of 
Nonna Jean's fragile condition, not because of any weaknesses in State's evidence, i.e., 
Nonna Jean's story. Trial counsel should have precluded Jay Rosenthal's testimony. 
The alleged reason for settling the case was not relevant and could not be rebutted by 
Mr. Hall, in violation of his right to due process and his rights to confrontation and fair 
rebuttal under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Further, the State effectively used 
Mr. Rosenthal, a fonner prosecutor and then current Idaho Deputy Attorney General, to 
bolster or vouch for Nonna Jean's testimony, a further violation of his Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment (due process) right to a fair trial. 
K. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct During Sentencing-Phase Closing 
Arguments 
1. Introduction 
In the quest to obtain the death penalty for Erick Hall, the State resorted to final 
arguments that were misleading, inflammatory, excessive, and prejudicial. Trial counsel 
failed to objection to any of the improper argument. See infra, Claim L., infra. 
2. Applicable Legal Standards 
"The desire for success should never induce [the prosecutor] to obtain a verdict by 
argument based upon anything except the evidence in the case and the conclusions 
63 This Court has limited Mr. Hall from developing a further factual basis for this claim 
by denying access to the State's files. See Order Regarding Discovery (requests for 
"prosecutor documents" regarding witnesses). 
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legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the same." State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 
253,268, 152 P. 1054, 1058 (1915). While counsel for the prosecution has traditionally 
been afforded latitude in closing argument, there are limits that, if exceeded, can 
constitute reversible error. See State v. Beebe, --- P.3d ----, 2007 WL 2377331 (Idaho 
App., 2007); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583, 587-588 (Ct. App. 2007).64 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recently discussed the range of prosecutorial 
argument prohibited by the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. See State v. 
Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 156 P.3d 583, 587-588 (Ct. App. 2007). Improper argument 
includes: expressions of personal opinions and beliefs about the credibility of a witness 
or the guilt of the accused; disparaging or inflammatory comments or descriptions of 
counsel, defendant, or a witness; misrepresentations or mischaracterizations of the 
evidence or law; undue emphasis on irrelevant facts or reference to facts not in evidence; 
comments (direct or indirect) on the defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent; 
and appeals to emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through inflammatory tactics. Id. 
at 85, 156 P.3d at 587. 
Where prosecutorial misconduct is shown, the test for harmless error is whether 
the appellate court can conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the result of the trial 
would not have been different absent the misconduct. State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 
64 In non-capital cases, where a prosecutor commits misconduct in closing argument 
without objection by trial counsel, a court will only consider the error if the defendant can 
demonstrate that the misconduct constitutes fundamental error. See State v. Lovelass, 133 
Idaho 160, 167, 983 P.2d 233, 240 (Ct. App. 1999). Fundamental error occurs if the 
prosecutor's summation is egregious or inflammatory such that any ensuing prejudice 
cannot be remedied by a curative jury instruction. Id. However, because this is a capital 
case, a capital defendant need not show fundamental error to obtain relief for otherwise 
unpreserved sentencing errors. See State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 411, 631 P.2d 187, 
193 (1981) (holding that sentencing errors will be considered even if no objection was 
entered by trial counsel). 
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523,37 P.3d 18,20 (Ct. App. 2001). However, in some circumstances, the Idaho Court 
of Appeals has suggested that, "if there is a pattern of repetitious misconduct by an 
individual prosecutor or a particular prosecutor's office," then reversal might be necessary 
despite a finding that the error was otherwise harmless. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 88, 156 
P.3d at 590 (citing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 
205-206 (1986». 
3. Analysis 
The prosecution committed misconduct during the sentencing-phase closing 
arguments. This claim is divided into the following ten subclaims: subclaim a addresses 
the misstatement of the definition of mitigation; subclaim b addresses the 
mischaracterization of the weighing process; subclaim c addresses disparaging and 
inflammatory comments about defense experts; subclaim d addresses misrepresentations 
of the evidence; subclaim e addresses argument inconsistent with evidence outside the 
record; subclaim f addresses arguments for the death penalty premised on deterrence and 
retribution; subclaim g addresses mischaracterization of the role of the jury as a link in 
the chain of law enforcement; subclaim h addresses personal opinions that the death 
penalty is the appropriate punishment; subclaim i addresses speculation of facts not in 
evidence that that lethal injection is painless and humane; and subclaim j addresses 
speculation about future conditions of confinement and the possibility of escape or 
commutation of sentence. Each of these subclaims independently establishes that the 
State committed reversible misconduct; however, the claims have a cumulative effect and 
should be considered in conjunction with one another. 
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a. The Prosecutor Impeded The Jury's Consideration Of 
Mitigation By Misstating The Definition Of Mitigation 
"[E]ach juror [must] be permitted to consider and give effect to mitigating 
evidence." McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 464 (1990) (relying on the principles 
stated in Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988». It is not enough "simply to allow the 
defendant to present mitigating evidence to the sentencer," rather there must not be any 
impediment, through evidentiary rules, jury instructions, or prosecutorial argument. 
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987), Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,326 (1989). 
The definition of mitigation for the jury's consideration and weighing is broad. 
See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,604 (1978) (plurality opinion) (defining mitigation as 
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death."); State v. 
Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 415, 631 P.2d 187, 197 (1981) ("We generally note that the 
concept of mitigation is broad" and includes circumstances "[ s ]uch as do not constitute a 
justification or excuse of the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may 
be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability.") (citation 
omitted). Applying this broad definition, the Supreme Court has recognized a capital 
defendant's difficult family history and emotional disturbance is valid mitigation. See 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982). Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized the relevance of a capital defendant's "background, his age, upbringing and 
environment or any other matter appropriate to a determination of the degree of 
culpability." Osborn, 102 Idaho at 415,631 P.2d at 197. Applying the "low threshold for 
relevance," the Supreme Court has specifically rejected the view that mitigating evidence 
is only relevant if it is causally connected to the crime. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 
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284 (2004); see also Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37, 45 (2004) (holding that a "nexus" 
requirement for purposes of establishing relevant mitigation is "a test we never 
countenanced and now have unequivocally rejected."). 
In this case, the State's closing argument impeded the jury's consideration of 
valid mitigating evidence by mischaracterizing the law. Specifically, the State argued 
that relevant mitigation is limited either to circumstances that remove the defendant's 
ability to choose not to engage in criminal conduct or to circumstances that are causally 
connected to the defendant's criminal conduct. These arguments impede a jury from 
giving meaningful consideration to mitigation by equating mitigation with first-phase 
defenses that would justify the crime (i.e., self-defense and defense of others), lower the 
degree of the crime (i.e., heat of passion), or completely negate the defendant's mens rea 
or another element of the crime. The State made the following arguments: 
The issue in this case that deals with the propensity factor, and that is the 
issue that makes mitigation relevant or not relevant, is the issue of choice 
to kill, right? That's what we're talking about here is the choice to kill. 
That's at the core of this thing, is the choice to kill or not to kill. Not 
whether he had a bad background, or not whether he would choose to 
marry the same person I would or that you would, or the choice to have 
the same kind of a home or not, or the same kind of a job or not. The core 
issue here is choice. And don't kid yourself that there's a difference 
between moral culpability and criminal responsibility. 
(Tr., p. 5491, Ls.3-17.) 
But the reason we didn't cross examine [Drs. Cunningham and Pettis] 
beyond the few relevant questions was because what they are saying is not 
relevant to the question at hand. That what they have to say about the 
defendant's background doesn't help you decide that mitigation, 
aggravation issue. Because the issue, as I see it, at rock bottom is the 
choice to kill or not to kill. And so if he had a bad background -- well, let 
me put it a different way. If the defendant could choose to kill or not to 
kill Lynn Henneman in September of 2000, then he is as responsible for 
his actions as we are responsible for our actions. And it doesn't matter 
what his background was like, whether it was a good background or bad 
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background if he could choose to kill or not to kill. If he couldn't choose 
to kill or not to kill, he couldn't make that choice, then similarly it doesn't 
matter what his background is. For instance if he was delusional, if he 
was hallucinating, if he was psychotic, if he thought that by pulling that 
thing tight around Lynn's neck he was really just wringing out the clothes 
from the washing machine, then he's not responsible because he can't 
make a choice, he's psychotic. And it doesn't matter whether he comes 
from a good background or bad background, does it -- I mean it's not like 
we hold people responsible for their actions if they're psychotic, if they 
come from good background but not from bad ones. It's not like we only 
prosecute people from the -- that have good families for murder when they 
make choices or we don't prosecute people from bad backgrounds for 
murder when they commit choices. That's why I didn't cross examine 
those doctors, besides asking them "Could the defendant make a choice? 
Did he know right from wrong? Did he understand the consequences? 
Did he have a mental illness? Was he delusional or psychotic or for some 
other reason couldn't make the mental connection that he had to make?" 
The doctors both said he could make choices. He knew right from wrong. 
He understood consequences. He's not psychotic. Now, if none of those 
things apply and the defendant could make a choice then he's responsible 
for the choice that he made the same as we are. We all come from a 
background that influences our choice. But don" get confused on choices 
how to live our life versus choices of kill or not to kill. The defendant's 
choices on how to live his life are influenced by his background the same 
as ours are, where to live, how to live, who to marry, what job to do, how 
to spend our day. But the choice to kill or not to kill is an entirely 
different thing and nothing you heard from these people tell you that the 
defendant doesn't know the difference between right and wrong, doesn't 
understand consequences, couldn't make the choice ... 
(Tr., p.5493, L.II - p.5495, L.17.) 
Counsel did it again today. He says that the doctors talked about head 
injury, and being hit on the head by his brothers and such. Did the 
Harvard medical doctor and a Ph.D. forensic psychologist give you one 
reason to think that the defendant has somehow been injured in his head 
by being hit on head when he was a kid? Did he say we gave the 
following psychological tests and they clearly show that the defendant 
can't understand consequences, cause and effect, the relation of A to B? 
No. Why didn't they? It's because they're not trying to help you find the 
truth here. They said, well, there's all kind of serotonin uptake inhibitors 
that do all this. Did the Harvard medical doctor tell you that he did a test 
on the defendant to show that the defendant needs a serotonin uptake 
inhibitor or that he was lacking in serotonin or anything else? He didn't. 
Why not? It's because he doesn't. There's not the cause and effect 
relationship that they want. 
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(Tr., p.5496, L. 21 -po S497, L.IS.) 
I say what these good men say is interesting background, but it doesn't 
help you with the core issue, which is could the defendant choose to kill 
Lynn Henneman in September or choose not to kill her? And you know 
that he can choose to kill her because he did. And you know that he could 
choose not to kill her because he chose not to kill her. He could have. 
That's what turns this mitigation into mitigation or not. This is the 
difference between mitigation and an abuse excuse. I didn't think about it, 
they thought of it. They said not abuse excuse. We want to tell you that 
right up front. The heck it isn't. That's just exactly what it is. This is a 
sympathy and I have sympathy for the defendant and I'll bet all of you do 
too if half the stuff that we heard about his childhood is true, then I have 
sympathy for him. But it's an excuse, because they cannot make the cause 
and effect relationship. 
(Tr., p.SS03, Ls.1-19.) 
We told you to begin with that the business here is the question of whether 
or not the aggravation outweighs the mitigation. And to understand that 
you have to understand whether it's really mitigation or not. And that's 
why I wanted to spend the time with you to help you understand that the 
defendant could make choices. Because if he can make a choice then the 
things you heard about his background is not mitigating. It's sad but it's 
not mitigating. And there's nothing about that that somehow indicates that 
he couldn't choose to kill. 
(Tr., p. 5504, L.16 - p. 5505, L.2.) 
The State's argument impeded the jury's ability to consider valid mitigation by 
informing them that mitigating circumstances (if even mitigation at all) are only relevant 
to the extent they are either linked to the defendant's criminal conduct or somehow 
prevented the defendant from making choices. Because of the State's misrepresentation 
of the law governing the consideration of, and the definition of, mitigating circumstances, 
the jury failed to consider relevant mitigating evidence when sentencing Mr. Hall to 
death. This Court cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the State's misconduct 
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did not contribute to the jury's verdict. Accordingly, Mr. Hall's death sentence must be 
vacated. 
Moreover, the individual prosecutors in this case, have engaged in "a pattern of 
repetitious misconduct" requiring reversal even if this Court deems the error harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Phillips, 144 Idaho at 88, 156 P.3d at 590 (recognizing 
that recurring prosecutorial misconduct may justify automatic reversal). Specifically, in 
2002, the same prosecutorial team in this case argued that the death penalty should be 
imposed on Darrell Payne. A theme throughout their argument was that circumstances 
constitute mitigation only if they prevent a defendant from making choices. The 
following is taken from the transcript of the State's rebuttal closing argument: 
And the second thing I'd like you to remember, Judge, is the word 
"choice". Because we are here today because of choices that Darrell 
Payne made. And no matter what else we talk about today or what weight 
you put on the things that the experts have testified to, it doesn't change 
the fact that the defendant made choices. And as a matter of fact, I was 
reading again this morning the testimony of Dr. Gummow when she 
testified at Pages 158 and 159. She had been talking about depression and 
- on a number of things and I asked her this: "And while I'm thinking 
about it, are you saying that he didn't have the ability to make a choice?" 
And she said, "About what?" And I said, "About what we're talking 
about." And she said, "About the murder?" And I said "yes." And she 
said, "The actual pulling of the trigger?" And I said, "Yes." And she said, 
"He probably did have the ability to make the choice to pull the trigger or 
not." And I said, "Did he have the choice to buy handcuffs or not?" And 
she said, "Certainly." And I asked, "Did he have a choice to get a gun and 
load it or not?" and She said, "Yes." And I said, "Okay. And he had the 
ability to make those choices?" And she said, "Yes." 
And so the other thing I'd like you to remember today, Judge, is that we 
are here because Darrell Payne made choices that he had the opportunity 
to make, which means that he could have chosen not to do the things that 
he did, and yet he did make those choices. He did buy those handcuffs, he 
did buy those gloves, he did get that gun, he did load the gun, he did put it 
to the back of her head and he did pull the trigger. And whatever else you 
want to believe about whether or not he ate pizza before he killed her or 
after, or whether he wrote the note before or after makes almost no 
difference. Because Darrell Payne made choices and he had the same 
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opportunity to make choices that you or I have and he chose to do what 
brings us to the courtroom. And so if you would remember those two 
things, Judge, what he did to Samantha and that he did it by choice I 
would appreciate it. 
*** 
And I don't think that this case is about revenge, Judge. I think it's about 
choices. The defendant chose to do the things that he did knowing what 
the potential consequences were. And that means that when he made the 
choice to do the act he chose the consequence. He can not now say 
through Counsel that he did not chose the consequence of pulling the 
trigger, the consequence to Samantha and the consequence to himself 
Because he knew what the laws were. He knew that the death penalty was 
a consequence for pulling that trigger. This isn't news to him. He didn't 
just fall into the United States of America from some foreign country 
where murder is legal. He knew what the consequences were. 
*** 
They're trying to find a way to keep him from looking responsible from 
making his own choices. That's what this is all about. He couldn't choose 
because he was compUlsive, disorganized, history of suicide, he's 
psychotic, Judge, he couldn't make his decision. Well, yeah, except that 
he only says that he heard voices sometimes and he was depressed. That's 
what that kind of comes down to. 
(Exhibit 77 (Tr., State v. Darrell Payne, Idaho Supreme Court, case no. 28589, p.4762, 
L.19 - p.4764, L.ll; p.4765, Ls.4-18; p.4795, Ls.12-20.).) 
In 2001, the same prosecutorial team argued that the death penalty should be 
imposed on Michael Jauhola, applying at least in part, the same formula. The following 
is taken from that argument: 
But only the defendant chose to kill. There is nothing about his 
background that indicates that he was taught to kill, or that his parents 
killed, or that they had him help kill. He has a troubled background, and 
to the extent that that's mitigating, it's not an explanation. 
*** 
Judge, in conclusion, I have to say that there's no justification for what the 
defendant did. There is no mitigation in what he did or how he did it. 
*** 
The defendant didn't have the right to do that. And I think that any lesser 
sentence than the death penalty will depreciate the seriousness of the 
offense and will send the wrong message. If there was ever a case where 
the death penalty was greater justification -- well, was more appropriately 
justified, there aren't many .... 
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(Exhibit 78 (Tr., State v. Jauhola, Idaho Supreme Court, case nos. 27490/31435, p.3147, 
Ls.18-23; p.3151, L.24 - p.3152, L.2; p.3153, L.16 - p.3153, L.24.).) 
In 1995, the same prosecutorial team argued that the death penalty should be 
imposed on Thomas Creech. The following is taken from that argument: 
I guess two other things bear speaking about, and once of them is that 
somehow Mr. Creech should be excused from his conduct of killing 
Mr. Jensen, that, as counsel said it, Mr. Jensen asked for it by pouring 
syrup on the floor. Now, I'll agree that there are certain kinds of actions 
that have been used to justify murder or homicide before. And, of course, 
one those is when you are threatened with great bodily harm or death, you 
can respond with deadly force. Or when you're defending somebody else 
from apparent great bodily harm or death, you can respond with deadly 
force. But that's not what were' talking about here. We're talking about a 
man who poured syrup on the floor, if he did, and then trying to justify 
that somehow that Jensen was asking for it, so to speak. And the facts 
belie that. There's no indication here of any kind that Mr. Creech or 
anybody else was threatened by Jensen. Jensen may have been obnoxious 
on the tier, but I suspect that a lot of people who are on that tier are pretty 
obnoxious because that's the kind of people that get there. It certainly 
didn't justify homicide in any respect. 
*** 
I guess it goes without saying that this defendant is responsible for his 
acts. And Dr. Brown said so on page 11 in his report where he says: 
"Finally, it should be completely clear that I am not suggesting that 
psychopaths are not responsible for their behavior." I mean we're trying 
to make a theory here that there's something maybe biologic about 
(illegible) and that's the most Dr. Brown can say is maybe there's some 
contribution genetically to a psychopath and then arguing to the court that 
the defendant has no choice, that is just false. It has nothing to do with the 
facts and it has nothing to do with what we now of human behaviors. 
(Exhibit 79 (Tr., State v. Thomas Creech, Ada County case no. 10252,3/27/95, case nos. 
**, p.414, L.6 -pAI5, L.6; pA16, Ls.12-25.).) 
Finally, in 1993, Roger Bourne (unclear whether assisted by Greg Bower) argued 
that the death penalty should be imposed on Robin Row. The following is taken from 
that argument: 
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In other words, Judge, it appears to me that when the defendant chooses 
to, she can be a productive citizen. Now, even though there is some 
mitigation in that I suppose, I think the real crux of that, Judge, is 
aggravation. That means that she can make a choice. And that in our case 
she chose to commit a crime of staggering proportions, whereas for years 
before she had conducted herself as a productive citizen. 
*** 
In either case it's crystal clear that the defendant does not fit the classic 
definition of alexithymic. Even if she did, it is not a mental illness. It's 
not a mental condition. It's only a description of the way people react to 
other people. That's all that it is. As a result, it cannot be said, it can't be 
argued that because she's alexithymic she kills. There is not connection 
between the two. One does not cause the other. And I know that it's 
popular and trendy to say a person who is same could not do this kind of a 
horrible crime. But we have to remember that we don't think like 
criminals think. I could not do that. I'm certain that the Court could not 
do that, but - could not kill as occurred here, but that does not mean that a 
person who can is necessarily insane. Rather, the psychological testing 
that Dr. Norman ignored indicates that she is sane. 
*** 
Now, in addition we know that alexithymic or not or sociopathic or not, 
she can conduct herself by the dictates of the law when she chooses to. 
She can hold down a job, she can keep up a tidy house, she can see that 
her children get to school, she can help other homeless people, she can do 
- she can make friends, she can go to birthday parties, she can do any of 
those things if she chooses to. In this case she chose to break the law. It's 
as simple as that. Now, - and not only did she choose to break the law, but 
she chose to break the law as part of an elaborate plan, a plan that involved 
literally weeks of planning. 
*** 
Those things show that she is able to plan and she is able to rationally 
think and able to put together a plan based upon one logical concept linked 
to another. And I suggest that that's not mitigating at all. That there is not 
mitigating substance in the defendant's psychological profile. If anything, 
it is as aggravating as it could be. If on the other hand the defendant had -
was unable to keep a job, lived under a bridge, couldn't take care of 
herself, then maybe the defendant could argue, well, I've go this 
psychological problem, and I - every time I walk in a store I steal and it's 
beyond my control. It's nothing like that. She controls herself and the 
people who are around her at her will. 
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(Exhibit 80 (Tr., State v. Robin Row, Ada County case no. 18945, 11112/93, p.4019, 
Ls.23 - p.4020, L.6; p.4024, L.16 - p.4025, L.8; p.4025, L.18 - p.4026, L.5; p.4026, L.17 
- p.4027, L.5.).)65 
In conclusion, when ruling on the forgoing claim of prosecutorial misconduct in 
closing argument, in addition to other misconduct noted below, Mr. Hall respectfully 
requests this Court to review Justice Blackmun's dissent in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 
U.S. 168 (1986), where he, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshal, and Stevens, quoting in 
part a Second Circuit dissent, stated: 
This court has several times used vigorous language in denouncing 
government counsel for such conduct as that of the [prosecutor] here. But, 
each time, it has said that, nevertheless, it would not reverse. Such an 
attitude of helpless piety is, I think, undesirable. It means actual 
condonation of counsel's alleged offense, coupled with verbal 
disapprobation. If we continue to do nothing practical to prevent such 
conduct, we should cease to disapprove it. For otherwise it will be as if we 
declared in effect, 'Government attorneys, without fear of reversal, may 
say just about what they please in addressing juries, for our rules on the 
subject are pretend-rules. If prosecutors win verdicts as a result of 
"disapproved" remarks, we will not deprive them of their victories; we 
will merely go through the form of expressing displeasure. The 
deprecatory words we use in our opinions on such occasions are purely 
ceremonial.' Government counsel, employing such tactics, are the kind 
who, eager to win victories, will gladly pay the small price of a ritualistic 
verbal spanking. The practice of this court--recalling the bitter tear shed by 
the Walrus as he ate the oysters--breeds a deplorably cynical attitude 
towards the jUdiciary (footnote omitted). 
[d., 477 U.S. at 205-206 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
b. The Prosecutor Diminished The Relative Weight Of The 
Mitigation By Mischaracterizing The Weighing Process 
While arguing their case for the death penalty, the State presented a PowerPoint 
slide that depicted the weighing of aggravating circumstances against mitigating 
65 Mr. Hall requests the Court take judicial notice of the transcripts of closing arguments 
in Payne, Jauhola, Creech, and Row, as submitted in Exhibits 77-80. 









circwnstances. The slide is that of a scale, likened to the scales of justice, with the term 
"mitigation" on one side weighed against all four aggravating circumstances the State 
sought to prove to the jury. The State presenting the following the jury by illustration 
and argument: 
(Exhibit 45.) 
The State's argwnent and illustration is a gross mischaracterization of the 
weighing process required under I.e. § 19-2515 (8)(a)(ii). Idaho's death penalty statute 
requires that all of the mitigation presented by the defense be weighed against each of the 
statutory aggravators it has found as proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989). The scale depicted by the prosecution 
66 The State's actual argument has been inserted into the slide for purposes of this 
petition. The actual slide, without the argument insert, is attached. (Exhibit 45.) 
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misstates the requirements under the law and constitutes gross, intentional misconduct.67 
This misconduct requires this Court to vacate Mr. Hall's death sentence. 
c. The Prosecutor Made Disparaging And Inflammatory 
Comments About The Defense Experts 
A defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense that includes the right 
to expert assistance. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70 (1985) ("[T]he Constitution 
requires that an indigent defendant have access to the psychiatric examination and 
assistance necessary to prepare an effective defense based on his mental condition.") The 
prosecution cannot attack a defendant for exercising his constitutional rights. 
In its closing argument, the State encouraged the jury to view Mr. Hall's experts 
as big-city, outsiders who were paid to give a performance without any real regard to the 
individual defendant. 
These men you heard from San Francisco and Dallas yesterday, experts. 
You heard a full day of it. Couple of things you don't want to forget. 
They're in the business of supplying criminal defendants with excuses. 
You heard hours about poor Erick. And yet the first time you heard that 
he can decide what he did, that he was accountable, that he wasn't 
schizophrenic, that he wasn't psychotic was when Mr. Bourne raised his 
hand and in the three or four questions he asked got that out of him and 
forgot that part. Most of what they told you doesn't have anything to do 
with this case. It just doesn't. The show you saw cost $100,000. 
$100,000. And did it tell you anything that you didn't already know about 
human nature? I don't think it did. And ask yourself a couple of things, 
67 From argument in another death penalty case, approximately three years earlier: 
THE COURT: And you would agree that you take each one of those 
aggravating factors separately and weigh them again the entire body of 
mitigating evidence? 
MR. BOURNE: Yes. And the Supreme Court rules are clear on that, that 
each statutory aggravator has to be weighed individually against the 
mitigation. 
(Tr., State v. Darrell Payne, Idaho Supreme Court, case no. 28589, p.4774, Ls.14-21.) 
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are they neutral observers of the evidence or are they hired to try to 
convince you to spare the defendant? Was that testimony you heard from 
the witness stand and from the podium or was it a performance? I suggest 
to you that that's what it was. It was a performance and it is done 
frequently enough by Dr. Cunningham that he is good at it. He could be 
preaching on Sunday. He has done -- does this 15 times a year and he's 
got it down. Coat yourself with the skepticism that protects you from that 
sort ofthing. 
(Tr., p.5460, L.25 - p.5462, L.2.) The prosecution crosses the line of permissible attacks 
on the impartiality of an expert witness, by suggesting that because the defense experts 
were paid hefty fees, their testimony would weigh heavily in favor of the defense. State v. 
Smith, 770 A.2d 255, 272 (N.J. 2001). "Experts are not the paid harlots of either side in a 
criminal case and should not be portrayed in such a light." State v. Schneider, 402 
N.W.2d 779, 788 (Minn. 1987). "Referring to a defense expert witness" as "that high 
falootin' expert" and to his testimony as an "infomercial" is improper. Butler v. State, 102 
P.3d 71, 85 (Nev. 2004). "[T]o attempt to establish a defendant's guilt by making 
unwarranted personal attacks on his attorney and the witness is not only unfair, but it 
impugns the integrity ofthe system as a whole. Such comments dangerously overshadow 
what a defendant's case is really about, and we presume that they prejudice a defendant." 
State v. Lundbom, 773 P.2d 11, 13 (Or. 1989). 
Here, the State impugned the integrity of Mr. Hall's experts by saying they are in 
the business of supplying excuses, their testimony was a performance, and the same 
performance is done frequently. This argument is a constitutionally improper personal 
attack on the character and credibility of Mr. Hall's expert witnesses and seeks to 
penalize him for exercising his Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due 
process, to present a defense, to counsel, and to fairness and reliability in death penalty 
cases. This misconduct requires this Court to vacate Mr. Hall's death sentence. 
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d. The Prosecutor Misrepresented The Evidence: Evelyn 
Dunaway & Michelle Deen 
The prosecutor gave a false and misleading argument by misstating the testimony 
of Michelle Deen and Evelyn Dunaway for the purpose of suggesting that Mr. Hall 
choked them during sex. 
So, as we talk, as you look at this record and we think and talk about 
propensity, let's talk for a moment about the defendant's prior conduct and 
his appetite. 
So has he exhibited by prior conduct or conduct in the commission of the 
murder at hand a propensity to commit murder which will probably 
constitute a continuing threat to society? I think you know the answer to 
this. Let's talk for a moment about the women you met, I guess it was last 
Saturday. Evelyn Dunaway, choked, beaten. Do you remember when she 
told you about how the defendant pulled her out through a window of the 
car and bit her in the face? She left that night. It became clear to her what 
- where this was leading. She left that night. Michelle Deen. Michelle 
Deen told you after she had been choked, beaten, sexually abused, that 
she snuck out at two o'clock in the morning with the clothes on her back 
to get away from the defendant. And you remember we didn't pick these 
people. The defendant picked them. 
(Tr., p.5456, L.16 - p.5458, LA (emphasis added).) In the State's rebuttal closing 
argument, the prosecutor argued: 
And the last one propensity. Has he shown a propensity to commit murder 
and probably constitute a continuing threat? Well, you've looked at the 
evidence. You know, do we start to see a pattern going on here? Well, 
what - you know what he did to Norma Jean. You know what he did to 
Lynn. You know what he did to Michelle. You know what he did to 
Evelyn. It's all pretty much the same, except he only killed once so far 
in that group. 
(Tr., p.5507, Ls.9-17(emphasis added).) 
Neither Ms. Deen nor Ms. Dunaway testified that Mr. Hall choked them while 
having sex. The State intentionally mischaracterized their testimony to draw a prejudicial 
parallel between Mr. Hall's prior behavior with women and the facts alleged in Ms. 
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Henneman's murder for the purpose of establishing the propensity aggravator and non-
statutory aggravating circumstances. 
e. The Prosecutor Presented Argument Inconsistent With 
Evidence Outside The Record 
The State had the opportunity to rebut the testimony of the defense experts during 
the penalty phase of the trial, yet they called no expert witness. Indeed, the State had its 
own professional witnesses, Dr. Michael Estess and Dr. Robert Engle, who they no doubt 
had to compensate to review Mr. Hall's experts' opinions as well as their testimony. Dr. 
Estess was even present in the courtroom to view the defense expert testimony at the 
sentencing. Nevertheless, the prosecution, after consultation during a recess, chose not to 
call either doctor as a witness, presumably because they could not rebut the defense 
experts' opinions. Accordingly, under such circumstances, it constitutes misconduct for 
the State to denigrate the character and opinions of Mr. Hall's experts when their own 
experts could not contradict them. 
Mr. Hall cannot fully state this claim as Dr. Estess has refused to cooperate with 
Mr. Hall's post-conviction investigation and because the Court denied Mr. Hall's motion 
for discovery of their files. See Order Regarding Discovery, p.l4, filed 2/16/07. 
f. The Prosecutor Argued That Imposition Of The Death 
Penalty For Mr. Hall Was Justified By General Deterrence 
And Retribution 
"[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual 
offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Woodson v. North 
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (l976) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court elaborated on 
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the principle of individualized sentencing in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) 
(plurality opinion), wherein the Court held that, to be fair, a capital sentencing scheme 
must treat each person convicted of a capital offense with that "degree of respect due the 
uniqueness of the individual." Id., at 605. The plurality concluded: 
The need for treating each defendant in a capital case with that degree of 
respect due the uniqueness of the individual is far more important than in 
noncapital cases. . . . The nonavailability of corrective or modifying 
mechanisms with respect to an executed capital sentence underscores the 
need for individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in 
imposing the death sentence. 
Id. In contrast, in non-capital cases, "the established practice of individualized sentences 
rests not on constitutional commands, but on public policy enacted into statutes." Id., at 
604-05. Accordingly, some courts have held in noncapital cases, a defendant's rights 
were not violated by consideration of general deterrence at sentencing. See e.g., United 
States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1009-10 (3rd Cir.1988). From an oft-quoted passage in 
Frank, 
the recognition of a substantive liberty interest in individualized treatment 
in sentencing would be inconsistent with the generally accepted notion 
that both retribution, which focuses on the interests of the victim rather 
than the status of the defendant, and general deterrence, which focuses 
on the interests of society at large rather than the status of the defendant, 
are appropriate societal versions for imposing sanctions. 
Id. at 1009-1010 (emphasis added). Conversely, because a capital defendant does have 
constitutional right to individualized sentencing treatment, consideration of general 
deterrence or retribution in determination of punishment is impermissible. 
Federal and state courts have condemned such argument on similar grounds. See 
Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635 (6th Cir. 2005) (condemning argument that voting for a life 
sentence would be tantamount to voting for a death sentence for some future victim); 
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Wilson v. Kemp, 777 F.2d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that the prosecutor's 
argument regarding deterrent effects and society's greater good swayed the focus of the 
jury away from the consideration of mitigating evidence in favor of evidence irrelevant to 
its consideration); People v. Love, 366 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1961) (holding that it was improper 
for the prosecution during closing argument to argue that the death penalty was a more 
effective deterrent than life imprisonment), overruled on other grounds by People v. 
Morse, 388 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1964); Comm. v. Baker, 511 A.2d 777, 788 (Pa. 1986) (noting 
that a jury might "wish to 'send a message' of extreme disapproval for the defendant's 
acts . . . although no sentencer had ever made a determination that death was the 
appropriate sentence."). Most recently, the Eighth Circuit held that general deterrence 
arguments are improper because they prevent individual determination of sentence and 
place too high of a burden on each defendant. In Weaver v. Bowersox, 438 F.3d 832 (8th 
Cir. 2006), the prosecutor had argued to the jury, "You people represent the entire 
community. You represent society. You have to give a message here .... The message 
has to be death for these types of people. That's the only message they are going to 
understand." Id at 836. The prosecutor further argued this case went beyond the 
defendant and if the jury did not impose the death penalty then there would be no 
deterrence. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals condemned the argument stating, 
"The argument that a signal must be sent from one case to affect other cases puts an 
improper burden on the defendant because it prevents an individual determination of 
the appropriateness of capital punishment." Id at 841. Additionally, the court held that 
"invoking a jury's general fear of crime to encourage the application of the death penalty 
in a particular case is unfairly inflammatory . .. Using the conscience of the community 
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as a guiding principle for punishment puts too significant of a burden on a single 
defendant." Id. 
Idaho courts have addressed deterrence arguments as well. In State v. Pratt, 125 
Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993), the district court had referenced deterrence in its 
findings when imposing the death penalty. The Idaho Supreme Court found that the 
district court's comments about deterrence were made after it had already properly made 
all the required [mdings for imposition of the death penalty. Therefore, the Court was 
able to determine with certainty that any consideration of deterrence did not affect the 
district court's findings. More recently, the Idaho court of appeals condemned closing 
arguments based on deterrence and retribution in State v. Beebe, _ P.3d _, _ Idaho _, 
2007 WL 2377331 (Ct. App., 2007). The Court of Appeals held that "Urgings, explicit 
or implied, for the jury to render a verdict based on factors other than the evidence 
admitted at trial and the law contained in the jury instructions have no place in closing 
arguments." Id. at 5. The court found the prosecutor's comments about concerns to 
protect the public and the rights of the victims were improper. Id. 
Here, during closing arguments, the prosecutor (Greg Bower) argued in part the 
following: 
A few last thoughts: If your verdict for death, saves just one person in the 
future, saves just one person in the future your sacrifice and your time will 
not have been in vain. 
*** 
For the last year and a half Mr. Bourne and I have done our job. And now 
it's time to end this and hand the baton to you. How many times have you 
sat? How many times have you sat at the breakfast table reading the 
newspaper and read about a horrible crime and said to your suppose [sic], 
"Why don't they do something about this? This is our town. Why don't 
they do something about this?" Well the reversal of that is, now you are 
they. You are they. There is in your hands. Trust each other. You've run a 
long path together. Trust each other. Remember last week to. Take your 
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common sense and your skepticism back into the jury room with you. 
Don't forget it. And finally the law is only as strong -- the law is only as 
strong as the weakest part on this jury which is heart. 
(Tr., p.5462, Ls.3-6; p.5462, L.24 - p.5463, L.15.)68 The State continued this line of 
argument in its rebuttal. Specifically, prosecutor Roger Bourne argued, "Is Lynn's life 
worth nothing? Is a loss (sic) worth nothing? Did we go through all this for nothing? 
What about retribution to her family? What about the protection of society? What about 
deterrence of others?" (Tr., p.551 0, L.22 - p.55l, L.2) 
It is highly likely that these arguments resonated with the jurors. Indeed, the 
prosecution primed the jury for this argument as early as voir dire. Numerous jurors 
testified in voir dire that they believed the death penalty generally deters crime. (Tr., 
p.2074, Ls.12-19; p.2093, L.14 -p.2095, L.14; p.2151, L. 9 - p.2153, L 20; p.2498, Ls.7-
15; p.2501, Ls.13-21; p.2503, L.16 - p.2504, L.1l; p.3029, L.l5 - p.3030, L.14).69 
Accordingly, the State cannot meet its burden of establishing that this error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, even if this Court finds that the error is harmless, 
reversal should be automatic as this argument is part of a pattern of repetitive misconduct 
68 This argument is particularly prejudicial as it appears to play off the community's fear 
and passion as described by the media coverage of this case. For instance, one 
newspaper article quoted a Boisean stating "We need to send the message to bad people: 
'Don't come to our town because there are consequences to pay. '" Police to rethink 
Greenbelt safety after attack, Idaho Statesman, Oct. 23, 2000, at 7 A. The prosecutor 
drew on this sentiment by stating, "How many times have you sat at the breakfast table 
reading the newspaper and read about a horrible crime and said to your suppose [sic), 
'Why don't they do something about this? This is our town. Why don't they do 
something about this?' Well the reversal ofthat is, now you are they. You are they." 
69 Testimony regarding deterrence from Juror No. 65 and Juror No. 62 was actually 
elicited by trial counsel. This fact does not change the claim but only shows that the 
State cannot show that the prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
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by the State in capital cases. For instance, three years ago, in the Payne case, the 
prosecutor Roger Bourne argued, 
But sometimes a person by his actions crosses a threshold. And when a 
person crosses that threshold they give up their right to live in society. 
They give up the right to live in any part of society because the thing that 
they have - they have done is so far beyond what society will stand for 
that society says we will not tolerate this kind of behavior at all. We 
won't put up with it. And society has a right to protect itself, and society 
has a right to send a message that that's enough, we've put up with all 
we're going to stand for. Society demands retribution for the life of this 
young woman. It has a duty to protect itself and to send out a message 
loud and clear to other people like Darrell Payne that we're not kidding. 
When you kill somebody under these circumstances you are facing the 
death penalty. 
(Exhibit 77 (Tr., State v. Darrell Payne, Idaho Supreme Court, case no. 28589, p.4767, 
Ls.6-22).) 
While Mr. Hall believes he has made a sufficient showing to vacate his death 
sentence, he does note that the Court's ruling that his investigative team cannot interview, 
or contact in any way, the jurors, significantly limits his ability to fully state this claim. 
g. The Prosecutor Mischaracterized The Role Of The Jury As 
A Link In The Chain Of Law Enforcement 
Arguments by prosecutors that mischaracterize or trivialize the role of a capital 
sentencing jury are improper. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 208, (1971) 
(explaining it is essential that jurors recognize "the truly awesome responsibility of 
decreeing death for a fellow human [so that they] will act with due regard for the 
consequences of their decision"). By mischaracterizing and trivializing the responsibility 
of the jury, prosecutors engage in reversible error. Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 834 
(9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). In Leavitt, an Idaho case, the Ninth Circuit 
specifically condemned the argument made by the prosecutor at a capital sentencing 
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